


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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Soviet Union**

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***SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES***

No 1, January-February 1988

# Soviet Union

## SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

No 1, January-February 1988

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## SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES

No 1, January-February 1988

**An Operational Survey of the Party Aktiv**  
*18060004a Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE*  
*ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian*  
*No 1, Jan-Feb 88 (signed to press 13 Jan 88) pp 3-6*

[Article by Viktor Nikolayevich Valtsev, first secretary of the Leninskiy CPSU Raykom of the city of Yaroslavl, and Boris Nikolayevich Kolodizh, sociologist and deputy chairman of the public opinion research council of the Leninskiy CPSU Raykom, whose articles "The Prestige of the Enterprise in the Public Opinion of Urban Inhabitants" (No 3, 1978), "How Does Production Rhythm Affect Labor Discipline?" (No 2, 1984), and "Orienting Ourselves to the Collective's Opinion" (No 2, 1985) have been published in our journal, under the rubric "In Anticipation of the 19th Party Conference: The Theory and Practice of Social Transformations"]

[Text] "Introduce regular study and consideration of public opinion into the practice of party and soviet organs... Subject the results to broad glasnost and always take them into account in management..."—From the CPSU Central Committee decree "On Glasnost in the Work of Party and Trade Union Organizations and Soviet Organs in Vladimir Oblast."

Enterprises which had switched to full cost accounting by 1 January of this year produce 60 percent of the industrial output. An altogether new situation has emerged in the country's economy. At the same time the process of democratization of all aspects of social life is building up. Along with the radical economic reform this creates new conditions for the activity of party committees. As was noted at the conference in the CPSU Central Committee in November of last year, "they must change their approaches and work style." Difficult questions arise here in all their magnitude: What should be rejected altogether? What particular steps should be taken so that the work of the party raykom apparat is adequate to the second stage of restructuring? How do the rayon's party aktiv and the raykom apparat associates themselves assess the results of their activity? It was not without hesitation that we decided on a very extraordinary step—as preparation for the regular plenum of the raykom to conduct a survey of the party aktiv to discover the answers to the questions indicated above and to certain other ones.

The results of the study are not of interest to the Leninskiy Rayon Party Organization of Yaroslavl alone; therefore we decided to introduce them to the readers of a specialized journal which has done a great deal to introduce sociological methods into the everyday practice of the party committees. The express questionnaire was anonymous. The fact that the respondents were essentially experts, which in this case the secretaries of the primary party organizations and their deputies

undoubtedly are, also insured the reliability of the results. One hundred and two people took part; 96 questionnaires were acceptable for processing.

The first question was stated in the following way: "Restructuring is underway in the country and in the party. It is difficult and complex, demanding sober and open evaluations. Relying on your personal experience and observations, please try to evaluate how energetic the party rayon committee apparat is in restructuring its own work."

The work of the secretaries, department chiefs, instructors, and the raykom apparat as a whole was to be evaluated on a five-point scale. As a result it was revealed that one out of two evaluates the work of the raykom apparat to restructure their own activity in the middle of the scale. Speaking in school language that is a "C." Approximately 1 out of 5 gave us a "D" or even an "F" and only 1 out of 10—a "B." Of the survey subjects 19.8 percent declined to answer the question at all. The failure to answer is in this case a very eloquent answer and confirms that the activity of the raykom cannot yet be given an unambiguous evaluation. Frankly speaking, the appropriate analogy here is to a person whom his associates cannot say anything bad or good about because they are not observing his actions.

The opinion of the party aktiv on the efficiency of the party raykom's impact on restructuring work in primary party organizations was even more instructive. Only 40.7 percent of those surveyed gave an average evaluation, only 5.2 percent—a high evaluation, and 28.5 percent—a low or even very low evaluation. The average was on the border between a "C" and a "D."

The answers to the questionnaire's alternative question—"What, in your opinion, should be developed and refined in the forms and methods of the work of the party raykom and what must be abandoned altogether?"—enabled us to determine what is successful in the raykom's work and what is not, and exactly where people must work harder and where primary attention should be focused. When the answers obtained are generalized as much as possible, they essentially come down to the need to persistently revive, develop, and refine the Leninist traditions of party interaction with the masses which make it possible to know people's sentiments and needs, to know everything. Essentially we are speaking of establishing the party raykom's direct link with the primary party organizations and the labor collectives on the basis of open and informal dealings with people directly in shops, production sections, and brigades. More than 70 percent of those surveyed indicated this problem as the most important one in the raykom's work.

Such a reaction by the respondents seems completely natural. Decades of stagnation, the absence of glasnost, and loose handling of the truth led to party workers beginning to fear direct contacts with people, and many



lost the talent for free and honest dialogue. While confident and overbearing in the quiet of their offices, they literally lost the ability to speak when meeting with workers in a real production environment. In conditions of democratization of society and glasnost, the ability to speak with people becomes a most important professional quality for a party worker of any rank. The ability to constantly keep your finger on the pulse of public opinion and look truth in the eye is a most important prerequisite for effective party work. Here are some concrete expressions of this problem in the most characteristic of the survey subjects' opinions:

"Democratization and glasnost in party work and in the organization of social life. Lively and honest conversations in lower organizations where the fate of restructuring is being decided. If that exists, then all the rest will exist as well."

"Raykom workers, especially secretaries, must regularly visit primary organizations, go to the people, and talk with them directly without intermediaries or special notification or making an event out of it. They must know people's opinions and sentiments as they really are."

"Instructors, department chiefs, and secretaries must not visit organizations as 'honored guests' at the presidiums of meetings and in the role of superficial commentators on the proceedings. They must thoroughly investigate the state of affairs in organizations, and not just in terms of information and report figures. They must constantly deal with people in the ordinary work environment and be able to strike up conversations and be an interested listener. But they must certainly leave a mark, at least decide something, at least help the people figure something out."

"What the raykom must be familiar with is not the secretaries of the primary organizations (although that is also necessary), but the collectives of the enterprises and organizations and their problems."

"It is not worth sending to meetings instructors who gather important questions when afterwards there is no reaction at all from the raykom. That makes all party work 'marking time.'"

"Party apparat workers must visit shops, construction sites, and schools and hospitals and ride urban transport more often in order to know the people's sentiments and needs. And they must demand and keep on demanding practical solutions to particular problems from economic managers, the rayispolkom, and other organizations. They must not be permitted to thwart restructuring with their empty talk."

"They must visit labor collectives and meet with workers at the machine rather than at meetings. They must learn political leadership and free interaction with people from M.S. Gorbachev."

The problem which is next in importance, as indicated by those surveyed, involves the need to refine theoretical and methodological training for party cadres, study progressive experience, and teach particular methods of work rather than general rules. Of those surveyed 57 percent indicated the pressing importance of doing that.

"There should not be quite so many general appeals," we read in one of the questionnaires, "and monotonous conferences and dressing-downs because of some long-faded slogan or unfulfilled order for a village, vegetable storage building, or construction project. There should be a little less excitement over an unswept street and unfulfilled assignments for subscriptions, admissions to the party, or formulation of the next plan of measures. There should be more serious seminars with secretaries of primary party organizations and more teaching of the forms and methods of living work with people and with cadres."

"The training of the party aktiv must be carried out with consideration of the specifics of different organizations," we read in another questionnaire. "It must be linked to the progressive experience of working with various population groups and the experience of individual work with people."

The survey subjects' other answers on directions of the activity of the rayon party committee are not statistically significant; that does not mean, however, that they can be overlooked. In this case the significance of a proposal can be determined by the experience, professional competency, and analytical potential of the secretary of the party organization who acts as an expert. Let us dwell on only one of those problems—the cadre problem. This is how that problem is formulated in one of the questionnaires: "What needs to be developed and refined in the party apparat's work is cadres. We must learn and teach how to choose cadres by their work and personal qualities. We must take into account science and people's opinions. We must not tolerate, as one often observes, that 'the new broom sweeps in the same old way, but does an even worse job.'"

The essence of the problem is captured here. In fact the system of choosing, evaluating, and promoting party cadres needs to be fundamentally improved. One might even say that this is one of the most neglected spheres of internal party work. Election, competition, and scientifically sound methods of choosing and evaluating cadres and forming a reserve are now more actively used in economic practice than in party work. Omissions of this sort must be corrected.

Now to the second part of our alternative question: "What should the party raykom abandon altogether?" First of all stop taking over activities of economic and other organizations, especially the rayispolkom. We are talking of the destructively bloated functions of the party raykom: the notorious assignments to the countryside and vegetable storage facilities to fix up the rayon and do



all the work at the place of residence, from participation in pressuring funds for enterprises of industry, transport, and trade to solemn ceremonies to even out the regional balance for commodity and output sales. All this diminishes the significance of the party committee's activity and makes it inconsistent, fragmentary, and superficial. In addition the habits of administration acquired as a result of fulfilling unnatural functions are transformed into the general style of work of the raykom in which administrative-bureaucratic methods can begin reproducing themselves on a broad scale.

During the survey the following picture was established: while one-third of those surveyed indicated the need to stop fulfilling functions that are unnatural for the party committee, two-thirds mentioned the need to stop constantly manifesting the formalistic-bureaucratic style of work—it should be abandoned altogether. This is how all this is given concrete expression in the most characteristic statements by respondents:

"The use of dictatorial methods, pressure, and giving of orders plus all the many inquiries and pointless conferences must be eliminated." "Eliminate the dictatorial attitude, statistics, and appeals to the raykom on every occasion. Grant independence." Abandon "working in spurts and countless conferences," "taking over the work of soviet and economic organs and arbitrary imposition of decisions in party work, overorganization and petty, excessive supervision," "unnecessary reports, assignments to the countryside, work on admissions to the party, subscription work, and others," "reports on paper and the office style of work, conferences which have the same uninteresting and useless subject matter," "forceful pressure on every single question," "formalism and fear of higher-ranking organs, obsession with reports and the desire to look good," "bureaucratic and administrative style of work, diversions to the countryside and vegetable storage facilities, and unnecessary paperwork," and "administrative abuse, working in spurts, and work just for show."

We cite the extensive list of opinions in order to show how passionately and unanimously the survey subjects reject the style of work in which they find themselves involved. In light of this, it should be borne in mind that the Leninskiy Party Raykom is no exception to the rule here. In this connection, it is relevant to refer to the opinion of V. Bukhonin, first secretary of the Sheksninskiy Party Raykom in Vologda Oblast, who is attending the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee, "I see an enormous shadow falling on the present party-administrative structure. I use the word 'present' with all responsibility. Because even though shaken by the decisions of the latest plenums, it is still firmly bureaucratic..." (YUNOST, No 10, 1987, p 35).

The general results of the survey enable us to speak of the following priority directions of the raykom's work in conditions of restructuring. First, a continually operating system of direct meetings and open dialogues between raykom workers, above all raykom secretaries, with the

workers in the primary party organizations and labor collectives must be set up in the very near future. This system can operate under the conditional name of "channel of direct ties" with a unified agenda: problems and difficulties of restructuring in your labor collective, in your work place, and in you personally. The raykom apparatus conference has examined the layout of the system for these meetings and the secretaries and department chiefs of the raykom have already begun to implement it. Secondly, the formalistic-bureaucratic style of work must be most decisively abandoned. Each step in the raykom's activity should be carefully considered and comprehensively "played through" for feasibility, level of positive effect, and negative consequences.

Both of the directions mentioned are interrelated and are the main links in the chain of measures for restructuring party work, the ones which one can grasp to pull the entire chain. The results of the express survey make no claim to an exhaustive picture of restructuring in party work on the level of the city raykom. It is rather merely a sounding of public opinion and a kind of probe of the opinions of experts. It must be supplemented with sociological research on the state of affairs in the rayon's labor collectives. We have done the research and now the processing of the data is underway. The practice of conducting systematic surveys of public opinion is exceptionally important to the activity of the party committee. Any system is a vital one if it is constructed on the principles of feedback.

#### **Restructuring and Sociological Science**

18060004b Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE

ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian

No 1, Jan-Feb 88 (signed to press 18 Jan 88) pp 7-16

[Article by Vilen Nikolayevich Ivanov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Sociological Research Institute, and regular contributor to our journal]

[Text] Knowledge of society in the stage of its restructuring, timely identification of the problems and contradictions that arise, the search for the optimal ways and methods of solving them, and reliable social prognosis—these are the urgent tasks of all Soviet social scientists, including sociologists. As M.S. Gorbachev noted, restructuring is not only eliminating the stagnation and conservatism of the previous period, correcting mistakes that were made, and overcoming outdated features of social organization and work methods, but "a comparatively lengthy process of revolutionary renewal of society which has its own logic and stages" [Source 1].

One of the essential aspects of the logic of restructuring is insuring the priority development of the social sphere and primary attention to social problems. Their timely and efficient solution will mark a social victory: creation of the necessary conditions for developing the socialist type of individual, universal and complete establishment

of socialist social justice and equality, further consolidation of the union of all social forces with the leading role of the working class, optimal combination of social differentiation and integration in Soviet society and consolidation of its sociopolitical unity, and development of socialist democracy and self-management.

Sociology has an important role in scientific support for the social victory of restructuring. Its scientific potential and the know-how in organizing and conducting sociological research accumulated in recent years makes it possible to develop a comprehensive social program which takes into account the objective needs of the revolutionary renewal of society and reveals new problems and trends of social development and new phenomena in different spheres of life and determines, as V.I. Lenin demanded, to what extent these new things fit communist ideas and how effective the means of supporting them are.

Today it is already obvious that restructuring is not a revision of the idea of socialism, but a decisive turn toward reality, a thorough grasp of the pressing needs of society as a developing organism, and elimination of the gap between socialist ideals and principles, on the one hand, and the state of society and the social behavior and reality of the earth's real people who make up the classes, nations, and labor collectives, on the other.

At the present time the greatest changes in social practice are taking place as a result of carrying out radical economic innovations: full cost accounting, self-financing, and self-recoupment. The agenda includes developing a uniform system for optimizing the operation of particular components of the economy (the association, the region, and the country as a whole) on the vertical and on the horizontal, carrying out a comprehensive program for refining the mechanism of socialist economic activity, reforming prices, and putting the Law on the State Enterprise (Association) into operation.

There is no doubt that we can count on increasing social activism and creating the necessary prerequisites for achieving a new qualitative condition of society only on the condition that restructuring in the economy leads directly to greater national prosperity.

Realization of the principle of social justice which affects the fundamental interests of all working people is related in public opinion to the current and upcoming economic reforms. It is completely natural that at the present time greater attention is being given to theoretical and practical questions of social justice. Taken on the strategic level, social justice acts as a most important program goal of communist construction and at the same time as an efficient means of accelerating social progress and the main source of the constructive energy of the masses and activation of the human factor. The interrelations of different communities (classes, groups, strata, and collectives) in regard to their social status and potential for

realizing their goals and satisfying their needs make up its content. In addition to that, justice is a social-moral category and the interpretation of it depends on many conditions and factors.

The principle of social justice is most fully embodied in the system of payment and stimulation of labor and in the availability of material and cultural blessings. As the June 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee noted, the main question in the theory and practice of socialism is how on a socialist basis to create stimuli to economic, scientific-technical, and social progress which are more powerful than those under capitalism and how to join planned management with the interests of the individual and the collective most effectively [Source 2]. The basic efforts of sociologists must also be concentrated on resolving this main question.

There is no doubt that the required stimuli will begin to "work" for restructuring if they embody socialist social justice and take into account and actively influence the formation of people's interests and needs to an adequate extent.

Notions of leveling-type distribution as socially just are very widespread in social consciousness. Moreover, such notions have received support in the practice of distribution. The principle "one apiece"—both to those who do a good job and to those who only pretend to work—has found supporters for a long time.

Consistently realizing the principle of payment in accordance with the quantity and quality of labor and its final results will lead to greater differentiation of the incomes of the population. In conditions of full cost accounting and self-financing those who work "to accumulate" will certainly feel this first in the wages they receive and in the lack of the corresponding privileges envisioned for those who work conscientiously. Deterioration of the material status of these workers will be socially justified and therefore just, although we cannot of course count on automatic approval of this type of measure.

Any stimuli—material, spiritual, and social—are related to satisfying fully defined needs. There is no doubt that the search for efficient stimuli should take into account the nature and dynamics of the needs and circumstances which promote or hinder their development. Stimuli must "work" to elevate needs, that is, to increase their diversity and change the structure in favor of needs which are more socially significant, spiritual, and the like.

In conditions of the revolutionary renewal of society, the question of the degree of development of the needs themselves and their judiciousness is very important. It has turned out that for a long time many people have been accustomed to doing a poor job and getting too little. The ability to be satisfied with a little has become a social custom. However, the underdevelopment of



material and spiritual needs (recent ones in particular), the meager quality of these needs, is now becoming an obstacle to the social and economic development of society.

Unfortunately, in addition to this, among some youth pseudoneeds and "prestige" forms of consumption are becoming widespread; they attest, on the one hand, to the status potential of certain groups and, on the other, to the one-sidedness and narrowness of the needs themselves, a tendency toward "acquisition of things for their own sake," and constant pursuit of superfashionable imported goods whose possession becomes a kind of means of self-affirmation of the individual.

We must also speak of a certain narrowness in our ideas about how reasonable the needs are. They are most often based on a normative approach. There are norms of diet, housing, services, and the like for the "average statistical consumer," figures made up by specialists without proper consideration of the dynamics of supply and demand (especially their qualitative aspect). How are these norms correlated with the real ideas of various groups of the population and with their real consumer behavior? It is obvious that they do not coincide. To what degree and for which groups—this question must be systematically studied in sociological surveys. This type of information may be useful not only in evaluating existing needs, but also in forecasting possible changes in their content and in means of satisfying them.

Analysis of the dynamics of the material well-being of the population based on data obtained during an all-Union study of the Soviet people's way of life shows: the needs of representatives of different strata of the population are converging faster than the material living conditions determined by the objective status of those strata of the population.<sup>1</sup> This appears in a trend toward diminished differences between the types of goods and services to which groups with varying levels of income are oriented and convergence of the consumer expectations of all categories of the population.

Of interest are the survey subjects' answers to the question of whether the payment for their labor seems fair enough to them and to what degree the wages stimulate their labor. 27.7 percent evaluated their labor payment as "somewhat less than fair," and approximately the same number (26 percent) noted that their labor payment gives insignificant incentive to work at full effort. 12 percent of the respondents evaluated their wages as "substantially less than fair," while 13.9 percent acknowledged that their wages did not provide any incentive to work at full effort at all.

However, a comparative analysis of the real earnings with the amount which people would like to receive showed that the desired "supplement" to the wage is no more than one-third of the present amount, and for 25-26 percent of those surveyed—even less.

In this way, a kind of "ceiling" on monetary expectations exists based on recognition of their own level of skills and labor contribution as compared to groups of workers which are close in terms of type of employment. Of course, this "ceiling" is also flexible, but it is very important to have information on the population's conceptions in this area in order to resolve the questions of fair stimulus of labor in the most optimal way.

Today the proposal is heard fairly often and persistently to construct a system of distribution of material goods so that everything that exceeds the minimum established and guaranteed for everyone is represented as supplemental payment, and not only to the state but also to private persons who are able to render essential services for additional compensation. Despite the seeming soundness of such a proposal, one cannot fail to see inevitable deformations in the process of its realization.

The first one which should be considered is who has money today? Is it always those who earned it by honest labor and because of circumstances were unable to spend it? I think that is by no means always the case. The second is who will the money for the supplemental blessing go to and what effect will that have on the general state of affairs in the social sphere? Will the prices of certain goods and services increase without a substantial increase in their quality? Won't a new group (or groups) of "super well-off people", a type of nouveau riche appear?

Obviously the danger exists of redistributing money among groups of the population in such a way that it will have no effect at all in terms of significantly improving the state of affairs. Of course, some of the citizens will be able to satisfy their needs. But that is not enough to solve the problem. Moreover, high wages outside the sphere of main activity may have a negative effect on the wages of the workers themselves. Will highly skilled specialists, for example, put all their efforts and knowledge into work in a state institution or merely be on its rolls and orient themselves primarily to individual labor activity or activity in the cooperative? In addition, the real danger arises of an outflow of cadres from state enterprises. And there is more. If the social norm (minimum) becomes the same for everyone, that is, if it is not initially differentiated (differentiation will seem to be a possibility when there is no shortage), will that not involve the same wage-leveling which we are fighting against? We must remember and speak of all this not in order to now reject what has already been planned, but to be well aware of the real difficulties in carrying those plans out. It is no secret that we have frequently strived at whatever cost to see and show only the positive aspects in the reforms and planned developments outlined without mentioning the negative preconditions and possible deviations and deformations.

The greater role of collective forms must be taken into account in searching for the most optimal forms and methods of incentive; for the principle of collective



incentive, where the entire labor collective (brigade, shop, and the like) is supposed to be materially stimulated for high results achieved, also corresponds to a greater degree to the socialist nature of labor based on the principles of collectivism. Of course, that does not presuppose wage-leveling. Material compensation can be differentiated using the coefficient of labor participation (and other means).

Such an approach will enable each laborer to be deeply aware of the direct dependence of personal success on the success of the entire collective. And in this case methods of distributing collective earnings become particularly important. The methods must be basically incontrovertible and fair and guarantee to protect the worker from any arbitrariness. (Unfortunately, indefinite criteria for figuring the coefficient of labor participation create such a possibility).

The particular production achievements of the collective should be taken into account in distributing and spending capital for measures to improve conditions of labor and leisure and for cultural-domestic needs. In keeping with the new system of awarding bonuses to workers, specialists, and white-collar workers introduced in January 1987, managers of enterprises have been granted the right to independently establish the statute on awarding bonuses for the primary results of economic activity; this provides ample room for having a real impact on the labor effort of all categories of workers. It is important only that the opinions of all members of the labor collectives are taken into account in the administration's decisions as much as possible.

In the process of organizing incentive, we must remember that to a person in the labor field it is not only highly productive and well-paid work which is important, but also the corresponding social evaluation of his participation in the general cause and a healthy moral-psychological climate. Despite the decisive role of the economy and material interests, we must not forget the simple truth that a man does not live by bread alone and that people's behavior and activity are determined by more than just economic circumstances. In our plans and estimates we must not approach man as an "economic" creature. We can hardly hope for major success without taking into account social and psychological factors, experience, and traditions (including national ones).

A certain one-sidedness is also very noticeable in the interpretation of social justice, which is viewed mostly in connection with the problems of distribution and redistribution with very little attention devoted to a most important question—fair placement of people in strict keeping with their practical, moral, and political characteristics.

Do we have such a mechanism today? In reality we are just beginning to set it up. And the main thing here is glasnost. Not secret negotiations and reliance on personal ties and the opinion of higher-ranking bosses, but

orientation to accountability to the collective which has elected you or agreed to your appointment and responsibility to the cause which you serve. Universal institution of such an approach will be very important in stimulating socially significant changes in the qualitative characteristics of all groups of the employed population and will at the same time be a form of social control which allows "natural selection" on a completely democratic basis. As our research confirms, the situation is changing slowly. Thus, the surveys of the workers of eight scientific production associations and five intersectoral scientific-technical complexes conducted in Moscow in November 1986 and January 1987 (1,200 people were surveyed in all) showed: in the opinion of 45 percent of the respondents, personal ties with the highest-ranking managers are of decisive importance for promotion to management posts and only 14 percent believe that the viewpoint of the labor collective and its party organization is taken into account in promotion to management posts.

The question of stimulating the role of social protection of people under socialism, that is, social guarantees against want, unemployment, and poverty, also needs to be theoretically interpreted. The existence of these guarantees is the greatest achievement of socialism. But they have become ordinary and been taken for granted, and perhaps this has resulted in a situation where, unfortunately, these guarantees do not operate as stimuli to conscientious labor. It appears that their impact can be manifested indirectly and only if they are correctly and completely acknowledged and valued. But a paradoxical situation arises here when both those who do a good job and those who do a bad job (or even shirk socially useful labor) enjoy social protection to an equal degree. In social consciousness, such a paradox is more and more often seen as something imperfect and unfair.

According to the data of the all-Union study of the way of life of Soviet people, 32.2 percent of those surveyed evaluate the existing system of material incentive as good, 40.7 percent—as satisfactory, and 17.5 percent—as poor; the corresponding figures for the system of moral incentives are 36.4 percent, 40.1 percent, and 15.1 percent, respectively. It is clear that there remains a great deal to be done to overcome and prevent the social passivity, indifference, and alienation which occurs in the vital activity of various groups of the population. The present incentive system must take more complete account of the features of the processes of socializing the individual in conditions of the present critical stage of restructuring and the formation of new motives, precepts, and values and envision the inevitability of a certain "psychological conservatism" which will make it more difficult to understand what is happening, and, accordingly, also envision the inevitable changes in the behavior and activity of individuals. The growing complexity of the whole group of factors which determine an individual's activity requires deep scientific knowledge. Without that it will be difficult to change the emphasis in the system of incentives in a timely manner.

The question of pension support needs to be specially analyzed, especially if we consider that the economic status of pensioners tends to deteriorate in connection with real growth in retail prices. But, regarding the problem of improving incentive, those authors should be supported who are of the opinion that the amount of the pensions should also be tied to the real labor contribution of each worker, since this will affect the level of social and economic efficiency of the use of production resources.

However, some approaches to solving the problem are by no means indisputable. In particular the concept of so-called deferred payments invites objection [Source 4]. Its main idea is that everyone works as long as possible without going on pension and then the pension will be correspondingly increased. Such an approach does not seem an optimal one if only because now any worker who has reached old age and gone on pension is free to choose work for himself in keeping with his strength and potential. But if going on pension is delayed using economic measures, it will complicate the natural replacement of cadres and the necessary rejuvenation, and in addition may promote an overload of work on conscientious people (age will have an effect) or imitation of "superactivity" among the rest.

In addition to the question of how to give incentive, the question also arises of to whom to give incentive. It would seem that the answer is obvious: those who deserve it through their labor. But after all, labor is not socially uniform and the role of different types of labor in social progress differs. A secondary worker engaged in manual labor and a designer of new machines and mechanisms do socially useful work, but the real significance of their activity to society is not the same.

It would seem that society wants to replace unskilled, monotonous, uncreative labor which requires no education or special training with mechanized machine labor. However, in practice the social unattractiveness and low prestige of this labor is materially compensated in a corresponding way, and that not only does not result in supplanting this labor, but helps conserve and preserve it. Ministries and departments have tried for a long time to expand their lists of work positions which enjoy the right to special privileges, considering this to be an effective method of recruiting and keeping workers.

The existing practice of evaluating the activity of enterprises also does not help reduce socially inefficient work positions; the workers themselves frequently prefer receiving special privileges to working in normal conditions and, as they say, are not straining to mechanize their labor and shift it "to the shoulders of machines."

Of course, particular groups of workers have played different roles in different stages of socialist construction. Some of them have become the social vanguard by carrying out decisive socioeconomic transformations and others have created the appropriate preconditions to do that.

In present conditions of the shift to the intensive type of management of the economy, the role of scientific-technical and design-engineer cadres, production organizers, and highly skilled workers is increasing. That must be taken into account in the strategy for stimulating labor and insuring preferential compensation (perhaps at the expense of other categories) for those groups who decisively determine the progress of restructuring and the rate of acceleration of socioeconomic development. On the whole this approach will help form and consolidate social forces interested in progressive changes and in the consistent realization of the reforms outlined.

In light of this, in conditions of a shortage of goods and services it is not at all sufficient to differentiate wages only and pay more to better workers. They must have real access to material blessings and commodity support of the ruble. We are not speaking, needless to say, about creating new types of closed stores. Everything must be done openly and publicly. But it must be done. Otherwise, those who are involved in trade and providing resources and services and those with certain sectorial affiliations, territorial priorities, and official positions will again prove to be in a more favorable position which is not at all in keeping with their labor contribution or benefit provided to society.

In addition to searching for socially just and efficient means of stimulating labor, the problem of effective rational employment of the population is a very important problem which is becoming more and more pressing. The question of the shortage of labor resources has been under serious study in our literature for a long time. However, more attentive and in-depth analysis shows that this shortage is most often an artificial one (or really exists only in certain regions). The following statistical data confirm this: about 540,000 people (86 percent of them—women) are not engaged in socially useful work in Uzbekistan. According to preliminary estimates, another approximately 200,000 people will be released as a result of improving the organization and payment of labor in the near future here. So that will be 740,000 people in one republic alone. In the Belorussian SSR 240,000 people do not participate in socially useful labor and in Chimkent Oblast in Kazakhstan—about 170,000. Other such examples could be given.

On the whole there is reason to assert that a qualitatively new situation has now taken shape in the sphere of social distribution of the work force. In addition to a substantial number of people not yet employed, we must also bear in mind the millions of people who will be released as a result of the introduction of mechanization and automation of production, wage reform, and other organizational-technical measures. Thus, according to estimates by the Scientific Research Economics Institute under USSR Gosplan, by the year 2000 the number of people employed in material production will decline by 16 million and agriculture will account for more than 10 million of them [Source 5]. All this greatly complicates the labor situation in the country. But in addition, such



measures will serve as a kind of additional stimulus for working people and incite them to value their work position and work time to a greater degree than before and be more concerned with constantly increasing their skills and receptivity to scientific-technical progress and its constantly growing demands. In light of this, all the country's workers should be certain that they will have jobs thanks to the system for training and retraining cadres (many new aspects of which are still to be created).

In connection with the intensification of social production, the attention of sociologists is being redirected to the qualitative sources of growth, above all to analyzing the entire complex of conditions and factors which determine people's behavior and labor activity. That means having a broader view of the problem and focusing efforts on identifying existing social reserves and qualitatively and quantitatively measuring and classifying them.

As the surveys of the workers of enterprises and organizations and students of daytime departments of VUZes and tekhnikums have shown, up to 20-30 percent of the respondents expressed a desire to do more work if favorable conditions were created.

In early 1987 less than one-third of the old-age pensioners who had been workers and white-collar workers were working [Source 6].

Normalizing the way of life of various sociodemographic and socioprofessional groups should be classified among the most important social problems. As is well known, radical measures have been taken in the last 2 years to activate the struggle against drunkenness and alcoholism. Administrative and economic measures have been the focus of those measures: reducing the production and sale of alcoholic beverages, increasing prices for wine and vodka, making all kinds of sanctions more severe (even criminal) for violations of the existing antialcohol laws and the established rules of trade. Although the measures taken have had positive results, they have not solved the problem as a whole. Moreover, alarming trends have been observed: the scale of homebrewing and speculation in alcohol has expanded and cases of toxic substance abuse and use of various substitutes have become more frequent.

In the years of stagnation, sociologists timidly resorted to studying the causes of negative social phenomena and processes, and that to a certain extent helped delay developing theoretical and methodological approaches to analyzing them. Now this work is being developed. Research devoted to the social problems of overcoming drunkenness and alcoholism has been praised by party organs. The results obtained were used not only when compiling scientific reports and information, but also for programs on Central Television and for preparing for the all-Union scientific-practical conference. The creative

alliance of subdivisions of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Sociological Research with Georgian sociologists, who have progressed a long way in the study of the reasons for such an extremely dangerous social illness as drug addiction, promises to be a fruitful one.

Of course, normalizing the way of life cannot be reduced to solving these problems. Raising the general physical culture of the population, making preventive and improvement work more efficient, and improving the activity of the health care organs as a whole are very important. It is remarkable that during the all-Union study already mentioned, most people mentioned improving health care and increasing medical services among the problems which must be solved first of all (in the city—55 percent and in the countryside—59.5 percent of those surveyed).

Sociological research conducted in recent years, including research on way of life, social indicators, problems of general and professional education, the use of collective forms of organizing and stimulating labor, and the struggle against social anomalies, has provided a wealth of information on our economic and social potential and on existing difficulties and unresolved problems. This information should help raise the sociological support of social policy to a qualitatively new level.

Comprehensive descriptions of the main social groups and indepth analysis of their needs and interests, substantiation of the variants for resolving problems which are arising, forecasting of the consequences of measures being taken, and guaranteed "feedback" between management organs and the masses are all mandatory conditions for a strong and realistic social policy. Unfortunately, sociologists' experience in this work is not great. We must create a serious scientific basis in the area of basic research and applied developments and forecasts. That demands that science intensify its efforts to the fullest and improve its organization and planning.

Social policy is realized in practice as a system of actions of corresponding institutions. In this connection sociology faces the task of developing social technologies. In recent years more and more attention has been devoted to these standardized methods of management. Progress in this direction involves the activity of the social development services offices. However, their work must be brought into line with new conditions and tasks of acceleration. In the situation of stagnation, where the residual principle of allocating resources to social programs operated while the organization of most labor collectives functioned with constant breakdowns, sociologists had a very weak effect on management practices and followed events, doing a bad job of predicting their nature and consequences.

Social forecasting and creating and realizing promising social models must be made the focus of all work today. Some experience in combining the efforts of representatives of some sciences has already been accumulated. I



am thinking of the development of the theme "Social Aspects of Planning of the Moscow Agglomeration." The temporary scientific collective set up on the base of the social forecasting sector of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Sociological Research has proven itself as a promising form of scientific cooperation. It prepared an organizational-activity game to develop a concept of Moscow's social development which was conducted under the aegis of Mossovet and united scientific and practical workers.

Increasing the role of sociology in solving social problems which have become pressing also involves improving the entire organization of sociologists' work. There is no doubt that the existing structure of sociological scientific research institutions is still not equal to the tasks which sociological science has been called upon to perform. This structure must be fundamentally changed both quantitatively and qualitatively. New sociological research centers and service offices are needed to study both socioeconomic and sociodemographic problems, and sociocultural problems and problems of spiritual life, among them the development of social consciousness and public opinion.

The definite improvement of all coordination work is no less important, if not more so. As the January 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee noted, "Such important questions as precisely coordinating Academy, VUZ, and sectorial science, integrating the efforts of the natural, technical, and social sciences, and making research comprehensive remain crucial and are in many respects unresolved" [Source 3]. The USSR Academy of Sciences has taken practical steps in this connection. It has been decided that USSR Academy of Sciences departments should be the leading scientific-methodological and organizational centers for coordination of scientific research; they will determine the main directions and authorize plans for coordinating the activities and monitoring their realization as well as bear responsibility for developing and coordinating basic scientific research conducted in the institutions of Academy, sectorial, and VUZ science. Councils to coordinate scientific activity are being set up at the departments and they will at the same time fulfill the functions of a section of the general Academy Council to Coordinate Scientific Research.

Priority themes will be the focus of the work of the coordinating councils. For the head scientific center in the area of sociology—the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Sociological Research—the theme is "The Social Sphere: Main Directions, Trends, and Indicators of Development." The concept of this research project was discussed at the report-election conference of the SSA [Soviet Sociological Association] in March 1987 and was continued at the coordinating conference held by the USSR Academy of Sciences Department of Philosophy and Law in Moscow in June of the same year. According to general opinion, the conference was useful.

Among other things, the conference mentioned the positive experience in coordinating research in the Baltic Region and in some other regions. Of course, we are now speaking not only of the necessary organizational and material-technical measures, but above all of shifting from an extensive path, involving for the most part developing sociology in breadth, to an intensive path, which is characterized by development in depth, that is, insuring qualitative changes in sociological research.

Resolving urgent social problems and forecasting possible social situations, contradictions, and conflicts demands that sociologists reinterpret previous experience and reject "social timidity" and theoretical developments which justify the status quo, universally affirm bold scientific pursuit and high professionalism, and treat various approaches and points of view on pressing practical and theoretical questions of social development in an attentive and involved way. The question of new sociological thinking able to actively promote restructuring and the cause of accelerating the country's socioeconomic development has been put on the agenda.

#### Footnote

1. The study was conducted in 1986-1987. More than 10,000 respondents representing the country's entire adult population were surveyed.

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### How To Become a Minister (Promotion of Management Cadres)

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ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian

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[Article by Irina Fedorovna Sokolova, candidate of philosophical sciences and senior scientific associate of the Academy of the National Economy under the USSR Council of Ministers, who is appearing in the journal for the first time, and Maksim Anatolyevich Manuilskiy, associate of the SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA editorial office and regular contributor to the journal]

[Text] Management cadres and methods and style of management are problem number one today. Performing the urgent tasks we face—beginning with restructuring of the economy and ending with universal affirmation of democracy—today depends on skillful organization of work and on who heads the cause in each particular section, how he does it, and whether he is able to lead people.

The problems which arise here are complicated by the fact that today managers of all ranks and the system of management have become the central target of criticism by public opinion, which brands bureaucratism as the main enemy of restructuring. Even if there is some emotional excess here, still this position has solid grounds. In mass consciousness trust in the figure of the boss has been fundamentally undermined by numerous cases of incompetency, personal indiscretion, violations of the law, and disdain of the rights of workers and inattention to their demands and needs. At the same time experience confirms that many people who proudly support restructuring nonetheless take a wait-and-see attitude—"Let the bosses restructure themselves first." But that is only half the trouble. The long-standing alienation of working people from real participation in making decisions that are vitally important to them has resulted in a lack of elementary management habits and, on a broader scale, a lack of political sophistication. Indignation at the incorrect actions or passivity of the leaders at times reaches the extreme. However, when it comes time to take real steps, not many people are in a hurry to take on themselves the boldness to act. The position that "the bosses have gotten themselves into the mess, now let them get themselves out of it" which is frequently encountered is not only a hindrance to restructuring, but a natural base for reviving bureaucratism.

All this makes extremely high demands on leaders and their personal and practical qualities. The main directions of the restructuring of cadre policy are defined in the decisions of the 27th Party Congress and the January 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee [Sources 2, 3]. Proceeding from the course drawn up, many theoretical and practical tasks must be performed. One of the central questions is the promotion of leaders. In this system the main principles of selecting and placing

cadres and the demands on the personality of the leader and the style and methods of his work are clearly revealed. One can unerringly judge the potential and level of economic leadership by who makes a career and how he does it.

At the same time, however, for a long time cadre questions have been a zone closed not only to broad public control but to science as well. Science has very little to tell the practical world today about managers, especially those of the highest link (these include main specialists, general directors of production associations, bosses of industrial enterprises, and leaders of ministries and departments and their deputies). Scientists encroach no further than the shop chief. And brigade leaders and foremen have been the main object of study of specialists

Let us try to open up this topic using materials from an empirical study. It is being conducted by the Academy of the National Economy under the USSR Council of Ministers (leaders—corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Scientists M.N. Rutkevich and Doctor of Philosophical Sciences G.V. Badeyev). Graduating classes of the academy for 7 years (1980-1986)—828 people in all—were the subject of the study. The basic results were obtained by analyzing documents (in particular personnel documents) and administering a written survey.<sup>1</sup> The data deal with the careers of those surveyed before they entered the academy. However, studies at the academy provide basic comprehensive training and open up broad possibilities for promotion. The overwhelming majority of the former students now occupy key posts in management of the economy, and essentially we will be talking about those people who will be at the helm of our economy in the near future.

### Management: The System and People

The system for selecting and promoting cadres is very sluggish. This is not a result of the fact that management is supposed to cement and give stability to the economy alone. Cadre work is built on the base of long-term political and ideological priorities, for it is a major channel of power and a means to support and strengthen the sociopolitical system. Taking what has been said into account, it makes sense to briefly examine the stages of the formation of the management cadres corps.

Three generations and three types of leaders may be discerned in our history. Their personal qualities and methods and style of work stemmed above all from the specific features of the development of the economy and the tasks being performed in the particular period of socialist construction [Source 4].

The first generation was formed in conditions of an acute class struggle. Professional revolutionaries and talented organizers from among the workers, peasants, and Red

Army members found themselves on a new, unaccustomed management-economic front. The style, content, forms, and methods of work took shape along with the formation and development of the system of planned management, the introduction of scientific organization of labor to the economy, and the establishment and development of socialist production relations. Unlimited devotion to the ideals of the revolution, unbending faith in a bright future, and readiness to apply all their efforts and give their lives for the sake of that future were characteristic of the best representatives of this generation. Since they had no opportunity for any substantial schooling, they were compelled to master the subtleties of management and special technical knowledge in practice in the shortest possible time. But still, above all these people were ideological champions of socialism and inspirations to the broad popular masses. The struggle to make socialist transformations in the economy irreversible was not only the main content of their activity, but a condition for creating Soviet industry as well.

The second generation of leaders took shape in the 1930's-1960's. During this period the sources for replenishing cadres and the means and methods of training and indoctrinating them were adapted to conform to the particular stage [Source 5, p 15]. In the 1930's-1940's, the main directions of work of the cadres, or as they were then called "the champions of fulfilling directives," were dictated by the need to speed up the rate of industrialization and give Soviet industry strong potential capable of surviving any ordeals given the aggravated international situation. The high rate at which production facilities were incorporated, old sectors of industry were technologically reconstructed, and new ones were created, a rate that presupposed unconditional fulfillment of orders from the center, demanded people of a particular mold—"commanders of production." Their main principle was "know the work to the last detail, know the work better than anyone, and do not trust spoken or written words" [Source 6, p 56]. The proteges of Sergo Ordzhonikidze—V.A. Malyshev, I.F. Tevosyan, A.P. Zavenyagin, V.V. Vakhrushev, I.A. Likhachev, A.F. Zasyadko, and A.Ye. Yefremov—and many others advanced by the party in the years of the prewar five-year plan periods made an important contribution to speeding up the victory over fascism and the postwar reconstruction [Source 7].

In summarizing the main results of the activities of the best representatives of the first generations of economic planners, we must not omit the customary phrase "in an unprecedentedly short time." But even if we do use it, we can hardly fully express and recognize the essence of the precedent which the history of world economics had never known before: in only two decades an industrially backward, agrarian, hungry country reached the level of the leading countries of Western Europe in terms of development of production. And, progress in the key sectors of industry reached a rate unprecedented in world practice. Behind all these successes were literate, competent, disciplined organizers who knew how to

unite people and orient them to unfailingly achieve the goals set. In order to fully evaluate the significance of their titanic efforts, we must remember that the country had minimal material and technical resources and the living conditions of the population were very difficult. Obeying an internal imperative and the strict laws of the Administrative System, these people went where their experience, knowledge, and efforts were most needed. The engineer-organizer of production became the main figure and scientific-technical achievements—the main goal of the development of the economy.

The extreme war and postwar conditions had a fundamental effect on management practice. To replace leaders who thoroughly knew the state of affairs in production and had examined every detail of its organization and operation, people whose unusual strong will and other qualities gave them the moral right to make strict demands on each person and, above all, on themselves came economic planners who acquired their habits of leadership mainly in a war environment. Their excessive command style and inability to persistently and consistently work with people led to a situation where authoritarian-pressure methods predominated in the system of management. A substantial number of the management cadres stopped taking the expectations and opinions of labor collectives into account.

Starting in the 1950's, the party and the government took measures focused on updating and improving the qualitative make-up of the managers and the organization of cadre work in the economy [Source 5, pp 16-17]. However, these steps proved to be half-hearted and inconsistent, and that could not fail to affect the make-up of the third generation of managers. They joined the economy in the second half of the 1960's, and most of them to this day occupy command posts. The transition to scientific-industrial production, broad introduction of the achievements of technical progress, and economic reform in the economy are related to the activities of this type of managers. However, stagnant phenomena struck the management sphere to a very great extent, for it is there that objective trends are translated into the language of real life. It was in this sphere that the contradictions between the Administrative System and the needs of the economy appeared most sharply.

### Qualifications and Promotion

What are the social characteristics of the present commanders of production? The overwhelming majority of them, unlike their predecessors, have higher education—primarily technical. Only 12.5 percent of those surveyed graduated from VUZes in the humanities (of them 11 percent—from economics departments). 47 percent are rural natives and 53 percent come from urban families; among them 13 percent were born in capital cities. If we speak of social origins, all the main social groups are represented equally in the selection: workers, kolkhoz



members, white-collar workers (nonspecialists), and specialists. 43 percent participated in the work of elected party organs and 47 percent—in the work of soviet organs, and the rest worked in a trade union or the Komsomol.

So, most of the leaders are specialists with diplomas. However, the quality of their special training remains a problem. And not merely because 22 percent graduated

from evening or correspondence departments of VUZes. Today knowledge must be continually updated for successful work. Self-education is not sufficient here, and systematic studies are needed. However, one out of five of the respondents have never raised their qualifications while they have been at the post. On the average the survey subjects went to appropriate courses (target courses with leave or without leave from production, studies at advanced study institutions, and the like) once or twice in 15-20 years (see Table 1).

Table 1. Advanced Studies Courses Taken by Economic Managers, % of respondents in groups

Groups by Position*	None	Advanced Study Courses Taken			
		1	2	3	4-5
Deputy Minister**	50.0	—	—	—	50.0
General Director	53.9	15.4	7.7	15.4	7.6
Deputy General Director	6.7	46.7	26.7	13.3	6.6
Director of Enterprise	10.0	15.0	35.0	25.0	15.0
Chief Specialist (engineer, technologist, economist, and so on)	19.1	14.3	33.3	19.0	14.3
Chief of Main Administration	18.5	29.6	29.5	22.4	—
Ministry Worker	14.3	28.6	42.9	7.1	7.1
Party Committee Secretary**	—	—	—	—	100.0
Management Worker of General Economic Organs	27.3	27.3	36.4	—	9.0
Average for the Sample	20.0	24.0	29.6	16.0	10.4

\*Here and in what follows we are speaking of the respondent's positions when they entered the academy.

\*\*The sample is not representative.

Things look relatively good in the metallurgical and chemical industries (an average indicator of 2.5) and in machine-building (2.17); the worst situation is in trade, public catering, the domestic services system, and the housing and municipal services system, as well as in construction (1.36). It is virtually only in metallurgy and chemistry that every manager has raised his qualifications at least once.

To go on. There are fundamental shortcomings in the system of retraining itself. The gross-numbers approach, where the number of people who have gone through instruction acts as the main indicator, prevails in the activity of target courses and sectorial institutes. The

selection of candidates by cadres services offices is spontaneous in many respects. Finally, economic managers are simply not interested in raising their qualifications. The real prospects of advancement do not depend on that in practice. The material and moral incentives are also minimal. But the main thing is that in recent years demands on professional training and the competency of the economic planners have clearly declined. The results of the study also confirm what has been said. Comparing the number of vertical movements of the survey subjects and the number of advanced study courses taken confirms the absolute autonomy of these processes (see Table 2). Moreover, it was revealed that the importance of the latter indicator decreases the higher the job level.

Table 2. Dynamics of Advancement and Professional Growth of Economic Managers

Groups by Position	Of Promotions	Average Number:	
		Of Advanced Studies Courses Taken	Of Years in the Given Position
Deputy Minister, State Committee Chairman*	5.5	2.0	3.5
General Director of Association	6.1	1.2	3.2
Director of Enterprise	6.2	2.3	3.0
Chief Specialist (engineer, technologist, economist, and so on)	6.4	2.0	3.2
Chief of Main Administration	4.7	1.6	3.6
Ministry (Department) Apparat Worker	6.4	1.6	2.7
Management Workers of General Economic Organs	5.1	1.5	2.7

\*The sample is not representative.

### The Steep Rungs of the Official Ladder

But what factors influence the career? This question has two interrelated aspects: the criteria for advancement to leadership work and the mechanisms of promotion. We will return later to the second aspect. As for the first, in any sphere of management they are the following: the level of special knowledge; moral-political make-up; ability to work with people; and practical experience. If a person does not have any one of the qualities mentioned, he will not be a real manager. However, this list has its own strict logic, the violation of which (making practical experience paramount, for example) can lead to serious shortcomings in the manager's activities.

On the whole the survey subjects evaluated (on a 7-point scale) the importance of the factors for promotion to management work as theory demands: 1) level of professional training; 2) ability to establish relations with subordinates; 3) moral-political qualities; 4) practical experience; 5) length of service and knowledge of the work "from within"; 6) sociopolitical activism; 7) ability to find a common language with the management; 8) family traditions. However, the model presented by the respondents contains very curious nuances. Let us mention two important features before we look at those nuances. First, transition from one position level to another (for example when the director of an enterprise is appointed to be a

deputy minister) has its own specific mechanisms. Analysis of them is a separate subject. Secondly, the leaders surveyed are not only the objects but the subjects of cadre policy. Therefore, it is logical to assume that the evaluations reflect both the role of different factors which influenced the respondents' careers and the principles by which they are guided in selecting and placing cadres.

So, the level of professional training came in first (see Table 3). It is true that with advancement the importance (by sum of ranks) of this factor declines. Either the respondents in fact always do advocate special training on a level higher than secondary or the role of other factors increases with time. What those factors are—we will now see.

Most put moral-political qualities in third rather than second place. Such a step is a direct consequence of formalism in selecting cadres. Obviously, the respondents had the opportunity to be convinced more than once that in order to occupy the necessary chair, one had first of all to have a "clean" application, and then a clean conscience. Of course, no one ignored moral-political criteria. But the survey subjects allotted them a place which deserves the government stamp of approval—"morally strong, ideologically certain." The fact that sociopolitical activism, a most important component of the group of individual qualities under study, came in sixth is additional evidence of what has been said.

**Table 3. Economic Managers' Evaluations of Various Factors Influencing Promotion to Management Work (average value of the index on a scale of -1 to +1)\***

Groups by Position	Level of Professional Training	Ability to Establish Relations with Subordinates	Moral-Political Qualities	Practical Experience	Length of Service and Knowledge of Work "From Within"	Sociopolitical Activism	Ability To Find a Common Language with Management	Family Traditions
General Director	0.22	0.64	0.11	0.20	0.40	—	-0.22	-0.40
Deputy General Director	0.54	0.50	0.58	0.23	0.23	0.23	-0.08	-0.69
Director of Enterprise	0.60	0.43	0.62	0.13	0.21	0.38	-0.20	-0.93
Chief Specialist	0.58	0.45	0.22	0.32	0.18	0.10	-0.16	-0.72
Chief of Main Administration	0.58	0.36	0.33	0.50	—	-0.13	-0.04	-0.75
Ministry (Department) Apparatus Worker	0.54	0.54	0.54	0.08	0.33	—	0.08	-0.67
Management Worker of General Economic Organs	0.55	0.07	0.45	0.09	0.11	0.28	-0.47	-0.82
Average for the Sample	0.52	0.43	0.41	0.22	0.18	0.11	-0.16	-0.71

\*A dash in the table means no evaluation.

The ability to work with people, that is, organizing talents, strong will, sophistication of interaction, and the like were evaluated as applied to subordinate and higher-ranking bosses. The survey subjects by no means attribute a similar role to the corresponding factors. The ability to establish relations with subordinates came in second. Of course, it is difficult to aspire to a management position without this quality. It seems, however, that to no small degree situational circumstances account for the greater attention to the factor mentioned. The practice of showing apparent well-being and democratism which was widespread during the period of stagnation had an effect here. If there are conflicts and dissatisfaction in the collective, the bosses look askance at the manager. But if there is peace and quiet, then the person is handling things and therefore deserves promotion.

Perhaps the fact that those surveyed put another aspect, the ability to build relations with management, next to last, in seventh place, is most striking. And in almost all the position groups the index shows a negative sign. Of course, the lines of conduct toward subordinates, on the one hand, and toward higher-ranking management, on the other, must certainly differ. But both aspects are equally important for successful management activity. But how can such a significant "distance" between the factors be explained? It cannot be ruled out that some of those surveyed were afraid of being suspected of excessive loyalty to management and tried to appear as though they did not and do not intend to play up to the "higher-ups." Such a position is completely understandable since public opinion severely condemns protectionism, servility, and rank-worship. But even if we allow that the survey subjects were being devious, it is not so very serious. It is much worse that a double standard created by the Administrative System exists in the management sphere: a style of interrelations for "internal use," so to speak, exists in the collective, and a different style intended for the "external" market—for the leadership. Generally they have little in common. But essentially these interrelations are built on different principles: in the first case—pressure and command methods, and in the second—a desire to give an account of all truths and untruths, to look good, and to enlist the support of the necessary people at the top; in the first case it is exclusively rights which predominate in the activity of the manager, and primarily duty—in the second. Such a situation involves a mass of negative consequences, and the main one is that private interest is passed off, in K. Marx's words, as state interest while state interest is reduced to the level of personal interest [Source 1]. In cadre policy this means that the goals (managers effectively executing the main functions of management) and means (training and promoting people capable of realizing this task) change places. The career and maintaining and raising official status begin to be considered ends in themselves to which strictly management tasks are subordinated.

Let us now talk about sociopolitical activism. The survey subjects openly acknowledged what we are still ashamed

to admit in practice, preferring to pass off necessity as virtue. With rare exceptions the deputy mandate, participation in various elected organs, including party organs, membership in commissions, and the like seem to serve as a mandatory appendage to the management post. At first glance, it seems that the situation which has become established is exclusively a tribute to formalism and a consequence of the "administrative zeal" both of the managers themselves and of their subordinates. But in reality a high level of social activism is, as mathematicians say, an "imaginary number": the level exists but activism does not.

There is some truth in that opinion. However, managers' participation in elected organs is by no means an empty formality. And that is not just because the materials, capital, and ceilings, that is, what the city soviet never has enough of, are distributed to social organizations for the most part through departmental channels and they can get scarce bricks, for example, only through economic planners. Another thing is also important. The real power which can be used to realize the decisions of social organizations and collegium organs of management is concentrated in the hands of the economic planners. Moreover, in order to do painstaking ideological-indoctrinational and organizational work or to give openly arbitrary administrative actions a "legitimate" framework (in the form of a popular initiative), members of commissions, committees, and headquarters vote to oblige the director, Comrade Such-and-Such, to designate people for the city-wide free work day, the First of May demonstration, the kolkhoz, voluntary people's brigade, and so on and so forth. Of course, many of these measures are not carried out in the name of the administration. Nonetheless, it is always assumed that disobedience to a decision threatens trouble with the bosses. In short, the survey subjects know that their practical qualities are judged by their ability to "mobilize" the community rather than by their activism at meetings. And they evaluated this factor of promotion very highly: the indicator "ability to establish relations with subordinates" came in second, as we recall.

#### Guidelines of Cadre Policy

The shortcomings in cadre policy indicated above appear especially clearly in the mechanism of official promotion (see Table 4). Judging by the respondents' evaluations, practical experience and knowledge of the work "from within" have no independent significance here. The influence of sociopolitical activism was reduced to a minimum. Or rather, it is a hindrance to the career (the value of the index is changed from a plus in the previous case to a minus). Special training moved from first to second place. In a certain respect, that change is a natural one. As the position level rises, and hence the scope of the management tasks as well, organizational and other practical qualities play an increasingly larger role. Specific technical and economic tasks move to the deputies or functional services.



**Table 4. Economic Managers' Evaluations of Various Factors Influencing the Speed of Advancement**  
(average values of indexes on a scale of -1 to +1)\*

Groups by Position	Adequate Organizational Talents and Personal Qualities	Level of Special Training	Successes of Labor Collective They Head	Sociopolitical Activism, Work in Elected Posts	Relations with Management
General Director	0.67	0.40	0.43	-0.20	—
Deputy General Director	0.62	0.64	0.50	-0.07	—
Director of Enterprise	0.84	0.68	0.56	-0.06	-0.29
Chief Specialist (Engineer, Technologist, Economist, and the like)	0.84	0.70	0.50	-0.10	-0.16
Chief of Main Administration	0.55	0.59	0.46	—	-0.05
Ministry (Department) Apparatus Worker	0.36	0.69	0.07	—	0.23
Management Worker of General Economic Organs	0.27	0.10	—	-0.22	-0.11
Average for the Sample	0.59	0.54	0.36	-0.09	-0.05

\*A dash in the table means no evaluation.

However, the contradiction in strictly management activity which we recorded above is aggravated: relations with subordinates and management are even more sharply divided. Organizational talents are in first place and the ability to establish contacts with the bosses—in last place. Does that not confirm that the significance of the “manager’s organizational talents and personal qualities” as a factor of promotion is determined at the discretion of the bosses? This idea is even more natural since the main and decisive criterion for evaluating management activity—the results of the collective’s work—is only in third place. Only one out two of those surveyed believes that the successes of the collective they lead substantially influenced the speed of advancement, while one out of six reject this link.

But if we think about it, there is nothing surprising in this fact. When the entire economy is “out of step” (that is, the cost and gross numbers approach and administrative rather than economic methods define the situation), why should just the lieutenants keep in step: will the efficiency of management be evaluated by the final result? It would be naive to expect that. Nonetheless, this situation is the key to understanding the contradictions of cadre policy. The point is that indicators of “gross numbers” and costs in reality are very shaky reading points despite how simple and instrumental they seem. The scale “more or less” used in this case has no precise limits. So many items at a certain cost have been produced this year. Next year, based on what has been achieved, 5 percent more is planned. But, how much is needed? In practice the answer to this question is reduced to material-technical aspects: the resources of production facilities, ceilings, funds, and the like. That is

why, by the way, that under the costs and gross-numbers approach a shortage is inevitable—the plan “by definition” must exceed material possibilities.

The lack of definite criteria for evaluating the activity of economic units erodes the guidelines of cadre policy and deforms the mechanisms of professional advancement. The practical and personal qualities of managers are judged in terms of the questionnaire’s standard clichés and abstract formulas. The process of raising qualifications is spontaneous in nature. The demands on the style and methods of management are dictated by the order to unfailingly fulfill directive instructions rather than by the real tasks. The manager’s responsibilities (including to the collective) are reduced to obligations to the higher-ranking offices and the like. Of course, management and its cadre potential are a relatively autonomous system. However, the shortcomings indicated confirm that the solution of cadre problems has gradually become less dependent on economic practice. Accordingly, getting on the nomenklatura list was the main condition of a career. But later success was determined by the ability to carry out directives, make timely reports, and find a patron. Is this not where the roots of that particular breed of economic planners—intolerant and even brutal in dressing-down subordinates and at the same time irresponsible and indifferent to the real state of affairs in the section entrusted to them and to the expectations and needs of the collective—are?

The cadre policy which we inherited from the era of stagnation is of a clearly expressed status character [Source 8]. Demands on the personal and practical qualities of managers were determined first by their

official and departmental affiliation, and only later by the particular management-economic problems. In some cases this approach makes it possible to concentrate highly qualified specialists in certain sections, achieve the goals posed, and advance and nurture talented organizers and brilliant leaders. However, in serving the Administrative System, this policy could not help but incorporate that system's main flaw. The essence of that flaw is that the tasks of management as a particular type of activity are identified with the principles of the functioning of the economy. The forms and methods of cadre work lost their sensitivity to the results of economic activity (both positive and negative ones). This became the strongest factor of retardation, one which we are now having great difficulty overcoming.

The experience of introducing new principles and methods of economic activity, above all expanding the independence of enterprises, and democratizing life, in particular management, have had a positive effect on resolving cadre questions. However, we must not put our faith only in creating legal and economic guarantees. Elected leaders, for example, is a method with very limited possibilities. Professionalism and the personal qualities which a leader needs are not acquired with a majority of votes. Pains-taking and methodical work which requires a serious scientific basis is needed here. One thing is clear: the high final result of management activity should be the main guideline for cadre policy.

#### Footnote

1. I.F. Sokolova participated directly in the study. It was she who processed the results presented in the article.

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#### From Social Knowledge to Social Engineering 18060004d Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian

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[Article by Irina Markovna Popova, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor in the philosophy department of the humanities college of Odessa State University imeni I.I. Mechnikov, author of the monographs "Problemy sotsialnogo regulirovaniya na promyshlennyykh predpriyatiyakh" [Problems of Social Regulation at Industrial Enterprises] (coauthor, 1973), "Stimulirovaniye trudovoy deyatel'nosti kak sposob upravleniya" [Stimulation of Labor Activity as a Method of Management] (1976), and "Soznaniye i trudovaya deyatel'nost' (tsennostnyye aspekty soznaniya, verbalnoye i fakticheskoye povedeniye v sfere truda)" [Consciousness and Labor Activity (Value Aspects of Consciousness and Verbal and Factual Behavior in the Labor Sphere)] (coauthor, 1985), and regular contributor to our journal, under the rubric "Theoretical-Methodological Problems"]

[Text] **Formulation of the Problem.** It would seem that sociology has boldly intervened in social practice and is becoming an inseparable part of it. Sociological research has become a sign of "good form" and references to it embellish official lectures and reports and figure in business papers. However, as a rule "sociological initiative," which is developing on an ever broader front, not only does not do any good, but frequently even harms social practice and sociological science. Of course, I am by no means advocating stifling initiative and creativity. The desire to make a contribution to social transformations relying on the "miraculous" potential of sociology is completely understandable. But it is intolerable to reconcile oneself to a situation where demagogues and ignoramuses who do not have specialized knowledge and do not know the methods and means by which this knowledge should be gotten take up the cause.

From my point of view, it is not merely the result of some theoretical weakness that our sociological science is by no means always able to give effective aid to practice. The fact that primarily everyday experience is the basis of social practice in many respects accounts for the inadequate competence and therefore low efficiency

of social management. In this connection, the question of social engineering and social technologies deserves focused attention. This question is by no means an abstract theoretical one. Recently concrete measures have been taken to create the prerequisites for developing social engineering activity. Among other things, the decree "On Improving the Organization of Social Work in the Sectors of the Economy" has been adopted and the "Model Statute on the Social Development Services Office of the Enterprise, Organization, and Ministry" has been ratified [Source 2]. I think that other steps will follow this first one.

Speaking of the prospects of social engineering activity, I must emphasize that not only does science promote the development of engineering and technology but vice-versa, engineering practice and the daily application of the latest technologies to a significant extent advance science itself [Source 3; Source 4, p 117; Source 5, p 121]. The accumulated experience which corroborates this interdependence inspires hope that the broad dissemination of social engineering activity and social technologies will become an important factor in the further refinement of the social disciplines.

What kind of knowledge can be transformed into social engineering activity and social technologies and in what way? What is the nature of this activity's link with ordinary, humanitarian, philosophical, and sociopolitical knowledge and moral ideas? How is social engineering related to other types of social practice? Is social engineering compatible with a humanitarian worldview?

**Engineering Activity and Social Engineering.** The negative attitude toward social engineering in Soviet social sciences of the 1950's-1970's was the result of the rejection of the positivist-oriented "sociology of small cases," which proclaimed its sociopolitical and philosophical neutrality to excess. The term "social engineering" undoubtedly has a substantial ideological charge. R. Mills' passionate protest against sociotechnical manipulation of a person, K. Popper's attempt to pit social engineering against "political Messianism" and "holism," the alternatives to positivism advanced by T. Adorno and Yu. Khabermas, the polemic of F. Znanetskiy with the advocates of naturalism and scientism, and phenomenologists' speeches against "traditional sociology" confirm that.

It is correct to ask: is it necessary to stand up for the good name of social engineering and is it advisable to acknowledge its status within the framework of the Marxist worldview? The affirmative answer stems, in my opinion, from the essence of the very concept "engineering activity," which expresses the objective processes of the evolution of society and human activity and the interrelationship between science and practice in some particular historical stage. In order to successfully

manage social processes and increase the practical efficiency of social science, it is important not only to explain the most fundamental characteristics of engineering activity but to also "uphold" them and deepen and reinterpret them.

First of all, let us note that most authors consider engineering an activity applied to scientific knowledge in order to create artificial technical objects and material values (see, for example, [Sources 6-9]). According to a more widespread interpretation, engineering-technical labor means a particular type of highly skilled labor focused on creating and transforming technical, technological, economic, organizational, and social systems and processes using engineering methods and means [Source 13]. Other definitions do not contain mention of the material-object result of engineering activity at all.

In my opinion, there are three features which are most important in engineering activity: 1) regular application of scientific knowledge; 2) special professional training; 3) realization of the link between science and production. Based on that, social engineering activity should be understood as a type of professional social-practice activity which marks the transformation of knowledge into decisions and programs for managing social production. The latter in turn must be interpreted broadly as reproduction of human activity.

Some explanations regarding engineering activity in general and of the engineering style of thinking in particular should also be used to more fully describe social engineering activity. Examples would be mention of the unity in the engineering style of thinking not only of theoretical and practical but also of conceptual and figurative thinking, the need to perform many production tasks promptly and efficiently [Source 10], and proposals to distinguish engineering activity which presupposes regular application of scientific knowledge from technical engineering activity based to a great extent "on experience, practical habits, and conjectures" [Source 7].

Expanding the concept "engineering activity" and acknowledging that it influences social processes is absolutely right. Even the advocates of the "narrow" meaning consider this interpretation the result of the division of labor which took shape historically. In singling out the different stages in the development of engineering practice, the authors direct attention to the fact that in each stage it fundamentally changed its appearance. So, in the early 20th century forecasting appeared (now it has taken shape as a particular type of activity which differs both from scientific activity and from engineering activity [Source 11]), and then systematic activity involving complex "human-machine systems," and finally sociotechnical activity which goes beyond the limits of scientific-engineering production and extends to many



spheres of social practice [Source 6, p 10]. It is also stressed that because of the rapid differentiation of engineering activity, it is becoming more difficult to define [Source 6, p 344].

The descriptions cited above make it possible to better understand the essence of social engineering. And it should be taken into account, on the one hand, that unlike "sociological initiative" it presupposes using social objects based not on usual life experience, but knowledge obtained as a result of specialized training; and on the other, unlike scientific activity it is directly practical and operational in nature. Operational sociological work, for example, is not at all identical to sociological study [Source 12].

An important conclusion comes from the primarily professional nature of engineering activity, namely that not only general sociologists must be trained but also sociologist-engineers capable of performing the social engineering tasks which arise in the process of social practice.

**Social Engineering and Social Technology.** The practical orientation of engineering activity is dictated by the need to deal with the concept of "social technology." First of all, it is appropriate to remember that technology is a person's active relationship not only to nature but also to social living conditions.

By insisting on the "technological nature" of social activity [Source 13], the most fundamental characteristics which should be "upheld" and deepened must be singled out. Even in ancient times technology meant art, mastery, and ability [Source 14]. Since technology is a "bridge from ideas to reality," it, like engineering activity, changes in various stages of social development.

The main features of contemporary technology are mass involvement, strict reproducibility of results, canonization of principles, and standardization of formulas [Source 4, pp 116-117]. Thus, the characteristics of technology which should be "upheld" in order to make our social activity "technological" are practical ability, mass involvement, and "standardized formulas" which insure the universality and reproducibility of results.

Practical sociologists are in dire need of those social technologies which are based on standard methods and make obtaining compatible results possible. The lack of these technologies is justifiably considered the main cause of the nonviability of many sociological subdivisions and the inadequate practical efficiency of sociological science.

"Development" of social mechanisms and consideration of factors which make up the sphere of competence of sociologists must be a necessary condition for adopting any management decision. Otherwise, the stagnation of social science cannot be avoided and delay in the work to create the technologies mentioned cannot be overcome.

As for social practice, it will be able to provide impetus to scientific thought only where social engineering activity which includes adjustment of scientifically sound social technologies is widespread. And let us emphasize that we are speaking not of patching up holes and correcting particular situations, but of professionals carrying out large-scale social measures.

**Science and Social Engineering.** There is no uniform opinion among Soviet specialists on the criteria for determining scientific character. Some authors even treat truth as merely a methodological regulator rather than an inherent characteristic of science [Sources 15, 16]. There is no need to get involved in the argument here. I will only dwell on one aspect of the problems under discussion, one which is directly related to the criticism of scientism and social engineering: the fact that the criteria for determining scientific character were formulated primarily under the influence of the natural disciplines should hardly be considered an obstacle to using them in studying social phenomena.

The desire for truth (and the search for means to achieve it) as a methodological regulator which became the internal impulse of the development of scientific knowledge primarily under the influence of natural science research is also used to evaluate social views. In describing economic ideas (which undoubtedly stem from social class interests and interests "outside" of knowledge), K. Marx emphasized the importance of the specifically internal criteria for determining scientific character. He writes, "... a person who tries to *adapt* science to a viewpoint gleaned not from science itself (as if science never made a mistake) but *from outside* and to a viewpoint which is dictated by interests *alien* to science—such a person I call 'low' [Source 1]. To the extent that science is defined as specialized activity (and specialized knowledge which specific means of cognition are used to achieve), the role of the external factors is only essential when they are transformed into an internal scientific problem. Forgetting the fact that "the most burning social questions may influence the development of science only if science's particular task, in some sense equivalent to the social problem, can be found within scientific knowledge" [Source 17], we thereby diminish the significance of general scientific criteria for social knowledge.

The prerequisites for social engineering activity are created thanks to the social scientific knowledge which is characterized by experimental adaptability<sup>1</sup> and the use of quantitative methods of analysis and various means of measurement. Accordingly, scientific cognition of social phenomena whose results could be realized in social engineering activity demand that we develop applied sociological research which presupposes the empirical study of the object. Increasing the efficiency of applied social science and sociology in particular depends not only on adapting the use of empirical methods but also on theoretical analysis which allows effective practical recommendations to be worked out. And we must

remember that "research activity proper does not at all begin with collecting and analyzing facts, but with seeing the social problems which seem to stand 'behind the facts'" [Source 18], and that "the richer and deeper the study, the more effective it is on the practical level" [Source 19].

**Social Engineering and Various Types of Nonscientific Knowledge.** The works of recent years have attempted to define the specific nature of a particular type of directed study of social phenomena—so-called humanitarian knowledge [see Sources 20-22]. Other terms are also used to signify it: "humanitarian-philosophical thinking" [Source 23], "the humanitarian sciences" [Source 24], and the like. The authors point out those traits which confirm the separation of the given type of knowledge not only from natural science but also from social science knowledge—the ethical charge, the dialogue character, and the polysemic nature of the facts, the ambiguity of truth, the understanding of meaningful motivation, and the like.

In this connection, it is appropriate to draw attention to an extremely important circumstance which prevents one from understanding the essence of the question. I am thinking of the desire to deny the fundamental difference of the particular method of cognition (it is a good idea to assign the term "humanitarian" to this method) from the other method of cognition which became historically established as "scientific." Essentially the same premise on which scientism is based is seen in this desire—the most perfect method of cognition is the scientific method, while the cognitive value of all the rest is determined by the degree to which they are "similar" to science. The attempts to "extend" other methods to the level of science and prove that there are essentially no differences between them arise from that.

Of course, the imprecision and "lack of rigor" of humanitarian knowledge (if it is evaluated in accordance with scientific criteria) does not at all prove that it is "second-rate." The well-known natural scientist and laureate of the Nobel Prize R. Feynman made a very witty statement in this regard: "When something is called not science, it does not mean there is something wrong with it, it just means that it is not science, and that's all" [Source 25].

The cognitive disciplines which traditionally use specific methods of interpreting social phenomena—history, literary criticism, the study of culture, linguistics, jurisprudence, and the like—are presently also using scientific methods of study very successfully. Art can be considered a model of genuinely humanitarian knowledge, and natural science or rather physical and mathematical knowledge can be the model of science (its maximum variant).<sup>2</sup>

Those types of nonscientific knowledge such as humanitarian, artistic, philosophical, and moral ideas involve certain value precepts and are of important indoctrinational significance. That is why they are related to social

engineering activity not only indirectly (through science contingent on the sociocultural context) but also directly, since like any social practical activity, it is carried out by an individual guided by certain social ideals and norms of behavior.

**The Transformation of Knowledge into Social Engineering Activity. The Link with Other Types of Social Practice.** The advantages of social engineering activity as compared to ordinary social practice are a result of the specific nature of scientific knowledge which provides a quantitative description of the object under analysis and explains the degree of manifestation of a particular quality using methods of measurement. However, science mediating between social needs transformed into an internal scientific problem and social engineering is accompanied by difficulties related to the fact that the results of scientific knowledge must be "translated" into the language of practical recommendations.

The main functions of applied social research, sociological research in particular, are informational-diagnostic and forecasting functions. The research sociologist first of all determines the optimal way to resolve practical problems, substantiates the legitimacy and feasibility of using certain indicators and norms of social activity, and studies the experience of introducing them. However, changing to practical recommendations and beginning with transforming information into social indicators and norms and then in turn into management decisions presupposes using special logical procedures and methods and requires special "technological" training for the sociologist. The essence of the problem is that "information and decisions have qualitatively different logical-semantic structures, and, moreover, their direct goals do not coincide" [Source 26]. This type of difficulty is the price which social engineering, which is separated from "practical" ordinary ideas, must pay for the soundness and scientific precision and rigor of its actions.

The fact that sociologists still do not know the rules for transforming results obtained into practical recommendations and the methods for changing data into social indicators and norms very well is responsible for the inadequate effectiveness of sociological research. On the other hand, "sociological initiative" is no different from "practicality," since information here is not only not transformed into programs of activity but is not interpreted at all. Usually this is a set of data expressed in percentages, and no one knows what it proves and what it necessitates.

The effective use of the results of applied sociological research in social engineering practice presupposes the development of social planning and the creation of scientific planning sociological subdivisions. Planning activity, as was already noted, is now being singled out as a relatively independent sphere. However, this circumstance does not at all prove that science is moving away

from practice. The same thing can be said about social planning: expanding its scope will mean social science effectively penetrating into practice.

The natural-technical sciences along with academic subdivisions also have a network of scientific planning organizations. But sociologists still only dream of them and hope that planning subdivisions will be envisioned in the system of unified sociological services which is to be set up.

The course followed after the 27th CPSU Congress focused on solving the social problems which are arising in a business-like and concrete way is favorable soil for developing social engineering activity. But are social scientists prepared to create the necessary scientific prerequisites? Most likely not. Moreover, the negative meaning which we often attribute to the concept "social engineering"—whether we want to or not—justifies inertia in thinking and unwillingness to master the specific methods of studying real social phenomena and processes in a concrete and scientifically valid way.

The trend toward ever greater popularity of "sociological initiative" bordering on superficiality, shallowness, dilettantism, and at times even simple charlatanism should also be acknowledged as wrong. It is also clear, however, that expanding the scope of social engineering activity is impossible without providing the proper conditions: training specialists, creating social planning subdivisions, overcoming the arrogance of officials who believe that they "know everything without any research."

And, finally, let us talk about the humanitarianism of social engineering activity. It is difficult to agree that adopting decisions which at times change the fates of hundreds and thousands of people merely on the basis of intuition or consideration of "general patterns" and good wishes is a more humanitarian act than carrying out measures (naturally ones which stem from the social priorities defined) which are preceded by the study of the particular mechanisms and relationships and strict calculation and measurement which make up the basis of any engineering activity.

#### Footnotes

1. Specialists justifiably point out that this feature must not be considered a general scientific criterion. However, as the history of the interaction between science and production confirms, it is experimentally-adaptable scientific cognition which the functioning of engineering activity is based upon.
2. Let us note that this does not rule out the need to take into account the specific features of the use of general scientific methods when studying social phenomena, in particular, the specifics of the social sciences' use of measurement methods.

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**Balancing Jobs and Labor Resources**  
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[Article by Irina Sergeyevna Gudzovskaya, junior scientific associate, who is appearing in our journal for the first time, and Avtandil Guseyn-ogly Kosayev, chief scientific associate and author of the articles published in our journal "Recruitment and Rational Use of Workers from Other Cities" (coauthor, No 4, 1981) and "Work Cadres of the Domestic Services Sphere: Structure, Qualifications, and Reasons for Turnover" (coauthor, No 4, 1983), both of whom work at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics, under the rubric "Applied Research"]

[Text] In Moscow many enterprises and sectors work at less than full capacity because of a shortage of cadres; for that reason a third of the equipment stands idle. The situation which has taken shape stems from the discrepancy between the size of and growth in labor resources, and the economy's need for them.

The demographic situation in Moscow is such that the growth in labor resources of the city itself does not meet the economy's ever-increasing need for work force. The number of Muscovites (not counting migrants) of working age is tending to decline. This is explained by the decline in the proportion of young people entering the working age bracket and the growth in the proportion of people of pension age [Source 1, p 49].

As compared to the preceding five-year plan period, in the 11th Five-Year Plan period (1981-1985), the stream of young people into the working age population declined by approximately 20 percent: the decline in the birth rate which occurred in the 1960's had an effect [Source 2, p 3]. Natural growth in the capital's population declined from 2.4 in 1970 to 1.8 in 1984 [Source 3, p 7], and that does not even support simple reproduction. The birth rate indicator in Moscow is substantially lower than the average USSR level.

During the 12th Five-Year Plan period, 150,000 more people will leave the working age bracket than will enter it. Thus, given the high employment rate (97-98 percent in 1985 [Source 2, p 5]) and the decline in the number of Muscovites able to work, the development of the growing need for work force (for the needs of construction, the urban economy, and industry) can be met for the most part by recruiting people from other cities. <sup>1</sup>

The number of places where labor is applied in the city's economy exceeds the size of labor resources proper. Therefore, every year more and more of the oblast's inhabitants come to work in Moscow: in 1960 there were 378,000 of them, in 1970—500,000, and in the 1980's—more than 600,000 people, which is 10-15 percent of all the people employed in the city's economy [Source 2, p

2). However, it is difficult to rely on more active recruitment of workers from Moscow Oblast, since a shortage of cadres is also being experienced there. Moreover, time is a limiting factor. At the present time 90 percent of the "pendulum migrants" from the Moscow Region live within a 60 kilometer radius (a 110-minute to 120-minute transport ride to the job in the capital). The average radius of the settlement pattern of suburban residents who work in Moscow is increasing: it was 40 kilometers in 1960, 50 kilometers in 1970, and 60 kilometers in 1980. The average length of the trip to the work place has risen in the last 15 years to 1.5 hours, which results in less free time and less opportunity to raise one's professional and cultural level [Source 2, p 3].

Another source of insuring the balance of jobs and labor resources of the city's economy is workers and white-collar workers who come by organizational recruitment with a temporary residence permit within the limits set for ministries and departments, as well as highly qualified specialists invited to Moscow. The overwhelming majority (75 percent) of those who come are men, for the most part bachelors [Source 2, p 18].

However, even here there are some minuses. A large number of dormitories are needed for workers with temporary residence permits under departmental limits, while living space must be provided for people who have gotten permanent residence permits. As a result, the number of residents increases inordinately and substantially exceeds the city's potential for municipal, domestic and housing, and transport services. Moreover, the territorial disproportions in the settlement pattern of working people and the location of additional jobs are increasing [Source 1, p 7], and that results in additional intercity traffic. (In the city more than 60 percent of those working spend 1.5-2 hours roundtrip to the work place and back every day). Transport fatigue leads to reduced labor productivity, especially in the first hours of work [Source 2, p 9].

The problem of balancing labor resources also remains acute because of the constant increase in the number of scientific institutions, industrial enterprises, and departmental, supply, and construction organizations, which often are not linked with the city economy. More than 80 percent of Moscow's enterprises obtain raw materials from outside, while a large part of the output is shipped to other regions [Source 4, p 3]. For example, the production of the main types of construction materials in Moscow has already reached the level of development where the production of output exceeds the need. The facilities created insure constant export of precast reinforced concrete (12 percent of production), ceramic tiles (20 percent), heat insulation materials and linoleum (51 percent), silica brick (60 percent), glass blocks (70 percent), and ceramic sewage pipe (95 percent) [Source 5, p 13].

Moving industrial enterprises and organizations which are not specialized for Moscow, do not have the necessary material base in the capital, and frequently are

harmful in health terms helps reduce the disproportion between jobs and labor resources. In accordance with the Master Plan of Development of Moscow, 327 enterprises and organizations are to be moved from the city [Source 2, p 9], 128 of them in the years of the 12th Five-Year Plan [Source 6, p 2]. However, unspecialized enterprises and production facilities and ones harmful in health terms are being moved extremely slowly.

Restructuring and the technical reequipping and reconstruction of old production facilities help increase the level of balance between the city economy's jobs and labor resources. Despite substantial work to increase the technical level of the capital's industry, the rate of renewal of its fixed capital in the 10th and 11th five-year plan periods was inadequate. The period of operation of equipment in the city's industry is substantially higher than in the country as a whole. So, in 1983 the proportion of metal-cutting machine tools which had been in service for 20 years or more was 27.2 percent in the city's industry and 20.3 percent in the country's industry, while in instrument making the figures were 28.3 percent and 21.0 percent, respectively. In Moscow's garment industry 31.5 percent of the technological equipment has been in operation for more than 10 years and 11 percent—for more than 20 years, while the corresponding figures in the country as a whole are 25.5 percent and 6.3 percent (authors' estimates). For example, in the Moscow Cheremushki Garment Association, the proportion of equipment with a period of use of 15-20 years is 66.1 percent. According to data of the head enterprise, at the present time 79 percent of all the equipment installed needs to be replaced or reconstructed.

The slow renewal of inefficient obsolete and worn-out equipment reduces its qualitative indicators, increases downtime because of malfunctions, and unjustifiably increases the need for repairs. Thus, in 1985 expenditures for capital repair of all Moscow enterprises was one-third higher than deductions into the production development fund and almost reached capital investments for technical reequipping [Source 7, p 2]. In the 12th Five-Year Plan period, 70 percent of all capital investments allocated for developing this sector of the economy is to be used for technical reequipping of Moscow industry, and that is 20 percent higher than the average for the country [Source 8, p 3].

The need for cadres depends not only on the existence of jobs but also on the shift index of the work of equipment, and in order for that to rise the number of skilled workers must rise. The shift index should rise, and that involves increasing the proportion of automated, highly efficient, and costly equipment whose downtime would be particularly burdensome. In the 12th Five-Year Plan period, highly efficient equipment is supposed to be changed to 2- or 3-shift work schedules,<sup>2</sup> and by doing so this index will rise (to 1.7). It must be noted that organizing three shifts presupposes restructuring the work schedule of the city's services sphere. We are

speaking of public transport, health care and cultural institutions, trade enterprises and domestic services offices, and children's preschool institutions.

The reserves for reducing the city economy's need for labor resources by mechanizing manual labor are very great. Suffice it to say that the proportion of manual work in Moscow's economy amounts to almost half of all people employed. In 1985 49 percent of all workers in the city's industry were engaged in manual jobs, while in construction it was 67.8 percent, which is 8 percentage points higher than in the country as a whole [Source 10, p 1]. The proportion of those engaged in manual jobs in trade (more than 70 percent), in domestic services (50 percent), and in housing and municipal services (from 30 to 70 percent) is too high [Source 11, p 75]. About 900,000 people are engaged in heavy manual labor in these sectors of the economy [Source 10, p 1], about the same number as people working in the city's science and scientific services.

The enormous number of manual labor jobs has come into conflict with the population's need for meaningful labor. The result of this has been an outflow of workers from sectors where conditions for increasing professional qualifications and showing creative initiative have not been created. The outflow of Muscovites from enterprises and sections with difficult work conditions is especially high.

In this way, the absolute release of workers as a result of reducing the proportion of manual labor becomes the definitive factor for balancing jobs and labor resources. When new equipment and technology are introduced, we must try to insure that the total number of people released is adequate to serve existing facilities and those being introduced, and to use them more completely and efficiently in 2-3-shift work. Moreover, the needs of the developing sectors of the services sphere must be satisfied. This growth will involve restructuring the work of transport, educational institutions, kindergartens, and the entire social infrastructure and is also related to the need to replenish the services sphere cadres up to the normative level.

From 1970 through 1984 redistribution of labor resources into the services sphere was observed in the Moscow economy, where the proportion of working people rose from 27.2 percent to 29.2 percent [Source 5, p 103]. The phenomenon mentioned is undoubtedly a progressive one. During this period the level of satisfaction of the Moscow population's need for housing and municipal and domestic services was approximately 50-60 percent of the planned norms [Source 12, p 89].

Residents of the suburbs and transients use the services of the capital enterprises in trade, public catering, domestic services, health care, culture, and art. That is a very important factor which is responsible for increased employment in the services sphere. More than 600,000 people come to Moscow Oblast to work every day, and

the number who come from other rayons of the country and from abroad totals about 2 million [Source 2, p 2]. According to present estimates, about one-third of the customers of retail trade in the city are from other cities. People not from Moscow use 35 percent of the services in the city's domestic services combines [Source 13, p 21].

In order to provide work force for the services sphere, the number of people working must be formulated on the basis of critical path normative indicators taking into account Moscow's population growth in the future, pendulum migration, and transients, rather than according to the remainder principle, as was done until recently. Rough estimates show that the number of people working in such sectors of the services sphere as trade, public catering, the hotel system, tourism, domestic services, passenger transport, and the communications system should be increased by 10-15 percent. There is now a shortage of about 30,000 workers in trade and public catering alone [Source 10, p 7].

Given the demographic situation that has taken shape and the high level of employment, a balance can be achieved between jobs and labor resources by releasing work force from industry, construction, science, and scientific services. In the 12th Five-Year Plan period, the number of people working in existing enterprises is to be decreased by 5 percent and in science and scientific services—by 7 percent (which amounts to more than 60,000 people), and another 15,000 people will be released from the management apparatus [Source 6, p 2]. The labor resources released are to be sent to develop the social sphere. However, the services sphere's additional need for work force is still great. Therefore the sectors of the services sphere must be developed on an intensive basis.

The main direction for increasing labor efficiency as well as solving many social problems is an all-out reduction of expenditures of unskilled manual labor on the basis of comprehensive mechanization.

Manual labor in unloading and hauling goods needs to be mechanized in trade enterprises. For example, approximately 20 percent of work time at food stores goes for receiving goods and delivering them to auxiliary facilities and sales areas. One-quarter of the workers are involved in these operations [Source 14, p 9]. Concentrating everyday goods in large self-service stores and technically complex items and goods in general, specialized, and company stores is important. The level of mechanization of labor is substantially higher at large trade enterprises than in medium-sized and small ones. They have more opportunities to introduce industrial methods of shipping goods in containers (this relates above all to baked goods, vegetables, and potatoes) and to use small power equipment, conveyor belts, electronic scales, and automatons. According to the most conservative estimates, extensive introduction of scientific organization of labor at retail trade enterprises will



increase labor productivity by 12-14 percent, and that means a reduction in the need for cadres of 2,500-3,000 people. There are reserves for increasing labor efficiency in the public catering system and at enterprises of the domestic and housing and municipal services system.

Those types of jobs which can be efficiently performed in the sectors of industry must be eliminated. We are speaking of the packaging of goods and manufacture of candy and baked goods as well as meat semi-manufactures. At the present time more than 10,000 people are performing these jobs at retail trade and public catering enterprises, and as a rule at shops with difficult working conditions using primarily manual labor.

In the 12th Five-Year Plan period, the number of stores using packing equipment and selling foodstuffs and industrial goods through trade automatons is to be increased by a factor of 1.5; the number of stores which deliver packaged foodstuffs is to be increased to 75 percent [Source 6, p 1].

Despite the large number of VUZes, Moscow's need for specialists is not being satisfied fully enough. The scale at which highly skilled specialists are being trained is not in keeping with the nature and level of development of the economy's sectors. So, in 1984 the city's higher and secondary specialized educational institutions graduated 146,000 people [Source 3, 175], that is, 68 percent of the specialists trained in the country. However, because of miscalculations in planning and the use of young specialists outside their specialization, the capital is experiencing a shortage of cadres in a number of professions. Among others, general education schools have been provided with only 94 percent of the pedagogical cadres they need, and there are 9,700 too few doctors and 23,400 too few nurses. The city's annual need for doctors totals 2,000 but only 1,300 are sent to the capital every year under interdepartmental distribution. In accordance with the Health Comprehensive Target Program of the City of Moscow for 1986-1990 and in the Period Until the Year 2000, this figure will be 1,800 [Source 15, p 2].

The supply of specialists for Moscow enterprises and organizations is also inadequate. In 1985 60.8 percent of the management workers had higher education and 26.5 percent had secondary specialized education and 12.7 percent were practitioners; among specialists the corresponding figures were 55.0 percent, 32.0 percent, and 13.0 percent. In terms of individual occupations, the number of practitioners remains very significant: about 75 percent of bookkeepers and 25 percent of engineer-economists and economists (authors' estimates).

However, more than 100,000 engineers, technicians, and scientific workers are working in posts which do not require special education. Compared with 1980, the number of these specialists in construction doubled, in transport and industry it increased by a factor of 3-3.5, and in trade and public catering by a factor greater than

10. About 132,000 specialists with diplomas are employed as workers [Source 10, p 3]. Frequently even middle-level specialists are used in posts which do not require a given level of education. They work as clerks, waiters, loading hands, taxi drivers, barbers, and the like. Sample surveys of domestic services workers confirm that 18.8 percent of the workers who have received vocational training had secondary specialized or higher education. Among fitters 18.8 percent graduated from a tekhnikum and 2.6 percent—from VUZes; among the construction specializations the corresponding figures are 7.6 percent and 1.5 percent; among radio repairmen—17.8 percent and 4.4 percent; and among barbers—18.3 percent and 3.6 percent. At domestic services enterprises 38 percent of the barbers have higher education [Source 16, p 106].

Another way to use cadres efficiently is to reduce the number of specialist positions in the economy, which are oftentimes contrived, and in this way decrease the demand for them.

The present system of occupational training does not insure the proper correlation between the occupational-skill structure of the students and the economy's needs. The city's needs for cadres for each specialization must be known. In Moscow VUZes, the proportion of new specializations which determine progress in the economy must be increased. Admission into VUZes should be worked so that the amount of training in scarce specializations rises by reducing the amount of training in specializations in excess supply and the introduction of new specializations would be accompanied by the elimination of old ones. In connection with this, it would be good to reduce the proportion of correspondence students who are Muscovites and increase the number of them in evening departments. Under the existing situation, starting with third or fourth year of study students and evening and correspondence departments of VUZes are obligated to find a job in the specialization they are acquiring in the educational institution. However, they do not always manage to realize this right. As a result, an absolute majority of graduates of evening and correspondence departments continue to work outside their specialization. The activity of the employment bureaus should be stepped up; they are capable of providing work in the specialization to students studying without leave from production.

The network of vocational-technical schools operating in Moscow does not meet the economy's need for skilled work force. Thus, in 1985 12.2 percent of trade workers and 5.8 percent of domestic and housing and municipal service workers were trained in vocational-technical schools [Source 3, p 115]. In order to perform the task posed, the network of vocational-technical schools must be developed at a faster rate.

The lack of information on the qualitative make-up of the able-bodied population and its distribution among the spheres of labor application hinders the efficient use

of labor resources in the city. Information on the city's enterprises' and organizations' need for cadres and their training and redistribution is still poorly coordinated. That is why the level of information support of rayon branches of employment bureaus is low.

In order to complete the transition of Moscow's economy to an intensive path of development given declining population growth, the able-bodied population must be fully and efficiently employed—workers must be rationally used in the labor process and work places and technical-technological and organizational-economic conditions of production must correspond to Muscovites' growing need for meaningful labor.

#### Footnotes

1. As research shows, the socioeconomic consequences of the "limit" are ambiguous [Source 17].
2. In GDR industry, the 2- or 3-shift work schedule for highly efficient equipment has become the norm. In 1986 this equipment was used 17.3 hours a day [Source 9, p 3].

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#### Interrelationship of the Secondary Education System and Reproduction of the Settlement Structure

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[Text] Reproduction of the settlement structure is determined for the most part by the continuity of the place of residence and migration. The predominance of one of these components at each stage of the society's development depends on a number of particular circumstances: the development of the economy in various types of settlement; the network of social institutions which insure that the young generation is included in these types of settlement; and, finally, the migration plans of young people [Source 2, p 12]. The active development of social production leads to rapid structural changes and thus to the predominance of migration; moderate development is accompanied by the prevalence of the continuity of the place of residence.

Effective management of the reproduction of the settlement structure requires differentiated solutions for different regions. Many processes (including reproduction of the settlement structure) run relatively automatically here. But all-Union data are proving to be very approximate guidelines for social policy. In this situation it

seems like a good idea to us to study the particular most characteristic groups of the regions and on this basis compile norms of development and predict possible changes.

The system of education has an indirect effect on reproduction of the settlement structure. It "appears as an increasingly more important form of regulated and purposeful socialization and professionalization of individuals and of their preparation to fulfill available social roles, and thereby make their particular contribution to the functioning of the structure and institutions of society and its reproduction in time" [Source 3, p 19]. The disparity which has become established between the settlement pattern and the location of educational institutions leads to migration streams of young people.

In the period which preceded the introduction of universal secondary education, migration was characteristic above all for graduates of general educational secondary schools. Since 1965 the number of elementary schools has been reduced to one-third its former level and of eight-year schools—to two thirds. This policy means, according to data of the longitudinal survey conducted in the Estonian SSR in 1966-1979, <sup>1</sup> that of the graduates of secondary schools under 30 years of age, only one-sixth of the young people lived in the village where they had been born [Source 4, p 214]. And the probability of those young people who finished secondary school in cities migrating from the village was five times greater.

In the 1980's in connection with the shift to universal secondary education, the migration of young people rose even more, since secondary specialized educational institutions and vocational-technical schools are unevenly distributed in terms of types of settlements. The data of the first stage of the All-Union Longitudinal Survey "Inclusion of Young People in the Working Class, the Kolkhoz Peasantry, and the Intelligentsia" make it possible to study on a regional basis, first, the migration intensity of young people related to obtaining a secondary education, secondly, the direction of this migration, and, finally, the impact of the disposition of secondary educational institutions on the reproduction of the settlement structure of the regions.

When comparing the regions, it must be taken into account that the migration activism of the population of the regions involved in the analysis varies, just as the level of development of the settlement structures in them does. The migration behavior of young people which is the norm for one region may have an adverse effect on reproduction of the settlement structure of another. The analysis included regions with sharply differing settlement structures and different migration activism of their populations. Thus, the Estonian SSR, Sverdlovsk and

Tula oblasts, and Krasnoyarsk Kray are the most urbanized regions. Structural changes in them are moderate in nature. The Estonian SSR is characterized by intensive exchange of population in all directions: among cities, among villages, and among cities and villages. For the rest intensive migration to the cities is characteristic above all. In the Belorussian SSR and Kurgan Oblast, the intensive process of urbanization has caused greater migration from villages to cities. In the Dagestan ASSR and the Tajik SSR, the proportion of urban population is substantially less than the all-Union average; the former is characterized by low mobility of the whole population while the second is characterized by low mobility of only the rural population [Sources 7, 8].

Migration is often considered an exclusively positive process since "without the creation of population mobility, neither can there be development of it" [Source 1]. In fact the population's independence from the place of residence is an indicator of social development and greatly expands freedom of choice. Migrants represent a special, socially active part of the population. But, on the other hand, a high level of migration without the corresponding social conditions is undesirable both for society as a whole and for the individual, since it complicates the reproduction of certain elements of the settlement structure, above all the socially less developed types of settlements, and creates problems of labor and social adaptation in the new environment. And the more fundamental the difference in the previous and new way of life of the migrants, the more complex this adaptation is.

The analysis began with determining the level of migration of the entire age cohort and of graduates of various types of secondary educational institutions. As the data show, in all the regions studied obtaining a secondary education involves intensive movement of young people (Table 1). The highest level of migration is observed in the Dagestan ASSR and in Kurgan Oblast. While in these regions only two-thirds of the young people receive a secondary education in the same settlement where they entered first grade, in Tajik SSR the rate exceeds 80 percent. It must be taken into account that the real level of migration is most likely even higher, since we could trace moves only among different types of settlement. But we were unable to discern migration on the level of one type of settlement (from one community to another, for example). Of course, these differences in migration intensity are not only the result of the location of secondary educational institutions but also of local cultural traditions. Thus, the high living standard in the countryside as compared to the city (excluding the capital) as well as the existence of strong family ties is the reason for the lowest level of migration in Tajikistan, rather than because an optimal disposition of the secondary education system in the region has been achieved [Source 9].



Table 1. The Relationship Between Young People's Educational Characteristics and Migration Intensity, %

Contingent	Proportion of Those Who Get Secondary Education in the Same Type of Settlement Where They Entered First Grade						
	Belorussian SSR	Tajik SSR	Estonian SSR	Dagestan ASSR	Krasnoyarsk Kray	Kurgan Oblast	Tula Oblast
Age Cohort	66	83	69	61	66	63	73
Graduates of Vocational- Technical Schools	55	53	48	24	63	26	71
of Secondary Specialized Educational Institutions	44	43	44	25	45	39	66
of Secondary General Edu- cation Schools	86	96	83	90	88	89	88

The differences in migration intensity of young people and in dependence on the educational institution which provides the secondary education are significant. The highest migration intensity in all regions except Kurgan Oblast is among those who enter tekhnikums. To a lesser degree migration is related to continuing studies in a vocational-technical school. Naturally, graduates of general education secondary schools make up the most stable part of young people in all types of settlements, and the main mass of the "stable ones" are residents of large cities. While in Tajikistan and Estonia urban-type communities and small cities account for most losses of young people, in other regions rural youth are the most mobile. For regions where the proportion of urban population is less than in the country as a whole, in Belorussia and Kurgan Oblast for example, such migration activism related to urbanization is the norm. But then for urbanized regions (Tula and Sverdlovsk oblasts and Krasnoyarsk Kray) the high mobility of rural youth is clearly undesirable, since it causes difficulties in reproduction of the rural population. In Tajikistan, in contrast, because of diminished urbanization and especially high population growth particularly in rural areas, the low mobility of rural youth which significantly lags behind the given indicator in other regions creates a number of problems. Residents of urban-type communities and small cities make up the least stable part of youth in Tajikistan; and that is also in conflict with plans of social development since in the republic, and throughout Central Asia in general, it is the problem of rapid development of small cities which is the most pressing [Source 10]. As the data of our study show, the measures taken in this regard are still not significantly influencing the migration behavior of youth.

Of course, the causes of intensive migration must not be reduced to undesirable behavior of youth. Ultimately territorial disposition of the economy, the priority development of some region, and the concentration of resources there also determine the migration of youth. In other words, the conditions that cause young people to move are created by society itself.

The study of the direction of migration of the age cohort as a whole and of the graduates of the basic educational institutions in different regions was the next stage of our study (Table 2). As it turned out, in all regions other than the Estonian SSR, obtaining a secondary education for most young people involves moving. Above all young people leave the rural area, and urban-type communities and small cities also lose a large number of eighth grade graduates. Because of them the population of large cities (from 10,000 to 100,000) and to a lesser degree medium-sized cities (more than 100,000) increases for the most part. Only in Estonia is a stream of young people to the rural area found. Differences in the structure of the urban population also result in the particular features of the direction of migration in different regions. In Kurgan and Tula oblasts and in Estonia, where the urban infrastructure is characterized by monocentrism (about half the urban population is concentrated in oblast centers and in the capital), it is precisely these cities which young people entering secondary educational institutions for the most part replenish. But then in Belorussia, where the urban infrastructure is developing in a polycentric way and the capital stands out only relatively among other urban centers, young people are almost equally distributed among all types of cities.

Table 2. Main Directions of Migration of Graduates of Secondary Educational Institutions

Region	Age Cohort	Vocational-Technical Schools	Graduates of: Tekhnikums	Secondary General Education Schools
Krasnoyarsk Kray	countryside, communities, and small cities—to—large and medium-sized cities	countryside—to—medium-sized and large cities	countryside, communities, and small cities—to—large and medium-sized cities	countryside—to—large and medium-sized cities
Kurgan Oblast	countryside—to—cities	countryside, communities, and small cities—to—large cities	countryside—to—medium-sized and large cities	
Tula Oblast	communities and small cities—to—medium-sized and large cities	countryside, communities, and small cities—to—medium-sized and large cities	countryside, communities, and small cities—to—medium-sized and large cities	
Tajik SSR	communities, small cities, and countryside—to—medium-sized and the capital	countryside—to—small and medium-sized cities and the capital	communities, small cities, and countryside—to—medium-sized and large cities and the capital	
Dagestan ASSR	countryside, communities, and small cities—to—medium-sized cities and the capital	countryside—to—medium-sized cities and the capital	countryside, communities, and small cities—to—medium-sized cities and the capital	
Belorussian SSR	countryside—to—communities and small cities	countryside, communities, and small cities—to—the capital and medium-sized and large cities	countryside—to—large and medium-sized cities	countryside—to—communities and small cities
Estonian SSR	communities and small cities—to—medium-sized and large cities communities and small cities—to—the capital, medium-sized cities, and countryside	communities and small cities—to—the capital, medium-sized cities, and countryside	communities and small cities—to—the capital, medium-sized cities, and countryside	

The specific features of the migration streams of vocational-technical school graduates allow us to conclude that while in Estonia the system of vocational-technical education results in an outflow of young people from communities and small cities, in the other regions the rural areas suffer more because of that system. Moreover, the populations of medium-sized cities (excluding Estonia and Kurgan Oblast, where the corresponding educational institutions are for the most part found in the capital and in the oblast center) are replenished more through young people entering vocational-technical schools.

The distribution of secondary specialized educational institutions causes the greatest losses to rural areas as well as to urban-type communities and small cities. The outflow of youth from communities and small cities proved most marked in Estonia. This outflow moves in two main directions: to the more developed and less developed types of settlements. This is explained by the fact that in Estonia agricultural tekhnikums are located primarily in rural areas, and eighth grade graduates of community schools entering this type of tekhnikum

results in migration to the countryside. But then continuation of studies in industrial and nonproduction tekhnikums results in migration of youth to more developed types of settlements (for the most part to the capital). In the other regions the system of secondary specialized education attracts young people to the large cities above all. And while the unequal distribution of these educational institutions throughout the region's territory is the main reason for the migration of those entering vocational-technical schools, for those continuing their studies in tekhnikums migration is more often related to the narrow specialization of those tekhnikums. Where the contingent of those entering vocational-technical schools is expanded, the main task is to distribute the system of vocational-technical education as evenly as possible relative to the needs of the sociocultural development of the particular region.

The continuation of studies in secondary general education schools involves the least changes in places of residence in all regions. Only in Krasnoyarsk Kray and in Belorussia do the graduates of rural 8-year schools

leave to study in large and medium-sized cities (Krasnoyarsk Kray) or in communities and small cities (Belorussia). Such migration may be related not only to the distribution of the school network but also to young people's desire to obtain better training in urban schools in order to enter VUZes.

On the whole it can be said with certainty that the present distribution of secondary educational institutions promotes the outflow of young people from rural areas, communities, and small cities to more developed types of settlements. Migration to the sites of future schooling results in greater step-by-step migration: rural youth who have gotten their secondary education in small and medium-sized cities do not return to their native places but leave to go to major cities. And the migration process of young people is contradictory in nature: on the one hand, the demographic structure deteriorates and the degree of available labor for agriculture declines and, on the other, the degree of available labor for production increases, the level of education of workers rises, and the demographic structure of the population in the more developed types of settlements improves.

Such unequal development of various types of settlements has led to some difficulties in reproduction of the settlement structure of our society. Moreover, it appears that the main differences arise not on the parallel, from

"the city to the countryside," but mainly within the urban settlement structure itself. Now the difference in distribution of economic potential between the network of large cities and the other cities of the country, including urban-type communities, is marked (40 percent of the industrial-production funds are found in 52 cities with populations of more than 500,000) [Source 11, p 21]. It is precisely for this reason that urbanization in the USSR is defined by the growth and development of large cities.

Reproduction of the settlement structure in our society can be achieved on the basis of its stabilization. (In the Soviet Union today almost half the population does not live in their birthplace, and in the Baltic Region even more do not) [Source 8]. A stable settlement structure which is preferable for society as a whole also creates the best conditions for the development of the particular individual. In order to consolidate the settlement structure, choosing a type of settlement similar to the birthplace as the future place of residence should become the norm. Based on the assumption that the place where young people finish the eighth grade is usually the permanent place of residence, let us examine how the present territorial distribution of secondary educational institutions influences the reproduction of the main types of settlements in different regions (Table 3).

Table 3. Reproduction of Population in Cities and in Rural Areas\*

Type of Settlement	Region	Age Cohort	Contingent		
			Graduates of: Vocational-Tech- nical Schools	Tekhnikums	Secondary General Education Schools
Capital	Tajik SSR	+	++	++	0
	Dagestan ASSR	+	++	++	0
	Belorussian SSR	+	+	0	0
	Estonian SSR	++	++	++	0
Large City	Krasnoyarsk Kray	+	+	++	0
	Sverdlovsk Oblast	+	+	+	0
	Kurgan Oblast	++	++	++	0
	Tula Oblast	+	+	++	0
	Tajik SSR	+	0	++	0
	Dagestan ASSR	0	0	0	0
	Belorussian SSR	+	+	++	-
	Estonian SSR	+	++	+	0
Medium-Sized City	Krasnoyarsk Kray	+	+	+	0
	Sverdlovsk Oblast	-	0	-	0
	Kurgan Oblast	+	0	++	0
	Tula Oblast	+	+	+	0
	Tajik SSR	+	++	++	0
	Dagestan ASSR	++	++	++	0
	Belorussian SSR	+	++	+	++
	Estonian SSR	+	+	0	0



Table 3. Reproduction of Population in Cities and in Rural Areas\*

Type of Settlement	Region	Age Cohort	Contingent		
			Graduates of: Vocational-Tech- nical Schools	Tekhnikums	Secondary General Education Schools
Small City and Urban-Type Com- munity	Krasnoyarsk Kray	-	-	-	0
	Sverdlovsk Oblast	—	—	—	0
	Kurgan Oblast	0	-	-	+
	Tula Oblast	-	-	—	0
	Tajik SSR	0	+	—	0
	Dagestan ASSR	0	0	-	0
	Belorussian SSR	0	+	-	+
	Estonian SSR	—	—	—	-
Rural Areas	Krasnoyarsk Kray	—	—	—	0
	Sverdlovsk Oblast	-	—	0	0
	Kurgan Oblast	—	—	—	-
	Tula Oblast	—	—	—	0
	Tajik SSR	-	—	—	0
	Dagestan ASSR	-	—	—	0
	Belorussian SSR	—	—	—	-
	Estonian SSR	0	0	++	-

\*"++" means a significant influx of youth; "+" means an influx of youth; "0" means the proportion of youth is not changing; "-" means an outflow of youth; and "—" means a significant outflow of youth.

The concentration of youth in large cities and in the capitals of republics is mainly related to the system of secondary specialized education and, moreover, the influx of youth here is almost equal both to industrial and to nonproduction tekhnikums. Only in Tula and Kurgan oblasts are the populations of large cities replenished above all through people entering urban vocational-technical schools. But in other regions, vocational-technical schools attract young people to the large cities (although to a somewhat smaller extent than secondary specialized educational institutions). Above all graduates of eight-grade schools come to medium-sized cities everywhere except Sverdlovsk Oblast (this influx is particularly noticeable in Dagestan), while vocational-technical school students make up the main mass. In Belorussia a large number of young people who are continuing their schooling in secondary general education schools make up this stream.

However, in most of the regions urban-type communities and small cities have a negative migration balance. Only in Belorussia, Tajikistan, Dagestan, and Kurgan Oblast are the influx and outflow equal. In Tajikistan young people come to these types of settlements to enter vocational-technical schools, in Kurgan Oblast—to enter secondary general education schools, and in Belorussia—to enter both types of educational institutions. But then tekhnikums in which one-half to two-thirds of the students who have obtained an eighth-grade education there determine the outflow of young people from communities and small cities in all regions. Only in Estonia does obtaining a secondary education not result in a

change in the proportion of urban residents in the group: the rural population in this republic is replenished through students of rural vocational-technical schools and agricultural tekhnikums, and young people entering all types of secondary educational institutions make up the outflow. In other regions the distribution of the secondary education system inflicts substantial damage precisely on rural areas and also makes reproduction of the rural population more difficult.

Despite the fact that the picture of the reproduction of the settlement structure through the cohorts being studied in different regions is quite similar, the real situation in them differs substantially. The intensity and directions of migration which are the norm for a region with a certain level of development of the settlement structure can have negative consequences and be clearly undesirable for another. Since the system of education (in this case secondary education) is one of the organizational methods of regulating the migration streams, because of differences in the settlement structures differentiations in the principles of distribution of secondary educational institutions in the regions' territories are also required.

The regions under study can theoretically be divided into five groups. The Tajik SSR and the other Central Asian Union republics belong to the first. In terms of the whole country, this is a region of diminished urbanization and higher population growth, especially in rural areas. Therefore, the master plan for USSR settlement for these republics posed the task to increase the migration stream from the villages to the cities, above all small cities

[Source 10]. But for the time being, unequal distribution of the secondary education system, for the most part vocational-technical education, leads in terms of settlements to annual shortages in the educational institutions of large cities and capitals and to the impossibility of further schooling for graduates of rural 8-year schools [Source 12]. Therefore, opening vocational-technical schools and secondary specialized educational institutions in small cities and urban-type communities is desirable for this region.

The Dagestan ASSR as well as the Transcaucasian Union republics can be classified in the second group of regions being studied. In this region the percentage of urban population lags behind the average Union indicator, but a gradual rise in it is already noticeable. There is no shortage of work force here and conditions for developing agriculture are very favorable. The problem of distribution of the secondary education system is not very crucial since an outflow of youth is seen only from rural areas. In connection with this, reducing the concentration of vocational-technical schools and secondary specialized educational institutions in the capital as well as opening vocational-technical schools and *tekhnikums* in rural areas seems the most desirable.

Regions which are less urbanized than in the country on the whole make up the third group; therefore urbanization is still continuing in them in an extensive form. The Belorussian SSR and Kurgan Oblast belong to this group. Problems related to the reproduction of less-developed types of settlements are naturally less marked in these regions than throughout the country as a whole, and the observable migration behavior of young people is the norm. In this group population reproduction in urban-type communities and small cities does not involve any particular difficulties.

Regions where the level of urbanization is high but growth in the number of urban residents still continues belong to the fourth group. Tula and Sverdlovsk oblasts and Krasnoyarsk Krai belong here. A marked polarization of the urban settlement structure is occurring here: young people from rural areas, small cities, and communities are rushing to the large cities. The distribution of the secondary education system dictates this migration. The serious difficulties in reproduction of the population which the less-developed types of settlements are experiencing can be eased through territorial reorganization of the secondary education system.

The Estonian SSR represents the fifth group. The levels of urbanization and migration mobility of the population are high, but in recent years the migration balance between the cities and the rural areas has changed to the benefit of the villages. As the preceding analysis showed, obtaining a secondary education does not drain off young people from the rural areas. But then reproduction of the population of communities and small cities is very problematical. Therefore, the distribution of secondary

education institutions in those settlements where it is desirable that young people stay to work after obtaining their education is the main task in regulating migration streams of youth.

On the basis of all that has been said, the conclusion may be drawn that the migration paths resulting from the secondary education system do not fully meet the needs of society. Concentration of secondary education institutions in large cities is not justified where secondary education is universal. The present distribution of vocational-technical schools and secondary specialized educational institutions causes increased migration to the more developed types of settlements. It is precisely this "education migration" as a type of indirectly regulated process which requires intensified planning and regulation of the number and composition of those coming with due regard for the prospects of them staying for possible further outflow. Therefore, interaction of the education system and the settlement structure which insures planned reproduction of all types of settlements is the main task of the development of education. Only unified territorial organization of the education system both on the level of regions and republics and on the level of the entire country can provide training of youth through the main links of education in accordance with the needs of society.

#### Footnotes

1. The study was carried out by the laboratory of the study of communist indoctrination of Tartu State University and the sociology of youth sector of the Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences History Institute under the leadership of M.Kh. Titma. In 1966 the graduates of regular and evening general education secondary schools were surveyed (2,260 of them). In 1969, 1973, 1976, and 1979 the subsequent stages of the study were carried out. In the latter 1,460 people were surveyed. The author of this article took part in conducting the last survey [Source 5, pp 82-110].
2. The all-Union interregional comparative study "Inclusion of Youth in the Working Class, Kolkhoz Peasantry, and Intelligentsia" is being carried out in 15 regions of the USSR: in the republics of the Soviet Baltic Region, the Belorussian and Tajik SSR's, the Dagestan and Tatar ASSR's, Sverdlovsk, Kharkhov, Karaganda, Kurgan, and Tula oblasts, and Krasnoyarsk and Altay krais. The program and instruments of the first stage of the study were developed by an authors' collective headed by M.Kh. Titma and published in [Source 6]. The coordinating council of the study, whose members included representatives of all regions (chairman—Titma), provided general supervision of the study. In the first stage of the study (in the 1982/83, 1983/84, or 1984/85 school years), the graduates of secondary vocational-technical schools, secondary specialized educational institutions, and secondary general education schools were surveyed. The sample covered 5 percent of the total in all regions. As a result approximately 50,000 respondents were surveyed.

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### A Journalist in the Courtroom

1806004g Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian

No 1, Jan-Feb 88 (signed to press 18 Jan 88) pp 47-52

[Article by Mikhail Aleksandrovich Fedotov, candidate of juridical sciences, docent of the All-Union Juridical Correspondence Institute, and author of the books "Konstitutsionnyy status sovetского grazhdanina" [The Constitutional Status of the Soviet Citizen] (1982) and "Sovety i pressa" [The Soviets and the Press] (1987), and Dmitriy Valentinovich Luchkin, investigator for the procurator's office of Zheleznodorozhnyy Rayon in the city of Moscow and 5th-year student at the above institute, both published in this journal for the first time]

[Text] "Open trial in all courts." That is a precept of Article 157 of the USSR Constitution. The principle of glasnost in legal proceedings perpetuated by the country's highest legal document is of enormous practical significance. Glasnost in legal proceedings serves as a guarantee of the precise observance of the procedural norms during investigation of materials of a case and thereby reduces the likelihood of judicial error. Needless to say, the further refinement of social control over the work of the criminal law organs is an indispensable condition of the democratization of social life. In addition, a regime of glasnost in legal proceedings is a powerful means for legal indoctrination of citizens and formation of a real socialist sense of justice.

Glasnost in whatever sphere of activity is simply inconceivable without the most active participation of mass information media in this activity. In other words, the question of the interrelationship of the press and the judicial organs is now becoming particularly crucial. In the 70 years of our State system, society has never seriously suffered from so-called pressure on the courts by the press organs. But the troubles from the exact opposite, lack of glasnost in legal proceedings, are in truth incalculable. I think that it is precisely from this standpoint that the problem of the "the judge and the journalist" should be approached.

When glasnost took the first bold steps in the courtrooms and when the long-declared irreproachability of our judicial system was questioned, it turned out that people see different ways to solve this problem. Journalists are emphasizing that their presence in the courtroom makes it possible to promptly identify procedural violations and infringements on the rights of defendants and respondents and helps prevent tragic miscarriages of justice. The workers of criminal law organs accuse the press of pursuing sensation and attempting to discredit them in the eyes of public opinion [Source 3].

We have a clash of positions which not only reflects the attitude toward the problem but is also manifested in specific life situations. One must establish that the judge's subjective assessment remains at present the only real basis for appropriate decisions. The law does not



envision any norms which regulate the rights and obligations of representatives of the mass information media. And where a gap is formed in the law, arbitrary discretion by the one who applies the law inevitably takes the place of a norm. As our study showed, the nature of the judges' discretion in similar situations fluctuates within very broad limits.

### A Lack of Trust

In 1986 the student scientific research laboratory on problems of the study of the state of the All-Union Juridical Correspondence Institute conducted a survey of 150 people's judges in Moscow as well as judges from other regions of the country who came to the capital to raise their qualifications. The entire body was divided into two basic groups. Those who responded positively to the question—"Have there been cases in your practice where journalists were present in the courtroom?"—went into the first group (61 percent) (henceforth called Group A). Those who responded negatively went into the second group (Group B, 39 percent). Even such an extremely simple classification identified interesting patterns. The respondents from Group A avoided answering questions on the questionnaire only half as often as those in Group B did. The suggestion to make concrete recommendations to improve the interrelations between judicial organs and the mass information media were ignored by 32 percent of those surveyed in the first group and 52 percent in the second. From this we should draw the at-first-glance trivial but very important conclusion that the experience of direct contacts with journalists forces a judge to be more deeply aware of the problem and is a necessary prerequisite for solving it constructively.

But what notion of journalists and the methods and results of their work has become established among judges? The overwhelming majority of the respondents (90 percent) regularly study articles on the corresponding themes. However, only 5 percent of those surveyed are satisfied with the quality of those articles (78 percent were not completely satisfied and 17 percent were dissatisfied). At the same time, however, only a few believe that material done in an unprofessional manner harms legal indoctrination. The rest obviously think that any mention (except a critical one, of course) of a judge or a law automatically generates respect for them.

Nevertheless, the evaluations given by the respondents should not be brushed aside. If only because the demands made by judges on publications—accuracy of legal wording, adequate interpretation of the materials of the case, a respectful attitude toward the court, and objective portrayal of its activity—by no means represent an attempt to protect "the honor of the uniform." But what charges are addressed against journalists? Insufficient legal literacy (27 percent), superficial familiarity with the materials of the case (11 percent), and the authors' exclusive use of materials of the preliminary investigation and inquest (8 percent). The respondents believe

that mass information media workers at times overestimate their own training and underestimate the judge's competency (17 percent), try to create the public opinion they need (19 percent), and sin by tendentiously stating the materials of the case (13 percent). Journalists who write on legal subjects should certainly heed these claims.

The degree of judges' overall dissatisfaction with the quality of publications is very high. But only about one-third of those dissatisfied made a specific charge against journalists. What about the rest? Do they prefer to keep silent in the old way? Or, as they say, is there nothing to hide? Most likely, both. But we think that one of the main causes of the figure of silence is a conception which has taken root over the years: a report in the press or on television is criticism which expresses the "viewpoint of the directive organs," and any such report presupposes organizational conclusions. This stereotype was not formed, incidentally, without the participation of the mass information media. If we proceed from the assumption that the journalist's opinion is truth in the last instance rather than one of the possible opinions, i.e. following fact becomes understandable. Only 57 percent of those surveyed in Group B and 66 percent in Group A believe that glasnost helps effectively administer the law.

Appreciating the times, those surveyed are prepared to admit glasnost into the courtroom. However, most of the respondents (52 percent in Group A and 62 percent in Group B) chose a form such as direct radio or television broadcast of the session. Of course, such broadcasts are needed. At the same time, however, the conclusion comes to mind: judges feel much more confident in a situation where the connecting link between themselves and public opinion is dispassionate equipment rather than a journalist. Judges' opinions on what brings associates of the mass information media to courtrooms serve as direct confirmation of what has been said. In Group A—30 percent and in Group B—40 percent believe that the representatives of the press pursue the goal of informing the population of the trial, identifying the causes and conditions of the offenses (22 percent and 14 percent), and telling about judicial activity proper (18 percent and 20 percent). One out of six respondents said that the journalist sets putting pressure on the court as his task. One of those surveyed cited as proof a case where a journalist present at a trial was a relative of the defendant. I think that merely mentioning the infamous "troikas" and "special sessions" explodes such arguments.

### Out of the Game

In our opinion, editorial offices must be given the right of accreditation in trials in order to overcome subjectivism. After being accredited by the person chairing the trial, the journalist should acquire the following rights: to study materials before and after the trial, to request and receive necessary information from participants, and to make a tape or video recording.\* (\*The authors do not

consider that granting the right of court accreditation makes the journalist directly dependent on the judge's viewpoint and permission will turn into prohibition [as often happens in our country]. Among other things, obtaining information from the participants in the trial, making a recording in any form, and the like is the guaranteed right of every person. In our country the principle should operate that everything that is not prohibited by law is permitted and not to be specially regulated—editor's note). Of course, the journalist will also have obligations, the main ones being clarifying the case based on careful study of all the data and helping establish legality.

Under the laws that now exist, the group of persons who have access to the materials of the case is clearly defined. The representatives of the mass information media are not among them, but there is no direct prohibition against familiarizing journalists with the documents. The question is again decided at the judge's discretion. In our case 62 percent of the respondents in Group A and only 37 percent in Group B were prepared to meet the journalist halfway. The rest would consult with the leadership (22 percent and 38 percent) or responded with a refusal (18 percent and 25 percent, respectively). In short, for the time being representatives of the mass information media must rely mainly on personal charm.

What will happen if a journalist wants to be in the courtroom on a par with other citizens? Judging from the results of the study, only 46 cases out of a 100 can count on success. In 18 percent of the cases they would not avoid preliminary questioning. Sixteen percent of the judges would simply slam the door in the journalist's face. Twenty percent of the respondents did not come to a definite decision.

The law does not provide for the journalist's right to request and obtain necessary information from the participants. At first glance it seems that there is no need for such a norm: who can forbid a press worker from posing questions (outside the courtroom!) to the procurator, the lawyer, the victim, the witnesses, and the experts? Thirty-five percent of the respondents reason in approximately that same spirit. Nineteen percent did not express a definite opinion. The rest were disposed to be very decisive: they were ready to cut off the journalist's contacts with the participants in the trial even if the talk took place outside the courtroom.

The impression is created that lack of confidence in their powers on the part of some of the judges lies behind this resolve. So, according to the opinion of 17 percent of the respondents, the appearance of an associate of the mass information media introduces tension into the work. At the same time 34 percent of those surveyed believe that the presence of a representative of the press disciplines the participants in the trial. There is a paradoxical situation: the journalist deprived of any rights in legal proceedings is considered by judges to be a guarantee of legality. Only 31 percent of those surveyed said that the

presence of a mass information media worker does not influence the course of the trial. Such a position seems the only true one to us, for it moves the interrelations of the parties to the footing (for the time being not sufficiently firm, it is true) of rights and obligations.

The principle of glasnost means the opportunity to record the information, opinions, and testimony divulged in the courtroom. In practice, however, cases are frequent where journalists are prohibited from making recordings [Source 4]. Many of those surveyed do not see anything wrong in this. Eleven percent believe that the chairman should stop attempts to make any recordings, 3 percent are inclined in that case to remove the journalist from the room, 16 percent are interested in the contents of the notes, and the rest of the respondents (with the exception of the 13 percent who avoided answering) are inclined to act in accordance with the law [Source 1], that is, they do not intend to make a procedural response.

And how will the judge act if the journalist begins to make a tape recording in the courtroom? (The law is again silent on this account). Only 15 percent of those surveyed will not begin to focus attention on the reporter's tape recorder; 13 percent will be interested in just how necessary using it is; and 28 percent (38 percent in Group B) will prohibit it under threat of removal from the courtroom. The rest did not give a definite answer. The fact that journalists still rarely use sound-recording equipment during legal proceedings obviously accounts for such a cautious attitude.

#### Are Judges Ready for Real Glasnost?

But now all the difficulties are behind us and the broadcast or essay has come out. As we will remember, judges evaluate the output of journalists very critically. But nevertheless, four-fifths of the respondents in Group A and 28 percent in Group B intend to add press reports to the file materials. Let us make a reservation: we are speaking of the so-called pretrial publications, that is, those which have appeared before the verdict has been brought in. Judicial workers' attitude toward such materials has always been negative. Usually they consider them an attempt to influence the court. Such a prejudice is the result of inadequate legal sophistication. But not just that. The faulty practice of violating the principle of judicial independence and obedience only to the law has an effect here. It is no accident that 58 percent of those surveyed confirm that the influence of pretrial publications is fairly high, but 71 percent were in favor of prohibiting such reports. The sad experience of cases where expediency was brought into the trials is obviously prompting judges to file press materials: if anything happens they can serve as justification for free interpretation of the law. Does this not explain judges' negative attitude toward public criticism against them as well? In both groups (80 percent in the first and 56 percent in the

second) the opinion prevails that articles with a negative evaluation of the court's activity in a particular case undermine the prestige of justice.

The line of the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee focused on eliminating zones closed to criticism also applies to the organs of justice and, incidentally, to the mass information media as well. The rights and obligations of editorial offices and persons criticized should be consolidated in the Law on the Press and the Mass Information Media now being formulated [Source 2]. Putting a legal basis under glasnost in legal proceedings is all the more necessary since many judges do not believe it advisable to regulate their contacts with journalists. According to the data of the study, only 32 percent of those surveyed in Group A were "for" that and in Group B—59 percent.

The mass information media's coverage of the activity of the criminal law organs will most likely be intensified and deepened. On the scales of Themis are human fates, so the significance of public control here is particularly great. Openness in legal proceedings is one of the components of glasnost and democracy. And, consequently, constant readiness for interaction with journalists must be a component part of the jurist's profession. The forms and methods of this interaction should be studied by jurists at the very least in advanced study courses.

The empirical data we obtained give reason to draw a very bitter conclusion: a very large number of judges are still not ready for real glasnost. This is explained above all by inadequate professionalism. The presence in the courtroom of a journalist can hardly disturb a judge who is in full possession of professional skill and decides a case in complete accordance with the law and socialist justice. For such a judge the journalist is an assistant, and such a judge should be pleased rather than distressed by attention to a judicial investigation on the part of the press, radio, and television.

We must certainly agree with the imperative formulated by V.P. Lozbyakov: even those superprofessionals who are obliged to be judges need constant juridical indoctrination [Source 5]. In our study this conclusion received empirical confirmation. It is precisely flaws in the sense of justice which induce judges to impede the journalist who is called upon to carry out what the law obliges him to do—to insure glasnost in judicial proceedings.

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#### On the Eve of Divorce

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[Article by Vladimir Vladimirovich Solodnikov, candidate of philosophical sciences and chief of the sociological laboratory of the Ryazselmash Production Association, who previously appeared in our journal with the articles "A New Form of Helping the Young Family" (No 1, 1985, coauthor) and "The Predivorce Situation in the Young Family" (No 4, 1986)]

[Text] The eve of divorce is generally a very crucial and extremely painful situation for family members. However, domestic sociology has done a poor job of studying it. A great many valuable things could be gleaned from the large number of foreign books on this subject, but hardly any of them have been translated into Russian. Nor has a secondary analysis of the works of Western authors which could systematize the characteristics of the predivorce situation and identify their relationship to the negative impact on the spouses been done. We have attempted such an analysis (see the appendix). As will be shown below, the conclusions of foreign specialists do not always coincide with the data we obtained during our own study.

So, married couples who applied for divorce were surveyed. The marriage did not last more than 5 years and the ages of both the husbands and the wives were limited to 30 years. It was the first marriage for all respondents. The questionnaire survey was conducted in 1985 in the departments of Civil Registry Office and people's courts of three cities. In Moscow 130 couples were surveyed and in Tula and Voronezh the corresponding figures were 60 and 75.

We constructed a special index to take into account the most important sociopsychological features of those getting a divorce as a special group in order to insure an integral evaluation of the spouses' status in the predivorce situation. Four variables were used as the components of the index: three questions<sup>1</sup> and the indicator of emotional instability (on the scale of neuroticism from the Ayzenka questionnaire).

The impact of the predivorce situation was considered strong if at the very least three of the components of the index confirmed that the divorce was a serious life crisis for the respondents. The representatives of this group



were marked by a high degree of neuroticism (sleep disorders, mood swings, psychosomatic disorders), considered the impending divorce a failure which seriously complicated their lives, did not intend to marry again (or had difficulty answering this question), and often regretted the past. But in cases where emotional stability was characteristic of the spouses and where they considered the impending divorce liberation which could change their lives for the better, intended to marry again, and did not regret the past; the impact of the predivorce situation was considered weak. Of the husbands 14 percent were in the first group and 28 percent—in the second group, and of the wives the corresponding figures were 17 percent and 24 percent. Moreover, if the number of components which confirmed a strong and a weak impact were the same, on the whole it was defined as average (25 percent of the husbands and 31 percent of the wives) and, finally, if the respondent did not answer three or more questions, he fell into the category of people who did not respond (33 percent of the husbands and 28 percent of the wives).

As apparent from the data cited, sex differences in the spouses' reaction to the impending dissolution of the marriage were insignificant. This differs from the results of the foreign studies which said that women have more difficulty going through a divorce (see the appendix). At the same time, however, judging from the individual indicators of the stress experienced, women are in a worse position than men. They are more often characterized by a higher level of emotional instability (22 percent of the women as opposed to 13 percent of the men), diminished sense of self-worth (corresponding figures were 48 percent and 32 percent), and difficulty sleeping (70 percent and 49 percent). From 24 percent to 51 percent of the women and from 12 percent to 34 percent of the men reported various psychosomatic disorders (fits of trembling, heart palpitations, and pains). (It is noteworthy that four of the husbands' and seven of the wives' questionnaires had to be rejected since they did not pass the so-called test for sincerity according to the Ayzenka questionnaire. All four of the men and two women exaggerated and five women, in contrast, understated their emotional stability. The distortions obtained in our opinion reflect ideas of masculinity and femininity which imply that a man should hide his emotions while a woman should emphasize them even to the detriment of sincerity. By taking into account these "adjustments," the sex differences again prove to be less significant).

Some researchers mention a direct relationship between the spread of divorce and the frequency of suicide [Source 1]. In our sample 10 percent of the husbands and 24 percent of the wives admitted that they had had suicidal thoughts.

It cannot be ruled out that the disruptions of general well-being mentioned by the respondents serve as the first stage of the development of neurosis or mental

illness. (According to the data we have, there are substantially more divorced people suffering from mental illness than among persons of a different marital status. See [Source 2]).

The stress of the predivorce situation may lead to a change in the spouses' consumption of alcohol [Source 3]. Among our respondents 10 percent of the husbands and 4 percent of the wives began to drink more until the decision to divorce was made, and another 13 percent and 8 percent, respectively—after. Foreign authors cite significantly higher figures—44 percent [Source 4]. In addition, judging from the responses of those surveyed, 14 percent of the husbands and 8 percent of the wives decreased their consumption of alcoholic beverages before the decision to divorce was made, and 19 percent and 12 percent, respectively—after. For the rest, no changes in this regard occurred according to their own evaluations. How should the data obtained be interpreted? On the one hand, they may indicate that for young spouses on the whole a response to trouble in the family such as increased consumption of alcohol is not characteristic; and, on the other, they may indicate a desire of some of them to preserve the family by cutting down on drunkenness. In the latter case alcoholism may return after the divorce.

In discussing the impact of divorce on the personality of each of the spouses, researchers have up to now reached no uniform opinion regarding whether the husband's (wife's) progressive pathological set of symptoms are the reason for the divorce or whether it is the result of the divorce which is either impending or has already occurred. In our opinion, the second explanation is more accurate. This explanation in turn presupposes the existence of relationships between the course of the respondents' predivorce life and the specific features of the consequences of this period.

But to what extent do the circumstances accompanying the breakdown of the family determine the force of impact of the predivorce situation on the spouses? First of all let us examine factors within the family.

The data presented in the appendix allow us to assume that the more unexpected the divorce and the shorter the predivorce period, the stronger the divorce's impact. We may take the spouses' first conversation on the subject as the indicator which confirms the start of the process of making the decision to divorce. The significant link predicted by statistics (probability less than or equal to 0.01)<sup>2</sup> was in fact revealed, but only for women. For men a discussion with the wife about the possibility of divorce was less significant, and most likely they do not see it as a real threat to the stability of the marriage.

The fact of separation does not change the significance of the index constructed. In other words, our data do not support the assumption that the spouses' separation

serves as clear proof of the impending divorce and "prepares" them for this step. The short period of time in which young divorcing couples live apart may account for that.

Scientists' opinion that the birth and upbringing of a child enriches the interaction of spouses and intensifies their responsibility for preserving the family [Source 5] finds empirical support, as is seen from the appendix. However, the results of the study made did not reveal statistically significant differences in the degree of influence of the predivorce situation on respondents who had children and those who did not. There are probably two explanations here. Perhaps the relationship of child and parents is most strongly disrupted only after divorce, and it is then that they perceive it painfully. But it is also possible that young parents have not yet fully acknowledged their parentage and responsibility for the children's fate.

Undoubtedly the degree of impact of the predivorce situation depends on who the initiator of the divorce was. This relationship was recorded (probability is less than or equal to 0.05 for men and 0.01 for women). The situation seems most painful when the divorce is undertaken at the initiative of the other side and least dramatic in the opposite case. Average intensity of impact is noted when both are the initiators (see Table 1).

**Table 1. The Initiator of the Divorce and the Impact of the Predivorce Situation, in percentages for each column**

	Initiator of the Divorce		
	Given Spouse N=187	Both Spouses N=214	Other Spouse N=111
Degree of Impact			
Strong	10	16	23
Average	30	22	34
Weak	31	28	17
No Response	29	34	26

The difficulty of the ordeals on the eve of divorce is in many respects determined by what feelings the husband and wife have for one another at that time. The research of foreign authors confirms that only an indifferent attitude reduces the "trauma of divorce." A person who maintains a feeling of love is most highly inclined to evaluate the situation which has taken shape as a serious life crisis. However, even negative feelings can reflect emotional attachment. Our data only partly confirm these conclusions.

Respondents who maintained positive feelings toward their partners (love, respect) experienced the strongest impact of the predivorce situation, and those whose attitude can be called negative (those who mentioned contempt or hatred) experienced the weakest impact. As for such alternatives as indifference, regret, or "it is

difficult to answer," the first two, in our opinion, attest to the more or less indifferent nature of the feelings, while the latter instead speaks of their inconsistency and ambivalence. The data provided by Table 2 agree with this supposition.

**Feelings Toward Marriage Partner and Impact of Predivorce Situation, in percentages for each column**

	Feelings Toward the Husband (Wife)		
	Positive N = 122	Ambivalent N = 119	Negative N = 69
Degree of Impact			
Strong	27	19	10
Average	27	24	32
Weak	16	19	30
No Response	30	38	28

So, there is a statistically significant relationship between the nature of the feelings of the divorcing spouses and the intensity of the impact of the predivorce situation on them (probability is less than or equal to 0.01), and, moreover, the more clearly expressed (and acknowledged) the positive feelings, the stronger the impact noted.

Up to now certain factors which determine the intrafamily, primarily spousal, attitudes in the period preceding the divorce have been examined. But does the degree of impact of the predivorce situation depend on parameters outside the family, in particular on how the members of the close social circle (above all parents and friends) of the young family regard the impending divorce?

The results of our study show that an attitude of approval by the respondents' friends lessens the "trauma of divorce" and condemnation intensifies it (see Table 3). However, the latter needs further study, since such an attitude on the part of friends is encountered extremely rarely.

**Friends' Attitude Toward the Impending Divorce and the Impact of the Predivorce Situation, in percentages for each column**

	Friends' Attitude Toward the Divorce		
	Condemnation N = 31	Aloofness or Lack of Knowledge N = 223	Approval N = 171
Degree of Impact			
Strong	29	18	10
Average	42	31	28
Weak	6	22	37
No Response	23	29	25

The opinion of the parents (the father and the mother separately) is for the most part important only for women (probability is less than or equal to 0.001). This relationship is not found for young men who are getting divorced, and that does not concur with the data presented in the appendix.

The opinion is widespread in ordinary consciousness that the children of young parents "are still so young that the divorce does not affect them." According to the data of Czechoslovak researchers, the overwhelming majority of parents with preschool-age children share this viewpoint and almost half with children who go to school do. However, these same parents tell about their children's behavior which the authors classify as traumatic or even depraved [Source 6]. Studying this problem requires using special psychological methods (tests, games, and the like). Our data only allow us to draw a picture in general outline and in addition are in the nature of indirect evaluations, since the information is obtained from the parents.

In all 140 families with children ended up in the sample, and of them 18 married couples had 2 children. Mothers indicated changes in the children's behavior (disobedience, flights of fancy, reticence) since the time trouble developed in the home in 27 percent of the cases, while fathers did so in only 10 percent of the cases. (Only two mothers mentioned that in the period preceding the divorce the child's behavior improved. We will cite their responses: "my child became calmer after my husband left" and "he is calmer and sleeps better and the diathesis disappeared").

Aggravation of the predivorce situation by spousal conflict undoubtedly intensifies the negative impact on the upbringing process in the family. Secondary analysis of the existing materials on this problem confirms that it is precisely conflict relations between the parents both before and after the dissolution of the marriage which have the strongest impact on the children rather than the very fact of divorce and (or) the absence of one of the parents [Source 7].

It seems that the mothers' evaluations here were more reliable than the fathers'. First, the mothers spend much more time with very young children. Secondly, if the spouses separate, the father is generally separated from the child. According to our data, 66 percent of all the children in whom the mothers noticed certain behavior deviations were in families where, by the wives' acknowledgement, a high rate of conflict between the spouses was observed.

In addition to the negative impact on the marriage partners and on their children, the predivorce situation involves undesirable consequences for society. We are speaking above all of the changes which the reproductive and upbringing functions of the family undergo. Thus, for most of those who were in the sample, the reproductive aims which they had upon entering the marriage

remained unrealized. At that time 8 percent of the respondents deliberately planned to have no children (at the time of the survey 47 percent had no children), 23 percent wanted to have one child (22 percent had one child), 48 percent—two children (3 percent had two children), and 10 percent wanted three or more (there were no families with three children in the sample). The rest skipped the question or it was difficult for them to answer.

Often divorced spouses form negative ideas about remarriage. Among our respondents 21 percent did not plan to get married again and 35 percent had no definite opinion on that score. The rest intended to set up a new family either immediately after the divorce (10 percent) or after meeting the right person (30 percent). Four percent did not respond. The results obtained agree with the data of V.A. Belovaya which say that "approximately three-quarters of those whose marriages were dissolved before they were 25 years old got married again 10 years after the first marriage broke up, and slightly more than half whose marriages had broken up when they were from 25 to 29 years of age did" [Source 8].

In this way, for one-fifth of the young people a negative family experience results in marriage losing its significance at the moment of divorce, and another one-third of them are not certain that it is necessary. In other words, about half of the divorcing spouses may at some time become supporters of nonmarital sexual relations. However, even more negative ideas about remarriage are formed under the impact of divorce for partners who have been in families for a longer time. According to the data of Lithuanian sociologists, one-half of the divorced wives and about one-third of the husbands had a negative attitude toward remarriage and one-quarter of them did not have a definite opinion [Source 9]. Therefore, it may be assumed that for young divorcing couples on the whole, the institution of the family continues to have comparatively high significance and divorce is more a means to leave the given partner than a conscious desire to be alone.

The fact that in the view of 26 percent of those surveyed, divorce will change their lives for the better and more than one half of that figure (15 percent) consider it a major failure which will cause many problems attracts attention. Another 55 percent of the respondents found it difficult to answer that question or believed that marked changes would not occur in their lives. Thus, most of the young spouses were inclined to believe that divorce would not resolve their problems, but still they intended to do it. Such an orientation obviously is not entirely unrelated to an indulgent or approving attitude on the part of those around (especially friends) toward the impending breakdown of the family. The "readiness" of friends to approve the divorce revealed during our study not only made the corresponding decision easier for the young wives, but can also have a negative effect on the stability of the families of the very people who gave the advice.



It is interesting to examine the changes the spouses expect in the upbringing of children after the divorce. Mothers were more optimistic in their prognoses. Of them 32 percent believed that the conditions for bringing up the child would improve as the result of the divorce (fathers shared this viewpoint in only 6 percent of the cases) and, in contrast, much more rarely adhered to the opposite opinion (29 percent and 46 percent, respectively). The difference in the answers most often indicated the evaluation by each of the spouses of the potential success of the child being brought up by the mother alone—for children remained with her in the overwhelming majority of cases.

It is notable that at the moment of the survey the answers of some of the respondents already showed future conflicts involving the children. For example, 46 percent of the fathers proposed to meet with the child at least once a week after the divorce, but among the mothers only 20 percent allowed such a possibility. At the same time they more often insisted that the father not meet with the son or daughter at all.

Husbands and wives imagined the forms of interaction of the father with the child after the divorce in different ways. Thus, 70 percent of the fathers intended to give their children gifts and only 27 percent to 36 percent intended to monitor their success in school, be involved in how the son or daughter spent their free time, and the like.

Those are the main results of our study. We hope that they are of some value to the organizers of advisory assistance to young families and will help specialists understand the most characteristic features of pre-divorce situations better.

#### Footnotes

1. Do you intend to get married again? Yes, after the divorce is final. Yes, when I meet the right person. No, I don't intend to. It's difficult to say.

Do you often regret the past. Yes. No.

On the whole do you believe that your divorce... is a failure which seriously complicates your life? An experience which will have little influence on your future? Freedom which will change your life for the better? An event whose consequences are difficult to predict?

2. The X square is used here and in what follows.

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Appendix

Appendix. Secondary Analysis of Characteristics of Predivorce Situation

Characteristics	Relationship with "Trauma of Divorce"	Authors
1. "Readiness" for divorce:		
a) firmness of the decision to divorce	inverse	V. Gud [Source 10]
b) duration of the conflict which preceded the divorce	inverse	V. Gud; G. Spanier, and R. Casto [Source 11]
c) attractiveness c' alternatives to marriage	inverse	V. Gud
d) time between the first discussion of divorce and the start of legal proceedings for divorce	inverse	V. Gud
2. Initiative for divorce belongs to:		
a) the subject spouse	inverse	R. Weiss [Source 12; V. Gud; M. Blair, J. Pais, and P. White [Source 13]; Sh. Kraus [Source 14]; L. Thompson and G. Spanier [Source 15]
b) other spouse		"
c) both spouses		"
3. Feelings for partner:		
a) positive	direct	V. Gud; Dzh. Mirs; R. Weiss; G. Kitson [Source 16]; G. Spanier and R. Casto
b) negative	direct	V. Gud
c) indifferent	inverse	V. Gud
4. Self-Worth	inverse	M. Blair, J. Pais, and P. White
5. Desire to Punish the Other Spouse	direct	V. Gud
6. Agreement by Spouses on Dividing Property	inverse	J. Pais and P. White
7. Existence of Children	direct	V. Gud (two and more); M. Blair, J. Pais, and P. White
8. Age of Children	inverse	V. Gud
9. Agreement by Spouses on Questions of Raising a Child After the Divorce	inverse	J. Pais and P. White
10. Child's Acceptance of Fact of Divorce	inverse	J. Pais and P. White
11. Sex Role Ideas: Nontraditional	inverse	Dzh. Mirs
12. Length of the Marriage	direct	R. Weiss (if more than 2 years); V. Gud (for young families)
13. Interest in Occupation and Public Work	inverse	J. Pais and P. White; V. Gud (full-time work for women)
14. Economic Well-Being (income)	inverse	V. Gud; J. Pais and P. White; M. Blair
15. Approval of Divorce by Friends	inverse	V. Gud; L. Thompson and G. Spanier
16. Existence of Divorced Friends	inverse	V. Gud
17. Condemnation of Divorce by the Parents' Family	direct	V. Gud; M. Blair
18. Number of Single People in the Populated Point	inverse	J. Pais and P. White
19. Existence of Another Partner at the Moment of Divorce	no relationship	
V. Gud; L. Thompson and G. Spanier		
20. Geographic Mobility of the Spouses	inverse	J. Pais and P. White
21. Rural Origin of Spouse	direct	V. Gud
22. Education of Spouse	inverse	L. Thompson and G. Spanier; J. Pais and P. White
23. Age of Spouse	direct	V. Gud; M. Blair; Dzh. Mirs
24. Sex of Spouse	"trauma" greater for women	G. Kitson; Sh. Kraus

# **Effectiveness of Investments in the Social Sphere of the Countryside**

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ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian

No 1, Jan-Feb 88 (signed to press 18 Jan 88) pp 59-62

[Article by Petr Karpovich Yerygin, doctor of economic sciences and head of the scientific communism department of Kuban Agricultural Institute, appearing in our journal for the time, under the rubric "Facts, Commentary, and Observations (From the Sociologist's Desk)"]

[Text] The survey of kolkhoz members of Krasnodar Kray which we conducted showed that 42.5 percent of the respondents need housing, 36.7 percent need kindergartens and nursery schools, 38.4 percent need more

domestic services enterprises, 10.9 percent need medical institutions, 10.8 percent need stores and public catering enterprises, 4.6 percent need sports facilities, and 3.7 percent need music schools. The question arises of how great the return from satisfying these needs is.

The answer is provided by a study based on the method of grouping kolkhozes according to the corresponding features which make it possible to trace the operation of the law of large numbers and identify stable trends in socioeconomic processes. Analysis of the data obtained showed that Kuban kolkhozes differ considerably in terms of fixed nonproduction capital provided per kolkhoz member. In some years the differences reached a magnitude of more than 10-fold. And this is how that was reflected in the levels of the economies of various farms (see table).

## **Interrelationship of Social and Economic Factors of Kolkhoz Production in Krasnodar Kray**

Groups of Kolkhozes by Value of Fixed Nonproduction Capital per Kolkhoz Member (in rubles)

Indicators	up to 1,300			Group 3 as Percentage of Group 1
	1,301-2,000	more than 2,000		
Number of Farms in Group	27	33	20	—
Fixed Nonproduction Capital per Kolkhoz member (in rubles)	1,056	1,648	2,437	230.8
Proportion of Capital Investments in Nonproduction Construction (in percentages):				
housing	23.9	25.3	30.6	—
municipal and domestic services	20.3	35.9	47.2	—
Proportion of Fixed Nonproduction Capital in All the Farm's Fixed Capital (in percentages)	14.9	26.1	43.4	—
Structure of Fixed Nonproduction Capital:	8.9	12.1	15.9	—
housing	29.2	30.5	32.8	—
municipal and domestic services	14.2	16.3	18.8	—
Production of gross output:				
per kolkhoz member (in thousands of rubles)	5.3	6.4	6.9	130.2
per 100 hectares of agricultural land (in thousands of rubles)	67.1	74.6	76.9	114.6
per 100 rubles of fixed nonproduction capital (in rubles)	44.8	45.2	56.6	—
Level of Profitability (in percentages)	19.3	24.4	28.8	—

The table clearly shows that the magnitude of differentiation of grouping features is very significant. Yet the grouping included only 80 kolkhozes (of 314 in the kray) which are in approximately the same natural-economic conditions. One of the reasons for this difference is the amount of deductions from income for increasing fixed nonproduction capital.

But how do the amount and structure of this capital in kolkhozes which are part of our grouping differ? Let us compare the extreme groups of farms in the table. The structure of the annual ceiling used for capital investments in each farm on the whole includes a larger proportion of expenditures for nonproduction construction in the Group 3 kolkhozes. The same trend was noted when fixed nonproduction capital was put into operation

(14.2 percent in Group 1 as compared to 19.3 percent in Group 3). The difference here is slightly less, but that is because capital investments in building nonproduction objects and turning them over for operation do not coincide in time. For the first are figured at the end of the fiscal year and gradually accumulate in the object under construction. But Group 3 kolkhozes clearly have the advantage. As a result, Group 3 accounts for more fixed nonproduction capital per worker (8.9 percent in Group 1 as opposed to 15.9 percent in Group 3).

Let us pose a question: what is the optimal correlation in the structure of fixed nonproduction capital for the successful development of the public sector? For the answer let us turn to supplemental data, namely the structure of fixed nonproduction capital in the kolkhozes



surveyed. The proportion of expenditures for housing and municipal and domestic services rises from Group 1 to Group 3 (sometimes even to the detriment of the other sectors of the social sphere). This is in the spirit of the times, one might say: rural inhabitants' need for well-appointed housing and services increases more rapidly than, for example, the need to increase the energy-labor ratio and the capital-labor ratio. As a result, figured per 100 hectares of agricultural land, the farms of Group 1 have 16.7 square meters of living space in homes which belong to the farm, while in Group 3 they have double that.

From the table it is apparent that labor productivity increases from Group 1 kolkhozes to Group 2 and the indicator of the use of the main production capital in agriculture—land—improves. The output-capital ratio rises, although negligibly. And the result is greater profitability of production, which in turn provides advantageous conditions for developing the nonproduction sphere. That is how the socioeconomic potential which in the future will help increase the efficiency of public production of these farms is formed.

For the kolkhozes of the central zone of Krasnodar Kray in which this survey was conducted, the following indicators are presently most effective: for the cost of fixed nonproduction capital figured per kolkhoz member—within the range of 2,500 rubles, and for its proportion within all fixed capital—15-16 percent. Other grouping breakdowns also confirm the magnitude of these proportions with small deviations: for availability of housing resources, labor productivity, and for the level of profitability of farms on the whole.

As for the prospects of their changing, that depends on many factors, both social and economic ones. Savings in fixed nonproduction capital and growth in its volume influenced by social needs will continue. And significant changes resulting from the influence of scientific-technical progress on the country's agroindustrial complex should occur in the indicator of the proportion of fixed nonproduction capital in all fixed capital when it becomes possible to perform a greater volume of work with fewer expenditures following the appearance of more sophisticated means of labor. Allow me to cite an example. The appearance of the powerful and highly efficient grain harvesting combine Don-1500 in the fields will fundamentally change not only the structure of the farms' energy resources but will also involve a certain social perspective: in production esthetics, in the level of skills of operators, and in reconstruction of the maintenance base.

Here is one more example. In the Kuban today the most productive and hence promising breed of cows is the black-spotted breed. These animals account for no more than 15 percent of the total herd. Expanded reproduction of this breed requires substantial changes not only in production but also in the social infrastructure. There must be special training for mechanics and operators of

sophisticated milking machines and a higher level of consciousness and responsibility by workers for the work entrusted to them. And here we cannot get by without improving the nonproduction sphere. For the new type of worker being shaped also requires new living conditions. Those are the dialectics of developing society's production forces. That is why even now preference must be given to improving the material base of the social sphere.

In connection with this, it would be interesting to cite data on particular farms. Let us take two kolkhozes in Vyselkovskiy Rayon—the Elektrosila Kolkhoz and the Kolkhoz imeni Sverdlov. When the kolkhozes were grouped in terms of value of fixed nonproduction capital per worker, the first kolkhoz came out in Group 3 and the second—in Group 1 (2,200 rubles and 1,400 rubles, respectively). Let us see whether the material base of the social sphere is in fact more developed at the Elektrosila Kolkhoz. We find confirmation in the fact that the share of fixed nonproduction capital in the total volume of expenditures there is 1.5 times higher (14.7 percent and 9.7 percent). In 1985 alone the kolkhoz spend almost a third of all capital investments for construction of nonproduction objects while the Kolkhoz imeni Sverdlov spent no more than one-sixth.

It did not take long for the results to have an effect. The Elektrosila Kolkhoz produced gross output per average annual worker of 7,600 rubles in 1985 and the profitability of production reached 48.7 percent. These figures are much more modest at the Kolkhoz imeni Sverdlov: 5,000 rubles and 16 percent, respectively. I must also add that the Elektrosila Kolkhoz has only two-fifths as much agricultural land—6,500 hectares as opposed to 19,300 acres. But the production of gross output per farm was 67.4 percent as compared to that of the kolkhoz mentioned. The data speak for themselves.

Undoubtedly the relationship between each sector of the nonproduction sphere and economic improvement is distinctive. Let us take education. Expenditures for education and cadre training serve a dual purpose. Their social result is a rise in the population's educational and cultural level. But the economic effectiveness appears in greater labor productivity and improved quality of labor. Here are the data for the kolkhozes of Krylovskiy and Tikhoretskiy rayons in Krasnodar Kray. At farms where the rating levels of operators are higher, the indicators of use of the machine fleet constantly increase, shift and daily output per standard tractor increases, and the average annual indicator of the use of machines improves. Moreover, for first-class tractor operators the average annual output per machine is almost 35 percent higher than for third-class operators; and the level of education, length of service, and degree of professionalism, that is, everything that builds up as the years go by, are rising. When they filled out the questionnaire, about 72 percent of the 400 kolkhoz tractor operators said that general educational training had a decisive role in their continued professional growth.

Expenditures for education include indoctrination of the rising generation, including those of preschool age. Therefore, the kolkhoz's expenses for preschool institutions are paid for above all by social effect—improved indoctrination of children and hence training of labor replacements. At the same time, however, there is a clearly expressed economic effect, since the possibility arises of more extensive involvement of women in work in the public works system. No one has doubted the economic effectiveness of these expenditures for a long time now; only supply and demand in this area need ultimately to be balanced.

We can figure, for example, the relationship between the average annual output of work-days by female kolkhoz members and the level of availability of kindergartens and nursery schools. On this basis it is easy to determine the increase in gross product per female worker. This is what happened here. In Group 1 farms the average annual output per female worker totaled 274 workdays, and in Group 3—386. The indicator of availability of kindergartens was 111 places and 174 places per 1,000 rural residents, respectively. For the Kuban the norm is considered 140 places.

Allow me to cite the following economic calculations. The initial data for this are the following: in 1984 the kolkhozes of Krasnodar Kray produced gross output worth 26.6 rubles in 1 work-day. The women in Group 3 on the average worked 112 days more than those in Group 1. When we multiple 112 man-days by 26.6 rubles we get a total of almost 3,000 rubles. Each woman in Group 3 produced that much more gross output in a year. Naturally, other socioeconomic factors had an effect here. But many people put availability of kindergartens and nursery schools first. Thus, to the survey question "What, in your opinion, needs to be built or expanded on the farm above all?" 75 percent of the young mothers answered: "Kindergartens and nursery schools." Here are more figures which confirm the importance of this factor. At the Druzhba Kolkhoz in Krasnogvardeyskiy Rayon the availability of kindergartens and nursery schools was 65 percent of the norm. The output per female kolkhoz member averaged less than 240 man-days. At the Rossiya Kolkhoz in the same rayon the output is close to the norm. The average annual output totals 275 man-days.

Housing has been a very crucial problem. In addition to the social function, the housing system also performs an economic function by influencing material production. At the present time the internal housing fund figured per 100 hectares of land at the kolkhozes of Krasnodar Kray is no more than 30 square meters. But among the different farms and even among whole groups of farms the difference in this indicator is fairly significant. In order to identify the role of the housing system in the development of public production in the countryside, we grouped the Kuban kolkhozes according to the amount of living space figured per 100 hectares of agricultural land. In Group 1 this figure averages 18 square meters and in Group 3—42

square meters. The difference is impressive. Where does it come from? It turns out that the share of capital investments in housing construction in the structure of expenditures for nonproduction construction totaled 41.3 percent in Group 3 as opposed to 35.1 percent in Group 1. One might say that there is essentially no housing problem in these kolkhozes. At some kolkhozes there were only a few people on the waiting lists. It is interesting that it is in these kolkhozes that 290 work-days were worked per kolkhoz member, while in the comparable group this indicator does not exceed 250 work-days. Gross product worth 8,500 rubles was received per worker, while in Group 1 it was almost 2,000 rubles less. Accordingly, the profitability of production was higher for them—26.1 percent as opposed to 21.1 percent.

Domestic services in the countryside are important in increasing social and economic efficiency. The form of annual reporting by kolkhozes authorized by the USSR Central Statistical Administration envisions gathering the necessary information to establish this indicator. In particular, Form No 19 includes initial numerical material for determining the volume of paid services to the population at so-called release prices. Since we have this data and know the average annual number of kolkhoz members involved in public production, we can calculate the relative amount of services rendered to the population.

Health care is a component part of the nonproduction sphere. Social effectiveness here includes improved health and a lower rate of illness among laborers, and on this basis longer periods of vigorous activity at the enterprise. The economic effect may be determined by calculating losses from illness. The yearly reports of the kolkhozes contain the information for this calculation. We calculated that in 1985 absences from work because of sickness cost our kolkhozes losses of 2.5 million work-days. The amount of damages this year because of kolkhoz members being sick came to 62 million rubles, or 3.75 percent of the total.

Analysis using grouping methods shows the high effectiveness of all the main directions for developing the social sphere of the countryside.

#### **Unregulated Labor of Scientific Workers**

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ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian

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[Article by Svetlana Nikolayevna Bykova, candidate of philosophical sciences and senior scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Sociological Research, who published the article "The Problem of 'Equal Opportunity' in Contemporary Bourgeois Sociology of Education" in our journal (No 1, 1977, coauthor)]

[Text] Supplemental unregulated labor is fairly widespread. Does this involve a desire to increase earnings or is unregulated labor a means of satisfying social and

spiritual needs? To what extent does supplemental labor influence the efficiency of the activity at the main work place? Finally, do the earnings obtained as a result of supplemental labor influence the economic differentiation of families?

Results of research done by the sector of social development of the intelligentsia of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Sociological Research confirm that scientific work is one of the main types of pursuits in free time for 23.8 percent of the representatives of the scientific-technical intelligentsia in Moscow (1984), for 21.4 percent—in Novosibirsk (1985), and for 31.7 percent—in Krasnoyarsk (1986). But on the whole, as a survey in scientific production associations and intersectorial scientific-technical complexes of Moscow (1987) showed, 66.1 percent of the respondents are involved in scientific work, design, inventions, and the like in their free time, and 23.8 percent do so regularly. Ten to 14 percent of the scientific workers and engineers have supplemental earnings unrelated to their main profession (above all from physical labor during vacation).

For a long time workers in science were the leaders among those working in the economy in terms of wage level. But in recent years the situation has changed: in 1940 the average earnings of a worker in science and scientific services exceeded the same indicator for a worker in the economy by a factor of 1.41, in 1960—by a factor of 1.37, in 1970—by a factor of 1.14, and since 1980—by a factor of 1.06 [Source 1].

Nonetheless, differentiation within science itself has remained high and is characterized, first, by "discrepancy" in wages among the various categories of workers (the discrepancy may be 1:6 within one scientific subdivision) and, secondly, little relationship between the labor contribution and the amount of earnings received.

Defense of the dissertation and promotion undoubtedly had an effect on earnings, but after that length of service in science played the main role. Publications, inventions, and participation in research served as a condition for receiving bonuses and pay supplements, but only in the event of a positive evaluation by the leadership and within the financial capabilities of the organization. But even with a higher degree and a stable position, the increase in earnings stopped upon reaching 10 years of service in science. Supplemental work became the only source for raising income. Especially since in science the potential for combining one's main and supplemental labor without changing its character and content is fairly high. In most cases it is a continuation of the professional activity (teaching, fee publications, lectures, and the like).

More than 30 percent of the workers in the social sciences are engaged in supplemental paid labor and 10 percent of the workers in the natural and technical sciences are. Men are involved in supplemental paid

labor twice as often as women. It is most widespread in the 25-40 year-old age group. Among doctors of sciences 20-25 percent of those surveyed were involved in supplemental labor, among candidates of sciences—16 percent, and among scientific associates without a degree—19 percent; in academic institutions—14-15 percent of those surveyed, in sectorial scientific research institutes—10 percent, and in planning and design organizations—8-10 percent.

A retrospective evaluation of the factors influencing the selection of the profession of scientist showed that the creative side of the work was of decisive importance to 65.0 percent of those involved in supplemental labor (43.5 percent for the group as a whole). In contrast, the possibility of material security at that time (when they were in the midst of selecting the future type of pursuit) was significant for only 5.6 percent. It is no accident that the degree of satisfaction with the creative side of their activity was substantially higher for those involved in supplemental labor. At the same time, however, 49.1 percent of those involved in supplemental professional labor and 40.5 percent—in supplemental nonprofessional labor did not make use of all their potential in their main job. It may be assumed that for scientific workers and engineers, unregulated labor is not merely a means of satisfying material needs (scientific workers whose income per family member is 100-200 rubles a month are more often engaged in supplemental labor) so much as a need to express their individuality in varied ways, and in an activity free from formalism and excessive organization.

The absence of clear criteria for evaluating the quality of labor, leveling in payment (introduction of a new grid of positions in science has changed little since the criteria remain vague while opportunities for subjective evaluations have become even broader), and finally, strict dependence on the manager increase the social significance of supplemental labor as a means of acquiring a better self-image and recognition.

Involvement in supplemental labor also involves the desire to increase one's range of knowledge. Thus, courses and self-education are the main types of pursuits in free time for 20.2 percent of those surveyed. Among those engaged in supplemental professional labor 55.7 percent mentioned this reason, and in supplemental nonprofessional labor—28.4 percent.

Supplemental professional labor does not result in leveling but in an even greater disproportion in the material status of scientific workers since the most highly paid of those workers are involved in it. As for nonprofessional labor, the opposite is true here. Those whose family income is 50-150 rubles per person are above all involved in this labor. Among engineers and junior scientific associates 10-12 percent are involved in it, among senior scientific associates—9 percent, and among leaders of subdivisions—3 percent.



The imperfections of labor payment and the weak link between earnings and the results of labor result in scientific associates and laboratory workers organizing work artels and spending their vacations on rural projects or at taiga logging enterprises. Interest in physical labor is high among scientific workers. But not because people consider the ozone of the taiga useful: they go to make money. And unlike the main work place they receive pay commensurate with the final result [Source 2]. Another way of using the intellectual potential of science cadres is to form design brigades which perform specific assignments during free time from their main jobs [Source 3]. That is beneficial to both society and the specialists.

Introduction of the Law on Individual Labor Activity is creating a new situation in the sphere of application of supplemental labor and in the sphere of income distribution; the results of this are difficult to predict at this time. Obviously it may bring about changes both in the structure of the professional detachment of the intelligentsia and in its social make-up.

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#### Who We Are (Young People on Themselves and the Older Generation)

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[Article by Stanislav Lvovich Katayev, candidate of philosophical sciences and docent of the Zaporozhye Industrial Institute, whose articles published in our journal are "The Musical Tastes of Young People" (No 1, 1986) and "Content and Intonation of Youth Songs" (No 1, 1987)]

[Text] The problem of fathers and sons is one of the leading ones in social consciousness, perhaps second only to the topic of love. In a situation of social upheavals and abrupt turnarounds in social development, the problem of the interrelationship of generations is generally aggravated. And today too, young people more and more often accuse "fathers" of promoting stagnation and

"grandfathers" of not daring to oppose the cult of personality. Parents in turn accuse children of forgetting civic ideals and of infantilism and consumerism. And emotions at times are whipped up to the extreme [Source 1]. Frequently opponents use them to try to stifle doubts in themselves. Because for each of the sides the mutual charges are ultimately attempts to answer very complex questions: "Who are we? Who have we become in subsequent generations? Who should we be?"

Let us examine what answers young men and women provide for this type of question.

First allow me to give several preliminary explanations. During a sociological study seniors at a technical VUZ gave their opinions. The survey was conducted in 1986-1987 in two stages. First a group of 20 people was given some questions in open form: what are differences between today's young generation, on the one hand, and "fathers and grandfathers"—on the other? They had to evaluate characteristics, moral norms, ideas of the future and culture, and attitude toward the family, technology, nature, and life's blessings. Closed questions were formulated on the basis of content analysis of the opinions expressed. The second stage included a full-scope survey of several groups of students (108 people of whom three-quarters were young women). The answers to certain questions were so unanimous that one may say that they are representative for students of technical VUZes. Nor were fundamental differences found in the opinions of young men and women—with the exception of certain cases which will be specially specified later.

At the same time, however, I would like to caution against literal and unilateral interpretation of the data obtained. Analysis of the answers to the open questions confirms that many young people choose different criteria of comparison: "My generation is less active but more independent," writes one female student. Another notes: "We are more educated and sure of ourselves, but less independent." Some of the respondents generally question the validity of a direct comparison. This is a characteristic opinion: "It seems to me that the previous generations were better, but that does not mean that we are bad." Naturally, when the questions were formalized it was not possible to take into account all approaches and all nuances of opinion. And there is one last methodological comment. The generations were evaluated in terms of eight parameters. The significance of each of them, "indifference toward or involvement in public affairs," for example, was measured on a scale of -5 to +5. If mutually exclusive characteristics ("desire for mutual understanding," for example) could not be identified, the minimal manifestation of the quality was fixed at the negative pole and the maximal—at the positive pole. The results of the study are cited in the table.

# Young People's Evaluation of the Social-Moral Qualities of Generations, in percentages

Criteria	Generation*	Percentage of Evaluations			Average Score
		Positive	Negative	No Evaluation	
Collectivism—Egoism**	peers	6	81	13	-2.3
	fathers	72	12	16	+1.9
	grandfathers	93	5	2	+3.2
Involvement—Indifference	peers	44	40	16	-0.2
	fathers	89	2	9	+2.5
	grandfathers	92	4	4	+3.4
Responsibility—Irresponsibility	peers	49	44	7	-0.1
	fathers	80	11	9	+3.0
	grandfathers	96	—	4	+3.3
Activism—Inertia	peers	34	54	12	-0.9
	fathers	83	12	5	+2.3
	grandfathers	78	9	13	+3.4
Confidence—Lack of Confidence	peers	64	20	16	+1.5
	fathers	88	2	10	+2.7
	grandfathers	79	8	13	+2.3
Desire for Mutual Understanding	peers	56	31	13	+0.6
	fathers	74	10	16	+1.9
	grandfathers	53	27	20	+0.7
Attitude Toward Family	peers	48	33	19	+0.3
	fathers	87	7	6	+2.0
	grandfathers	84	5	11	+2.9
Attitude Toward Nature	peers	62	24	14	+0.9
	fathers	63	26	11	+1.3
	grandfathers	76	10	14	+2.3

\*On the basis of the respondents' evaluations, the age limits of generations were defined in the following way: peers (my generation)—17-27 years old; fathers—38-55 years old; and grandfathers—56-78 years old.

\*\*In answering the open questions the respondents set collectivism rather than individualism against egoism. This alternative is widespread in mass consciousness, but in reality altruism is the opposite of egoism.

First of all it is striking that young people give a higher evaluation to the older generation but have a fairly critical attitude toward themselves. And the respondents regard the civic qualities of the individual as the primary virtues of their parents and, accordingly, the shortcomings of their peers. Differences in evaluation decline when we are dealing with features which are manifested in direct relations. Incidentally, in this case a fact which does not fit into traditional ideas is also revealed. The desire for mutual understanding is stronger, in the opinion of those surveyed, in the older generations. Yet how often we hear adults being accused—"You don't understand and you don't want to understand." Why do the survey data contradict such a popular assertion? It seems that additional study is needed to explain this paradox. And here is one other mystery: among the features characteristic of contemporary young men and women, "confidence" gathered the largest number of votes. That is fairly surprising for there were a multitude of occasions to conclude that "young people lack character and do not themselves know what they want."

The study revealed a number of, so to speak, particular but very interesting circumstances. According to the opinion of those surveyed, maximal manifestation of a

particular quality is a rarity. The respondents' pencils marked points on the scale from -3 to +3. The average evaluation was 2.6. Today's youth are obviously not inclined to moral rigorism. It is true that there are differences here between young men and young women. For the former the average score is 2.4 and for the latter—2.7. Young women more often express opposite opinions while young men are marked by greater unanimity. Thus, the absolute average score for the former is 0.7 and for the latter—1.4. That means that the positive evaluations of some of the young women were "canceled out" by the negative evaluations of others. At the same time, however, conformism is more strongly developed among representatives of the fair sex. In other words, "rebelliousness" appears more rarely among young women, but then it is more striking and stands out more.

Differences also exist in the evaluation of some other parameters. For example, both young men and young women have a low opinion of their peers' attitude toward the family. However, as should be expected, among the former the number of skeptics is double the number among the latter. Young men's own attitude toward nature and their fathers also does not give them satisfaction. But young women make accusations only

against their own generation, and then not very sharp ones. Representatives of the fair sex see the source of dissonance between generations more in themselves and in their "grandfathers." But young men evaluated grandfathers' and fathers' desire for mutual understanding equally (+1.0), while for themselves they gave a -0.6 score. In other words, they put responsibility for possible conflicts on their own generation. Most of the respondents believe that their peers are more egotistical and less enterprising than their elders and show indifference more often and responsibility less often. What is the reason for this opinion?

In answers to the open questions the difference between generations was related above all to the war and hardships and rarely to the cult of personality. This means that many young people grasp the historical-moral paradox—improved living conditions may be accompanied by a certain moral degradation—and in general regret it. It is true that some of those surveyed either do not see the differences or do not consider them significant. From 5 to 10 percent of the respondents give a negative evaluation both to themselves and to their elders. When they characterized one generation, approximately 20 percent (depending on the criteria) mark 0 and when they characterize a different one, they put down particular scores. Indirectly that attests to an unwillingness to define the differences between generations.

How should the fact of the young generation's low self-image be regarded? Undoubtedly some of the young men and women have a constructive, critical attitude toward themselves. Recognizing their shortcomings, young people are prepared, if only in words, to overcome them. Others attribute the shortcomings of the moral position of their peers to the impossibility of showing positive qualities and the lack of spheres to apply their efforts. If the need arises, these respondents believe, young people will follow their moral duty. Usually such a position is backed up by references to the construction of BAM [Baikal Amur Trunk Line], internationalist soldiers in Afghanistan, and the like. Finally, there are young people who are simply defiant, and even in denial of positive features see a way to self-affirmation and to formation of the generation's self-consciousness.

The results of the study were discussed with representatives of the older generations. The following main viewpoints were expressed. 1. Young people evaluate themselves accurately. They really are worse than their elders. 2. Young men and women have been instilled with the idea that they are worse. In fact that is not true. 3. Negative features are put forward specially for show. However, young people are better than they say they are. 4. The low self-image is a result of demographic factors and unrelated to the peculiarities of the times they are living in. 5. For different generations moral qualities merely have common names. In every age the corresponding features receive a definite embodiment. Therefore, it is a mistake to use any uniform criteria without identifying their concrete historical meaning.

The author agrees with the last point of view. With only one significant reservation: the overwhelming majority of young men and women involved in the study do not reflect on the meaning of the concepts presented and, judging from everything, accept them unequivocally and literally. Up to this point intergenerational semantic differentiation has hardly been studied at all. We hope that the problems identified in this study will serve as incentive for further work by specialists.

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#### The 'Third Economy'

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[Article by Igor Vasilyevich Bestuzhev-Lada, doctor of historical sciences, professor, head of the sector of social forecasting and planning of the USSR Academy of Sciences Sociological Research Institute, author of a number of monographs on the history and theory of social forecasting, among them "Okno v budushcheye" [Window into the Future] (1970), "Poiskovoye sotsialnoye prognozirovaniye" [Exploratory Social Forecasting] (1984), "Normativnoye sotsialnoye prognozirovaniye" [Normative Social Forecasting] (1987), and others, and regular contributor to our journal, under the rubric "Sociological Sociopolitical Commentary"]

[Text] One must know the social "zones" where violations of the norms of the socialist way of life systematically arise in order to make a sound judgment on the problems of distributive relations and social justice. Inasmuch as there are fewer and fewer "zones" closed to criticism in our country, the time has come to pose the question of the social mechanism for obtaining nonlabor income. What disturbs N.F. Naumova and V.Z. Rogovin [Source 2] so much is the result of the operation of a certain type of economy which I shall call the "third economy" (understanding the "first" to be the country's national economic complex and the "second" to be the domestic economy), where more than a hundred billion man-hours are spent every year (not that many fewer than in the first economy) and which has its own very specific economic laws which operate.

We encounter the "third economy" almost every day.

A cook. Salary—120 rubles a month. His wife is a housewife. His children are in school. Official income per family member is less than 30 rubles a month. How can he make ends meet? This is how: a private residence worth more than 100,000 rubles. A dacha worth approximately the same. His own personal "Volga." Expensive furniture, crystal, and carpets, wardrobes crammed with the best clothes. Expensive fancy foods at home, at the dacha, or in a restaurant almost every week. And every



year a thousand for recreation. And how much he has saved is a secret. Because the owner has not yet been caught. And therefore is not a criminal.

A store director. Salary—137 rubles a month. Everything exactly the same. Except that the private residence is even more expensive. It is so expensive that it staggered the imagination of the entire population of the large oblast city. The only difference is that he has already been caught. The savings books and money boxes have been confiscated. It is not reported how much was in the savings accounts, but in the money box buried under a fir tree in the garden and found using a metal detector were 4,000 rubles and 80,000 worth of jewelry.

Of course, these cases, no matter how many there are of them, can always be contrasted with the exact opposite: are there really no cooks and directors of stores who live according to their consciences in our country? And vice-versa—are swindlers only common in the services sphere? It would be unacceptable to cast a shadow on a whole sphere of production and on all the people working in it on the basis of isolated cases.

Let us try to understand why in some cases people behave one way and in others completely differently. In particular, why in certain circumstances do people as a rule begin to violate the moral and criminal codes even though they suspect how it will almost certainly end? And what kind of conditions are those that prove to be stronger than the fear of inevitable retribution?

Let us risk a hypothesis. As is well known, the method of production in our country is socialist and, consequently, production relations are also socialist. But where "gaps" which it does not fill form, phenomena alien to the prevailing method of production frequently arise. In addition, relations among people as members of different social groups and institutions exist on the basis of production relations and in close interaction with them. They are not economic relations and not material relations but they are capable of the strongest impact on the latter.

And so it turns out that social relations which are foreign to socialist ones and seem to erode them take shape in the above-mentioned "gaps." It is important not to ignore them and not to reduce everything to abuses, but to try to identify the essence of the matter, that is, the causes of their confrontation with socialist production relations. In short, we must consider them to be like all other antisocial phenomena, crime and drunkenness, for example. But to do this we must become a little better acquainted with the strange world of the "third economy."

Have you thought about why some taxi drivers who are not at all misers watching every kopeck and not chiselers who try to squeeze money out of the passenger by any means, but are normal people like you and me, not only

accept the deliberate humiliation of taking what they have not earned, but also react with real annoyance if they are paid exactly what is on the meter?

I get in a taxi next to the driver Slava. It is a long trip and we carry on a leisurely conversation about this and that. I ask if it is not hard for him in the taxi fleet. I caution him in advance that I am not so much interested in his personal fate as in the working conditions of the "average" taxi driver. Therefore let us ignore Slava's last name and the number of his car given next to his photograph. "The most important thing is to get a new car," Slava answers. After all, it is the same for a car as for a person: as old age approaches, illnesses increase. Only a car begins to "fray" much sooner—in the fourth or fifth year. Of course it may run for 20 years. But it is just the same as an old man with an artificial heart, lungs, and kidneys. It is him, but really it isn't. So the bosses decide who gets a new one. And there is only one way to deal with the bosses if you are not on friendly relations—a hundred-ruble note. It is just like with an old car: either it stands idle or you pay the mechanics one 10-ruble note after another. And besides the mechanics there are still the dispatcher, the head of the garage, the guard at the gates, the car wash—it goes on and on.

"And how much do you average in a month?"

Slava wavers. For I am not so much looking into his soul but into his pocketbook. And this, we both know, is unseemly. So I remind him once again that I am not speaking of him personally, but of what he considers to be a typical taxi driver.

"It's difficult to say, it varies from day to day and year to year, and, the main thing, from person to person. Some might simply do it for years at 150 a month after all the fees. And some manage to earn two or three times more. I'd say this: if you use your head you can certainly accumulate somewhere around 350. Deducting 100 for all the payoffs that leaves 250. A perfectly decent wage."

I have talked with other taxi drivers on this same subject more than once. The thinking differed, but in regard to income everything came out the same: if you want to have a decent wage—lay out approximately 100 a month.

... In one of the most prestigious Moscow restaurants where we took a sponsored delegation, I got tired of arguing with my colleagues and sat down a little ways off. A waiter in a black smoking jacket with a bow-tie came up and... asked for permission to sit down next to me. We gradually got to talking.

"Do you think that being a waiter means serving food and clearing the table and that's it?" he told me. "It's being a porter above all. In one shift you cover more than 10 versts carrying a heavy tray. Like at the train station. Only there they thought of using carts to make the porter's work easier a long time ago, while we carry

things ourselves, like 100 or 200 years ago. Toward the end of the shift your feet feel like cotton and your eyes are so tired you can't see. Do you really think that somebody would take this job for a 100 or a 150 a month? It'd be better to be a ditch-digger or a loading hand. But unlike a loading hand, we have to keep up our defenses on three fronts: the customer, the cook and the bartender, and the bosses. You can't 'write off' the cook and the bartender or they'll give you something on the tray that'll make the customer explode. Then the maitre-d', the production chief, the director... No matter what, you have to give them their share. Each restaurant has a definite share. Just try to hold it back or short them! They'll trip you up so badly that at best you'll manage to leave 'at your own request.' Do you have to pay a lot? About the same as you yourself get. Everybody knows our wage: 100 plus or minus 100 is nothing at all. But you need several hundred for yourself. And you pay off the same amount. So how can you do without tips and 'preferred' customers? And food without problems for your whole family besides. So you can live."

The "third economy" maintains itself on scarcity. If there is no scarcity—then there is no problem either, and no one tries to ingratiate himself with anyone and no one pays too much. A shortage in the "first economy" may sometimes be covered by the "second"—going home to have supper after seeing the line at the doors of a restaurant, for example. But when a person must get something, get in, or receive something, then the "benefactor"—clerk, ticket-collector, or bureaucrat—must be compensated. And the fate of the "benefactor" himself is utterly and completely in the hands of at least 10 people who monitor and regulate his activity. Even if nine of them are disinterested persons who unconcernedly watch the "benefactor" putting more than he should into his pocket, the 10th one will most likely put out his hand for his share. And then, you look, and the ninth one figures out what is what, and the eighth one's wife will explain to him who can live and who cannot, the seventh will be jealous...

As a result a vicious circle or rather a pyramid is formed where, in contrast to the laws of nature, everything flows not from the top to the bottom but vice-versa, from the bottom to the top. And the higher the place in this pyramid, the more flows. Of course, this vicious circle does not exist everywhere. Let us not groundlessly smear all workers. The only thing that interests us in this case is understanding why it happens.

From the sociological standpoint, the mechanism is fairly simple. One might even say primitive. As soon as needs are not satisfied in a lawful, legal way, unlawful, "left-hand" methods of satisfying them appear. One of the foundations of the socialist economy has been violated—strict control over the measure of labor and consumption—and dishonest people immediately appear who use the loopholes which have opened up for personal enrichment. And when social immunity has not

been developed in the society and when stagnant phenomena become established in the economy or culture, the evil which has emerged inevitably spreads.

Let us recall the "blue crook" Alkhen from "The Twelve Chairs" by I. Ilf and Ye. Petrov. Could he cram a lot into his apartment? Even Ostap Bender himself felt very uncomfortable with the cherished million he had acquired. At that time he would have tried to build himself a mansion worth half a million, furnish it with suites of furniture from General Popov's wife, and provide himself with a personal Lincoln instead of a pitiful Antelope-Gnu! Since that time our economy has grown enormously. But at the same time so have opportunities for rapacity and all kinds of ways to get more than you are supposed to. And when for years people looked on such phenomena as either an unavoidable evil or the escapades of certain dishonest persons who were caught and that was the end of it, the situation was only aggravated. And what is more, people were accustomed to looking without indignation and even with envy at the nouveau riche who boasted of their wealth which came from no-one-knew-where (but everyone knew where!). Could any changes for the better have been expected in light of that?

So, the "third economy" naturally emerges everywhere that the "first economy" does not operate and the "second" does not reach. By spontaneously filling the gaps which form for certain reasons in the "first" and in the "second" economies, it shamelessly preys on them.

A small fish which has jerked on the float too roughly or violated the rules of the game is skillfully put forward by a slightly bigger fish which has cunningly hidden in the weeds to evade the arm of the law. A second little fish and a third... and now they pull in a big-toothed pike with a whole suitcase of money in his mouth. One pike, then another... Well, what do you know! What a giant catfish has been caught, a regular whale!

The "pike" and the "whale" are not necessarily the director or manager of some enterprise. As we have seen, it may certainly be the most ordinary cook who has managed to fix himself up in such a way that either he himself gathers tribute from his comrades or he does not pay it to those of higher rank and manages to rake together several times more than the ordinary "small fish."

And there is more. The "small fish" and the "pike" and even the "whale" do not necessarily mean mansions and Mercedes, dachas and yachts, drunken parties for hundreds of people, and spendthrift lovers. The descendants of Gobseks and other miserly knights are alive. A newly arrived Koreyko may live in an ordinary five-floor apartment house, have 1950's furniture, wear a cheap suit, and eat ordinary cabbage soup and goulash. But he collects his thousands meticulously right up to the arrival

of those people whom the state has charged with confiscating these unjust thousands and, as they used to say in the old days, "taking" the person who owns them.

But it is clearly not enough to confine ourselves to punishing the usurers (although they must be punished). The specific features of the operation and development of the "third economy" must be studied and a system—a system surely!—of measures must be put into effect to prevent the appearance of thistles in our economic cornfield.

The "third" economy did not appear yesterday and is not found only in our country. Foreign scientists call it the shadow, black, gray, hidden, secret, underground, unofficial, parallel, or irregular economy and evaluate its size at the start of the 1980's to be between 5-8 percent (France, Canada) and 8-12 percent (United States) of the total volume of the economy of the corresponding country. For some countries this figure is rising to 15-17 percent and even higher. In the West such an economy is usually related to crisis phenomena in production and the desire of some of the population to evade rising taxes and find at least illegal income given growing unemployment. Sociological surveys have shown, for example, that about one-fifth of the population of Norway had income from the secret economy while more than one-quarter utilized its services. That is perhaps a typical picture for the developed capitalist countries.

Study of the data on the "third economy" in countries of the West clearly shows that it has fundamental characteristic features in different social systems and in different countries. A global approach is ruled out in this case. In the Soviet Union we would try in vain to find the roots of the "third economy" in the tragedy of overproduction and in attempts to be saved from perpetual unemployment, to avoid enormous taxes, and the like.

And the most deceptive impression which we already mentioned is that the sphere of the "third economy" coincides in full with the services sphere. Nothing of the kind!

When above-limit and above-norm stocks of raw materials and equipment worth millions of rubles are formed in some enterprises and their neighbors are desperately trying, at any price, to obtain just a little of this wealth without which production "expires," then the principles of the socialist economy are violated and troubled waters are formed in which the various small fish, pikes, and catfish begin splashing around merrily. If with a wave of her hand a clerk is able to extricate something from under the counter which provides profit equal to her monthly earnings, then what kind of trade (in the strict sense of the word) can we be referring to? For things are not sold here, deals are "made"; things are not purchased, they are "gotten." And in places where the shortage is substantial, "black markets" inevitably emerge.

A whole network of such markets has surrounded our housing from all sides. There is the apartment market: for a bribe one can worm into a cooperative apartment

building that has just been built. And there is the special market for individuals building their own houses. Have you seen many stores where future cottages, dachas, and garden sheds are sold? Or even stores with sets of building materials? But cottages, dachas, and garden sheds are built and repaired by hundreds of thousands if not millions of people every year. Where do they get the materials and how are those materials paid for?

But let us pass over the "black markets" in daily life. Let us move on to the higher spheres of health care, education, and management. Alas, we find "black markets" even here.

In the sphere of management let us cast our glance on only one "shop," the one where the monument to our stupidity, called the DOCUMENT, is displayed. As soon as your foot steps into the sphere of management, a document is needed immediately. Thousands of documents. That you are who you are, that you have so many children, that you live somewhere and work somewhere (even though it is on your passport and identity card). That they do not object, do not prohibit, do not notify, do not do this, do not do that, and so on. There they believe that if you put together a document, even without deception and using words and even documents—it is blatant deceit. But to speak honestly, have the number of abuses been reduced from the billions of documents which are easy for swindlers to fake and very difficult for honest people to get? And if it is difficult, they say, let us try to make it easier. And so it starts: a document for a ruble, a document for a three-ruble note, a document for a five-ruble note.

Strictly speaking, the document system itself is not to blame either; it is the bureaucratic cult of prohibitions. "You cannot!" "It is not allowed!" But make a payoff to the right person and you can, it is allowed. So bureaucratic barriers help shady wheeler-dealers pull off their dirty deals more smoothly and hinder an effective struggle against these deals and against these wheeler-dealers.

The best means of struggle against pollution of the social environment is no shortages. That is why the party's course to accelerate the country's socioeconomic development and increase the efficiency of our state and domestic economy is also a course to undermine the "third economy," to destroy it for good and make it disappear. This is the sector of the main strike, and after defining it we will be able to bring down all the power of public control on the flank of the "third economy." Departmental control in this case is ineffective. When they await "their own" inspector, the Lyapkins-Tyapkins and the Bobchinskiy's and the Dobchinskiy's merely rub their hands with joy and prepare to receive a dear (in the literal sense) guest. Generally any bureaucratic control, even control that goes beyond their own department, does not and cannot give significant results.

An important focus of the counterattack on the "third economy" is flexible price-setting. Its essential features are simple: anything really worth 10 rubles must not be



sold for a ruble. Otherwise, the item will immediately be sold from under the counter and 9 (and even 99) rubles will end up in the pocket of "black market" dealers. It makes better sense when a person can buy a desired, fashionable item through a trade name store, even at a higher price than usual. On the other hand, it is just as reasonable to sell goods that have gone out of fashion and not found a buyer at a lowered or even discount price. And that is certainly no new discovery: there are trade name stores and there are marked down goods. Only the system does not exist, the scope is not sufficient, and there is not enough flexibility in price-setting. As a result, millions if not billions of rubles flow past the state pocket into the purses of the usurers.

Subsidized prices for bread and milk, for children's food, and for certain consumer goods are understandable. However, we must take care that the "free" bread is not fed to livestock and that our children do not hurl rolls like snowballs during school breakfast. But it is absolutely impossible to understand why goods in so-called higher demand are knowingly underpriced, for we know in advance that the item will not reach the buyer without an added amount for the seller. After all, people finally got the idea of selling old books or books in high demand not at the face value marked on the jacket but at the commission price set by a commodity researcher in conformity with market conditions. And that is why, for example, a volume from the "Library of World Literature" (face value of 1 ruble 50 kopecks) is officially sold under the new price at 22 rubles 50 kopecks. And there is no speculation at all! Simply a flash of commercial sense which has automatically transferred thousands of rubles from the pocket of the book swindler to state income.

If we are speaking of books, in our opinion differentiation of publications could strike a major blow against the "black market" in books. For mass reading—cheap editions like "novel newspapers", for public libraries—books on high-quality paper, and for collectors—gift editions at antique shop prices. Incidentally, all this has already begun to gradually appear, but somehow very timidly, unsystematically, and unthinkingly.

Something like it is also happening with housing in our country. The good sense of the need to differentiate apartment payments according to the apartment's location and quality has been making tortuously slow headway for years. In the same way, the sensible idea that if you remain alone in an enormous apartment in your old age it should be advantageous for you to exchange that apartment for a smaller one has faded away. And here is another idea: instead of dispensing apartments for nothing, would it not be more sensible to sell them so that a person would not try to earn an apartment, but to earn money for an apartment? Today by no means is everyone able to make an advance payment of many thousands of rubles and later pay for it out of small wages, especially young people. But certainly installments can be made more acceptable and for cooperative housing even paid out of the enterprise's capital in exchange for conscientious work at that enterprise.

I see nothing terrible in the existence of housing-exchange brokers who would receive a payment for their services at a set price rather than for a coin or two and turn over the profits to the cashier, as is done for notary services. And, in addition, guarantee to match the kind needed. Nor do I see anything terrible if "mini-housing construction combines" appear ready to build a garden shed or even a cottage for you, and at real prices for such kinds of goods and services which, as everybody knows, are an order higher than nominal prices. For the difference will go into the state treasury too!

Receiving decent housing on credit and later repaying this credit through honest labor, erecting a garden shed during the summer or remodeling an apartment in two or three days at a firm price which does not need to be raised at all, exchanging a large apartment for a small one and if necessary replacing it with a more comfortable one for an appropriate supplemental payment—if these services are done legally, it will be worse for the "black marketeers." And so, better for you and me.

I would like to have a choice: either to go to the free rayon polyclinic or to the cost-accounting polyclinic beside it and pay for care and consultation there. Just pay, rather than thrusting your hand into the doctor's jacket with tears of shame in your eyes.

Under socialism it is not customary to extract payment for instruction in a school or a VUZ. But, in our opinion, it would be sensible for enterprises and institutions concluding a contract agreement with students to say: we will pay the cost of your studies for you and add on something every month to your stipend, and you study conscientiously and then just as conscientiously work off the money invested by the enterprise.

Finally, if we reduced the astronomical number of prohibitions and documents in the management sphere, then the number of three-ruble notes and five-ruble notes which migrate from the pocket of the suppliant citizen to the pockets of the bureaucratic authorities and suppliers would be reduced proportionally.

And, finally, we are striking one more blow against the "third economy" by transforming extra earnings on the "left" into perfectly "right" earnings. Why, for example, should a handyman have to explain himself to the precinct officer if he can buy a license for legal extra earnings in the services sphere or pay the appropriate tax for it? But this is the trouble: such exorbitant prices are set for licenses right off that many people wonder whether the game is worth the candle. Or the tax is set in such a way that some people prefer "paying off" in the old way with a bribe—it proves to be cheaper. But if there are still no firm guarantees that either with a license or with taxes a supplemental "payment" will not still somehow have to be made, and if there is no firm guarantee that what has been legalized today will not be made illegal again tomorrow—then will many people get licenses and pay taxes? And we really can see how slowly,

drop by drop, the little stream whose source is the Law on Individual Labor is starting to flow. But it should already be starting to flow like a deep river. In our opinion, the problem is held up for lack of a rational license-tax policy and the lack of a reinforced guarantee on the security and profitability of individual labor.

We are against robbery, but we are also against wage leveling. We are for different amounts of pay for different labor, but we are against the nonlabor ruble which is illegal and stolen from us—both in large and in small quantities. In other words, we are against social dependency. We are for social equality which under socialism means equal opportunities, but not equal remuneration for unequal labor. As at the crossroads in the fairy tale: if you go to the left—you will undermine incentive for labor and ruin the economy, and if you go to the right—you will create exploiters of others' labor and undermine socialism. It would be advisable, in our opinion, to consistently move from unorganized consumer redistribution (through the network of "black markets" which already exist) to organized consumer redistribution. This means a more flexible system for offering goods and services in different conditions, beginning with free ones (or rather, at the expense of public funds) in places where that is possible and necessary, and ending with more expensive ones—in places where that is dictated by economic necessity and where it is socially justified. We have already talked about the specific paths of this approach. The main thing is that we need a system, not isolated experiments which on the whole do not change the situation. And the system must, of course, rely on specially developed economic and sociological and perhaps even sociopsychological theory. In short, we need a comprehensive problem-oriented study and scientific recommendations to eliminate the "third economy" based on that study.

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#### Youth in a Diverse World

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[Article by Yuriy Viktorovich Chaykovskiy, candidate of technical sciences, senior scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the Natural Sciences and Technology, and specialist in the philosophical problems of evolution, appearing in our journal for the first time]

[Text] "When Phillip announced that he was going to make war on Corinth and everyone dashed off to prepare to fight him, Diogenes began rolling his barrel back and

forth. He was asked, 'Why are you doing that, Diogenes?' He answered, 'Everyone is so busy now, it would not be good for me to be idle. I am rolling the barrel because it is all I have.'" Diogenes of Laertes

You cannot retell the story of Yu. Podniyeks's documentary film "Is It Easy to Be Young?" in words. You have to see it. The satisfied look with which the female procurator sends the crying idler off to the colony (from which he returns a hardened criminal); the edifying abuse with which the flock of psychiatrists "calm" the girl who has thrown herself out of a window of the investigator's office (if she gets away from them it will be as an embittered invalid); the bunch of shy crippled boys among their hospital beds; the medal ashamedly hidden in a fist ("I did something dirty, wrong for a human being"). These things cannot be described, just as you cannot describe a smell or music.

"We gave birth to the child, and then we slowly kill it instead of raising it"—this reproach by one of the young characters in the film is thrown out to us all. How can we answer it?

The film arouses protests from some: why does it show only unfortunate and lost people, why are there no ordinary working and student youths among its heroes? On a second viewing it becomes clear that they are there, but you do not remember them—the unfortunate young people make such a strong impression.

The wonderful boy Gennadiy is on the screen. He dreams of becoming a doctor and is sure that every doctor sympathizes deeply with his patients. Then right after this we see flowers on Gennadiy's grave. An accident? Yes and no. Just after admission to the medical institute he was sent to harvest potatoes. He got chilled, came down with a kidney ailment, and died in the hospital where he was "somehow unsuccessfully treated" by those people he admired so much.

The film's questions are addressed mainly to sociology, but not only to it. For example, in Gennadiy's death the sociological theme is interwoven with economic, medical, organizational, and legal themes. When college and secondary students are injured or die in agricultural work, who is to blame?

You do not want to roll your barrel back and forth like Diogenes; you have to come out of it and look around. Can my professional knowledge of biology be used to resolve the problems raised above?

One of the characters in the film cries out: "You can't talk about young people as all being the same!" Indeed, to measure everyone with the same ruler is to slowly kill many. If all Gennadiy needed was a caring labor organizer (and if there was none, at least a caring doctor), another may need an example to follow, a third needs a caring teacher, and the fourth will run away from a

caring teacher—he needs a strict one! And so it goes ad infinitum, for people in general and young people in particular are infinitely varied. But that is exactly the problem I study, diversity!

It would be overconfidence to see a solution to the problem in what I am going to talk about here, but to me it seems very important to discuss it.

### What Is Diversity?

If we do not chase after a precise definition, we can say this: the science of diversity studies those differences in similar objects and those similarities in different objects which are usually neglected. It looks for rules here.

You can hardly find a phenomenon which is as well-known to us and as poorly understood by us as diversity. We all know that no two people are identical and that a program figured for the "average student" is boring to some and incomprehensible to others, but nonetheless we live as if we were surrounded by "average" people. We are accustomed to identifying the average, but in complex systems the average value is often simply a statistical fiction. For example, in 1960 half of USSR urban-dwellers lived in cities with more than 90,000 population at a time when the average size of a Soviet city was 50,000. A concentration of the majority on one side of the average is irregular and destroys the very "ideology" of average values. Other circumstances also destroy it. It is precisely in those places where averaging is not informative that the problem of diversity as such arises. How often can any of us boast that we relate to another not as an average, but as a single, unique individual? No, even with our own children we apply standard measures.

But all the same our entire life is exploitation of diversity. Whether we are choosing a life partner or fellow worker, following a rising talent, cheering for an athlete, consulting with a specialist, or asking a mover to come to our home—the main thing is always the personal qualities of the person which distinguish him from others at the particular moment. The same thing can be said about the diversity of animals or of any objects. Today, when the diversity of organisms has begun to decrease in a threatening manner, we cannot limit ourselves to a description of similarities and differences; even the most detailed knowledge of them often will not help prevent a loss in nature, to say nothing of restoring lost species. What must we know about diversity to control it? Is it possible, even in principle, to speak of abolishing diversity? And is this necessary?

Are we perhaps capable of raising "useful" species while exterminating the "harmful" ones and ignoring all the rest? Biologists answer in the negative, but in other branches of knowledge there is still no certainty. Why does a society need murderers, sadists, and morons? They appear (just like plagues, for example) not because someone cultivates them, but because the enormous diversity of

organisms every now and then realizes the most diverse qualities. The persecution of plague victims, idiots, and lunatics did not do any more to normalize society than the persecution of heretics and other dissidents—normalization was only achieved by clarifying the causes of the illnesses and developing methods of treatment. And victory over certain misfortunes is accompanied by the appearance of others, formerly unnoticed or even completely unknown—such are the surprises of diversity.

The human race was not prepared for the general rise in well-being to engender many new problems, among them for young people who had become equal in "satiation," so to speak, not to reveal a similar tendency in other relations. While striving for equality no one thought about whether it would be necessary to preserve diversity and, if necessary, what kind of diversity and how. But it has turned out that diversity is not diminishing; it is only assuming new forms, sometime sinister ones.

The biosphere only exists as a whole unit (although it seems that each particular species could be removed from it) and society can only exist as a whole unit. Attempts to hold down particular national, religious, or social groups have led to tragedy for the state as a whole. One of these social groups is young people, and more than a few attempts have been made to deprive them of their own interests and institutions.

Many people probably think that there were no youth institutions in archaic societies. That is not true. All we have to do is look at folk tales to see that since time immemorial a major story subject has been the social affirmation of young people before (or during) formation of the family. This segment of life is called the "heroic" period [Source 1], and in fairy tales it ended either with a wedding or with the young spouses proving their right to live together. Girls do sometimes show the male virtues—strength, dexterity, and courage—but the tale usually gives them their own, purely feminine role: they show enviable devotion, readiness for self-sacrifice, skills, and wisdom (usually in the form of sorcery). It is precisely the "cleverness" of the maidens that saves their unthinking suitors, and not the other way around; this is something to think about. The wedding concludes the tale, putting the young people into the ranks of producers ("and they lived happily ever after"). The "heroic period" was over, and so were the lawful forms of leisure for young people—walking together, the girls' circles dances, and fistfighting by the boys.

The "heroic period" of life remains a principal theme in love and adventure genres in all societies. States have always taken advantage of it (for wars, development of new territory, and so on), at the same time exploiting the undemanding nature of young people with respect to conveniences, comfort, and safety. And here is the paradox: while exploiting the specific features of young people, society tries not to notice their specific demands, their desire to live for themselves, not just for older people.



Observe that childhood as such is usually not found in ancient texts. Adam and Eve appeared as adults, and Eve gave birth to Cain "and also his brother Abel. And Abel was a herder of sheep. And Cain was a tiller of the land." Children are usually likened to adults: young Zeus castrated his father Chronos, Heracles performed his first heroic deed as a newborn baby, and the heroes of the *Makhabkharata* spoke wisdom while still in their mother's womb. In the mid-16th century John Calvin, one of the leaders of the Reformation, carried negation of the role of formation of the individual to its logical conclusion (in fact to the point of absurdity). He taught that a person was fated to go to heaven or hell at the moment of his birth. Thus the role of teacher amounted only to identifying and distinguishing. Only in modern times did formation of the individual person begin to be valued as something special, different from growth. First they stopped trying and executing children, and after that gradually began to recognize that they had special rights (to support, medical care, education, and entertainment). Yet even today upbringing is often viewed as simply learning adult affairs.

Biologists too for a long time viewed the child organism, and even the embryo, as a small, fully formed organism. Childhood was absent in evolutionary doctrine too. It is hard to believe (after all, the parallel of development of the species with development of the organism is one of the oldest parallels in science) but, for example, Darwinism deals with the embryo, larva, and young animal on just two planes—whether many of them are born and whether they themselves struggle for existence. Only now is the idea (also an old one) beginning to take hold in biology that the adult organism hardly participates in evolution of the species, if at all, and that evolution consists of change in the paths of development of the embryo and, in part, of other immature forms. This is also important for the sociologist to know: after all, the sociological sciences have taken and today take an evolutionary element from biology. In both biology and sociology evolution depends little on adults, because their capabilities for change are small. That is why every social upheaval sharply lowers the age of the stratum of activists, all the way to the young generals of revolutionary armies. The maturation of a human being and the development of society are as inseparably linked as the development of the embryo and evolution of the species in biology. In a stagnant society even the individual is in decline, if we are talking about the "social type," not isolated heroes. To find a place for young people in society means, in large part, to direct their evolution, and so we should think not only about influence on young people but also of the transformation of adult society for young people.

The sociology of adolescence is only now getting on its feet, trying to overcome the age-old "sociological conclusion," the grumbling of old people about how "young people in our day were better."

No, young people have not gone bad; they have simply run into a blind alley and do not know what will happen

with their "heroic period." And the boys in the Podniyek's film repeat over and over the angry reproach to the adults: you made us this way. The younger generation's sharp retort to the older generation's age-old grumbling is a sign of the times; but are the young people right?

In my opinion they are. The young people are defending their difference from the older ones, while the latter call on the younger to follow their example. Some do, but this is not a solution to the problem: young people are varied, the "heroic period" is underdeveloped in some, while in others it is directed into an area that is inaccessible to the majority. But what are the rest, those to whom nature has not given any special talent, to do? In a December 1986 broadcast of the television program "Musical Ring," a girl asked the bards: "What can you say to us 18-year-olds?" In response they sang their song about war. It was difficult and shameful to hear how the 40-year-olds sang in the first person (as if they were participants) of heroic deeds 45 years ago, and how they explained afterward that this was their answer to the young people's anxiety. In my opinion the defiant voice which sings from the speaker, "We have had enough heroic deeds and glory to last the rest of our lives" is far more honest. The young people clearly have not had enough; they themselves need to fight for something. "You are incapable of fighting, and yet you want to instill it in us," Podniyek's hero, the young leader of the "metallists," summarizes.

Having described the situation, let us try to clarify how the science of diversity in general and biology in particular can be useful here.

It is proper to ask whether rules established in one science can be transferred to the material of a different science. I respond that it is entirely permissible if we do not view them as axioms, but simply as indicating a path along which success is more likely. In recent decades a new discipline, general systems theory, has arisen; it has shown that complex systems have common features that do not depend on the nature of the elements of which each system is composed. One of the aspects of this theory is in fact the science of diversity.

#### The Nucleus and the Periphery

There is a simple law of diversity, the law of the nucleus and the periphery. The essence of it is as follows: every large group of objects that are in some significant way similar has not only typical, easily distinguished objects (the nucleus), but also a relatively small number of atypical objects, which are easy to confuse with objects of other groups. This minority is the periphery. Thus, animals (mammals) usually walk on four legs—this is a trait of the nucleus of the class of animals; but there are groups whose representatives have fins (cetaceans) or wings (bats) instead of legs—they are the periphery of the class. The peripheral species always cause controversy. They are occasionally declared to be distinct groups or switched from one group to another, but this should not

prevent us from seeing the overall logic: the system is constructed according to typical forms (by the nuclei of groups). Each group has the right to exist, if the traits of its nucleus have been accurately described: "The class has been accurately established, although not clearly delineated" (V. Wavell, 1840). Thus, classification does not involve drawing precise boundaries (as many think), but rather identifying typical forms. As for assigning each unclear form to a definite group, that is a question of desire or taste and cannot be decided once and for all.

Nuclei can be singled out everywhere. In 1941 E. Fromm wrote, "The social character contains only a set of features, a significant nucleus of the structure of the character of the majority of group members. But there will always be 'deviating' individuals with a completely different structure of character" [Source 2]. We need to identify the nucleus of features of the group which is usually called young people (although no one can give its boundaries).

Since the time when almost all young people walked in the footsteps of their elders, the language has preserved the word "staratsya" [to try], which originally meant "to be like the elder one." Since that time the word "elder" has had a double meaning, "older" and "person in charge." "Staraniye" [trying], "stareniye" [aging], and "starshinstvo" [elderhood] all pointed a person along essentially the same life path, because in the course of a person's life society changed little and as he aged he would ordinarily become more important in his circle. In early preclass society the young man was a warrior, the mature man was a producer, and the old man was a teacher, leader, and seer. The female path was more complex (the peer of the warrior, the 16-year-old, was also supposed to be involved in the exhausting cycle of pregnancies, births, and nursing, in other words to become a "producer"; in rough terms she went through four stages—maiden, producer of children, upbringer, and leader—and all the time worked at home), but the age diversity in very rough form corresponded to the social diversity. Although I cannot trace this line of reasoning through the variations of class societies here, I will note that the person who successfully completed the "heroic period" fell onto the path of "staraniye-stareniye-starshinstvo," to which he was guided by his father or another "elder." And if he did not fit in there, he found himself on the "periphery" of society. The reproach "all the children are the same" was used by the father to point out the "nucleus" to which he himself belonged and which he saw as the only suitable way for his son.

It is not that way today.

The "heroic period" is now to be spent in school, girls become "producers" late and for only a short time, differences between the sexes are largely ignored by society ("equality"), there are few brothers and sisters who formerly defined the microstructure of society, and the mother manages the home sporadically. Elders have

very limited opportunities to pass on their experience because they themselves began life in a different situation than their children, and especially their grandchildren. Therefore old people are losing their former role of teachers and the family easily parts with them and moves away, and upbringing of the grandchildren is turned over to television, the school, and the street. Only the street accustoms them to any kind of activism (unfortunately, it is often antisocial). School above all prepares employees who are capable of giving a report on any assignment where things are "smooth on paper," teaches them to "kill time" at school and away from it, saps away their initiative and their own opinions, and cultivates the denunciation as a form of dealing with elders. Young people take all this in and return it to society abundantly in the form of youth problems and such adult qualities as hypocrisy, bureaucratism, irresponsibility, a taste for anonymous denunciations, and so on. Of course all these problems did exist before when the family was the main upbringer, but then they were peripheral problems; today they are closer to characterizing the nucleus of urban young people.

We can suppose that the parents belong to the "nucleus" of their stratum, but if their children want to follow their example, too often they will find themselves on the "periphery" of their own, youth stratum, and this is unpleasant for most people. These are just a few of the reasons for conflicts.

We can summarize what has been said as follows: the diversity of conditions in which society suggests that young people live has changed greatly, and therefore the former diversity of young people themselves has proved deeply inappropriate to society. This has happened numerous times before in history.

### The Phoenix of Diversity

But has the diversity of young people remained as before? Or is it in fact declining? For an answer it is useful to refer to the experience of theoretical biology. The law of transit polyformism is formulated in the works of S.V. Meyen, the paleobotanist and evolutionist who recently died [Source 3]. We do not need here to state the law exactly, so I will just note the following: the significant features of large organic diversities are reproduced in the alternation of generations regardless of which part (unless it is too small) of the initial diversity was taken for reproduction. We observe a kind of independent transfer (transit) of the diversity in time, and it depends little on the features of the specific individuals who are the basis of this transit.

We can sometimes observe how diversity is reborn and mysteriously repeats its earlier forms. Long ago Darwin was amazed that the smooth-skinned peach was derived from the fuzzy peach, and the smooth forms, changing, repeated all the significant variations of the fuzzy ones. In the following 100 years many such examples were published, and their biological meaning was usually

discussed, but it was only with Meyen's works (especially [Source 4]) that the fundamental law of nature began to be drawn: the spectrum of possible changes of organisms is limited and orderly, and the organism inherits its spectrum (its tendencies) just as it does its existing features.

Whereas biologists for 100 years thought that evolution was a continuous process of adaptation (and extinction of those that did not adapt), it is now becoming clear that evolution sometimes moves in the direction indicated by a definite law of diversity [Source 3]. Adaptation consists of those cases where marginally viable variations are rare and there are no nonviable ones at all. Thus, there are many species of handed vertebrates (with front extremities, but without back ones), although this is in no way an adaptation. In fish the absence of back fins is quite common, and with cetaceans it is compulsory; among land animals handed species are very rare, and there are no such birds at all. The "khirot" [amphisbaena] (literally "one with hands") is a lizard without back paws and descended from the ordinary lizard, so his handedness is not an adaptation and not inherited from a handed ancestor. It is a pure form of a mistake of diversity, a repetition of the same thing in different conditions, a transit.

The diversity of people is also very transitive. Among other things, elderly people of every generation are certain that when they were young they were better than current young people. As a person ages he moves along the spectrum of diversity, and rarely is he fully conscious of this. Reflecting on his youthful diary, Romain Rolland was astonished: "I see before me a strange boy who has my name and is similar—no, not to me (I do not recognize myself in him), but to someone else who is familiar to me."

The stability of transitive diversity shows vividly in the fact that all attempts to change society by persecuting people of a certain type fail. The ancient natural philosophical idea of getting rid of defects by persecuting those who are defective, an idea that gave rise to social Darwinism, terrorism, and much more, collapses upon recognition of the phenomenon of transitive polymorphism. There will be sinners, righteous ones, and faceless ones in every generation, although they do not necessarily inherit these qualities from their parents.

This does not mean that diversity cannot be controlled at all. It can, but you must operate according to the laws of its own movement and not hinder it. To turn a car you have to rotate the wheel, not push on the body from the side. To get rid of bureaucracy it is necessary to eliminate the bureaucratic administrative apparatus (the absence of effective feedback coming from below). It is useless, in my view, to prosecute specific officials. Yes, bureaucratism is associated with certain character traits, but it would be naive to think that a change (even a complete one) of personnel at an institution could change the nature of administration for long; there will

be a transit of the administrative structure and it will itself select those who can exist successfully in it. And if the principle of administration changes, then people of the former type will gradually move out of the nucleus of the apparatus to the periphery, and the nucleus will fill with people from the former periphery and outsiders. If we want to control the structure of the diversity of young people, we must restore the disrupted correspondence between it and the structure of society.

#### The Variants Are Limited. The Meyen Refrain

You would think that every rich diversity is varied and chaotic, but that is untrue. Meyen demonstrated with botanical material that refrains prevail in nature. These are stable series of variability that repeat in different groups so the diversity is created primarily by the imposition of independent series. The handedness of vertebrates considered above is an example of a zoological refrain.

There is a similar phenomenon in grammar. All Russian nouns are inflected, that is, they realize the same six-case series, but independent of this they change in number, and so there are two independent refrains. Adjectives have three independent, combinatory refrains (gender, number, and case) and one special feature (degree of comparison). The refrains of the verbs are just as exact. They are given in tables, which produces an enormous savings. We have to memorize each word in just one form (for example the infinitives of verbs) with an indication of its type of variability (declension number and so on). Although there are many exceptions, still the usefulness of grammar has been proven by experience. In the same way, the absence of legless birds should not overshadow the graphic and economic quality of a tabular description of the variants of organism changeability. The parallel proposed by Meyen between biological and linguistic diversity is quite promising. Just as there cannot be a noun outside the case and number series, so there is no hope of meeting an "angel," a vertebrate with three pairs of extremities. In other words, the "grammar of biology" [Source 5] is capable of meaningful prediction. This principle fundamentally contradicts the former one, where it was thought that anything can result from adaptation and it is impossible in principle to predict evolution.

Now let us specify what has been said: existing diversity can be controlled only by moving along with the refrains, not across them; in other words, no attempt should be made to impose a cell from a different series (refrain) on the table of diversity.

Many refrains of human qualities have been constructed already. For example, in 1914 Spranger described six "ideal types" of individuals, stipulating that they are not encountered in pure form but are only tendencies. In my opinion it would be better to say that he identified six refrains whose imposition in rough outline describes the diversity of people on the level of motivation (life aims).



Here they are: 1. theoretical—the yearning for knowledge; 2. economic—the search for utility and yearning to realize it; 3. esthetic—yearning for the impression, experience, and self-expression; 4. social—yearning for interaction, including love; 5. political—the will to power and desire to submit to it; 6. religious—the search for a higher meaning to life. According to Spranger, each of the tendencies has many degrees and forms of manifestation. Thus, concerning the religious type he emphasizes that this “can be a person who does not belong to a single faith and performs no rituals, but is precisely a person who is searching for a higher meaning, a higher truth, the prime cause. And he listed Spinoza and Giorgio Bruno as this type” [Source 6]. Each of Spranger’s tendencies is a general refrain, and therefore his formulation contains a great deal of information. I will not undertake to evaluate the quality and completeness of Spranger’s types; I took them simply as a clear example of refrains, and moreover one that is often used in the literature.

The personality determines many characteristics, for example temperament, in other words, “a general concept relating to that aspect of behavior which answers the question ‘How?’” It differs from capabilities, which are related to those aspects of behavior associated with the questions “What?” and “How well?” and from motivation, which is linked with the questions “For what?” and “Why?” [Source 7]. The most ancient and simplest classification of temperaments—choleric, melancholic, sanguinic, and phlegmatic—is today reduced to imposition of two characteristics: reaction speed and strength of feeling. (According to other authors the number of temperament refrains is larger and may reach seven.)

To go further we will need two properties of refrains: first, they are imposed one on another almost independently (for example, a person’s temperament tells nothing about his motivation), and second, every development can be defined as a change in states within the framework of previous refrains or in the refrains themselves. For example, a person is not in one cell of the table of diversity, but is rather moving across it along several (sometimes all) refrains (thus, the social principle in him may be dying while the theoretical or economic is growing). It is significant that this change of states is irregular in the individual, but shows statistical regularity in a large set of individuals.

### The Place of Young People in Society

Are young people a special social stratum, or are they just a “transitional age” from children to adults? I.S. Kon allows that youth has “a certain social status, a social position and activities that are specific for the given age stratum” [Source 8], but does not explain exactly what this means, limiting himself to the remarks of psychologists called on to distinguish youth from childhood (at 15 years “the individual differences grow rapidly”; youth is “characterized by the appearance of a need and capability for intimate psychological closeness

with another person, including sexual closeness”) and from youth [sic] (“the most important acquisition of adulthood is creative activity and the accompanying feeling of being productive”). It is easy to put such scattered remarks into a unified system if we use the concepts of the nucleus and the refrain. It appears that there are no special sociopsychological youth refrains, and this is the reason that young people have always been denied special status. But through the development of each person in the course of life, the nucleus of traits of young people differs greatly from the nuclei of other social groups and this, as we know, is sufficient for singling out a group.

It can be said that young people are particularly characterized by social motivations, self-analysis (especially for girls), and reaction speed, and on the other hand they are much less concerned than adults about economic questions, comfort, safety, and responsibility for one’s neighbor. This is a rough description of young people as a special stratum of society. Although these features are common in adults too, they are rarely found together in adults, while among young people they are usual. The nucleus of the social type of young people is a periphery of the adult type, and vice versa.

Of course, life changes the interrelations of the nucleus and the periphery. In the past, when young people basically maintained themselves their nucleus was close to the adult nucleus. I finished secondary school in 1957 and I can testify: until seventh grade our problems differed little from children’s problems (the acceleration became noticeable later, in the 1960’s), and in eighth grade only half of us were left. Some seventh-graders were impatient to get to work and have their own money. Working at age 14 is certainly early, but the result was that there were no loafers in the upper classes—the tone was set by those who were preparing for college. You cannot help recalling here the words of A.A. Lyubishchev, spoken 30 years earlier: “Compulsory secondary education must be understood in the sense of giving everyone the opportunity to study, but not in the sense of obligating teachers to bring every sluggard to graduation” [Source 9]. Again after completion of 10th grade about half of my peers went off to earn money, while most of those who continued in school could not live without a stipend. Thus our problems immediately became adult ones.

Specifically youth problems began to grow in the 1960’s when masses of parents were able to spare young people from the need to go to work at a young age, when the young people got their own money for vodka and material things. Therefore, many people think that young people are going mad from satiation, but what we have said above leads to a different conclusion: they are going mad not from material satiation, but from mental and emotional famine.

The removal of economic pressure is dangerous for anyone who has not developed some kind of strong

noneconomic trait. A.N. Leontyev writes: "The personality cannot develop within the framework of consumption; its development necessarily presupposes a shift of needs to constructive work, which is the only thing that is unlimited" [Source 10]. And the young characters in the *Podniyek*s film, who are far from science, in fact think the same thing, only they bend it through the prism of their own view of the world: "There is nothing to die for today," "I feel like tipping something over and smashing it up so there is something lacking, something to strive for." Drug addiction and crime are growing.

Prohibitions are useless, and it is useless to try to frighten them; after all, we know that boys in all ages have enjoyed risking life and health, and their freedom. We must make them not want to do violence to themselves and to others, make them want something else. But what? What does the adult society offer to young people to fill the labor vacuum? Above all it is leisure time; leisure time, however, is good after work, but as the main preoccupation leisure falls far short for many. Needless to say, those young people who have already developed strong scientific, technical, esthetic, athletic, administrative, or ideological aspirations will be able to use their time, but they are not the problem, just as those who seek to get ahead are not the problem. The problem is the young people who have no aspirations or have only a desire for social interaction.

Adults also try to limit the amount of free time that young people have by increasing the workload on students, broadening the scope of "voluntary-mandatory" work, reducing the range of persons excused from military service, and so on, and doing so without any consideration of the diversity of young people. The result is certainly lamentable: the problems are not being solved, but only passed on to other places and other planes. These measures do not make young people constructive in their own eyes.

I cannot point to a specific solution, but in general form the problem involves restoring the disrupted correspondence of two diversities—social and psychological. In the latter young people are being more and more sharply isolated as a distinct stratum at a time when society cannot offer those generations entering upon life a special place, with the exception of compulsory enlistment for those jobs which cannot be filled by free hiring. This flagrant violation of the law is loudly called "labor indoctrination," although in my opinion it teaches not love of labor, but lack of initiative, apathy, and disrespect for the law and laws. The gap between young people and adults grows. After all, the prevailing trend in the 20th century is just the opposite: in the opinion of sociologists children are finally no longer a source of income for their elders, which has "turned 180 degrees, from the parents to the children," and as a result the former family which "knows no parental debt to the children, but on the contrary an eternal debt to the parents" [Source 11], has disintegrated.

To make upbringing labor-oriented and successful, young people must be interested, not forced. But how?

The nucleus of young people does not see the connection between production and consumption (because it consumes on the level offered by the family, usually a small family); they work more for "show" or to get a reference for going to college, so the usual monetary stimulus will not be effective and will not interest them. Moreover, a sharp growth in production, if it is possible, will lead to an intolerable acceleration in destruction of the environment. A major youth cause must be sought on the periphery of the current system of the "adult" economy. For example, the restoration of natural and cultural treasures that are being destroyed by the economy is such a cause. And we already have some experience in this: *Podniyek*s shows how alienated punk rockers and metallists become interested in the ecology of their hometown. Even larger projects are possible. For example, more than 30,000 young Canadians conducted a huge ecological operation during which they cleaned up trash from some 1,000 kilometers of river and lake shoreline. This initiative by young people is a direct challenge to adults and their attitude toward nature [Source 12].

This challenge to society will have to be accepted, in other words turn ecology from a nagging enemy of the economy into one of its leading sectors. The connection between the youth and ecological problems is not accidental. Together with the problem of disarmament, all three of these problems show clearly that the former orientation of the economy is unacceptable. But whereas this is generally understood in relation to disarmament and ecology is starting to gain the right to dictate limiting conditions to economic development, things are much worse with young people. Although the traditional expenditures for them (education, leisure, propaganda) are recognized as necessary, in fact the tendency to get a quick return—economic and other—from them is gradually returning. There is no talk at all about fundamentally new expenditures for young people. It is more the other way around; restructuring of the economy aggravates the problem because it reduces adolescent contacts with the family even further (because of evening shifts and other types of labor intensification for both young people and adults). But new expenditures are essential.

The economy (and not just the economy, but also environmental protection, medicine, and education) for a long time has been based on the idea of credit: society pays now for future enterprises, resources, and cadres. In our day society has increased the advance to young people by allowing them to use more of the income of their elders for a longer time, but this advance is not a credit because it is not directed to any kind of development. On the contrary, this advance holds young people back in the status of children. The credit to young people should promote their development, in other words help them move along the adult refrains, and for this we must know the laws of this movement. In the first place, it is, as we have already said, irregular (the specific path of a person's maturation is almost unpredictable), and in the second place the young subject in his every action feels a

desire to show his independence from the dictates of his elders. Adults usually ignore both of these circumstances, thinking that they themselves know best what each young person should do. It is here that a fundamentally new credit is needed (let us recall that the Italian word "credito" originally meant "trust"); to the maximum possible degree we should trust young people themselves to decide how to use that share of public attention and product which society credits to them. This is not philanthropy; it is the least expensive method of smoothing out the accumulated conflicts.

Indeed, today when everyone is talking about democratization, it looks strange that young people's choice of their path in life is becoming less and less free, that they are increasingly dictated to by those who still must restructure themselves. First one group of leaders decides who goes on to ninth grade, then another passes out "Komsomol passes," and a third announces that everyone should work enthusiastically "in conformity with society's needs." But it is long since time to admit that enthusiasm on order is impossible, especially where the leaders themselves are the ones who define the "needs." If there are not enough young workers, it is naive to think that the more new vocational-technical schools we open, the more former secondary school students will take up worker occupations. It is better to try to understand why there is a shortage, that is, why the diversity of young people corresponds so poorly to the diversity of jobs.

Let us recall that in the 1960's the interests of secondary school graduates unexpectedly turned from the exact and technical sciences to biology and the humanities—we now know that this was the first signal of trouble in technocratic society. Isn't that what the broader movement today tells us? That young people are turning away from factories and construction sites? After all, there are more and more of all kinds of manmade structures, and less and less natural area. Is housing inadequate in the cities? There is a surplus of it in the rural areas. Is there a shortage of machines in the fields and at the plants that make the machines? No, there are surpluses at both places, but they do not work well.

Granted that we still do not see the connections between young people's confused charges and the future organization of society, but we need to recognize that this connection objectively exists and that it must be studied and used. And that is why today, when a small stream of young people have begun returning to the countryside, I think it is much more important to support this movement than to restore two-shift work at the factories.

To support those young people who want to restructure the economy and culture and defend nature is the same (on the socioeconomic level) as financing free education. The generation as a whole will repay the advance, of course; but they will repay to their children, not their parents. In my opinion, such a strategy is much more promising than the current one. After all, it is the future, not our ideas about it, that belongs to the young people.

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### Stereotypes of Criticism and Criticism of Stereotypes

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[Article by Svetozar Aleksandrovich Efirov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, leading scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Sociological Research Institute, author of the monographs "From Hegel to Genet. On the Fate of Dialectics in Bourgeois Philosophy" (1960), "Italian Bourgeois Philosophy of the 20th Century" (1968), "An Attempt on the Future. The Logic and Futurology of 'Left' Extremism" (1984), and "'Leftist' Terrorism in the West: History and Contemporary Times" (1986, coauthor), and author of the articles published in our journal "Critical Comments on the 'Critical Sociology' of Ferrarotti" (No 4, 1975) and



"Left Extremism: Social Reality and Ideology" (No 2, 1979)]

[Text] Restructuring is a profound revolutionary process which affects many fundamental structures of our life. Its successes or failures and progressive development or reversal are of vital importance to us. One of the decisive factors of success is psychological reorientation of people and new thinking—above all political and social. The inertia of obsolete ideas, canons, and stereotypes is an extremely serious obstacle in the way to forming an effective socio-economic system and real socialist democracy.

The dominant role of stereotypes quite clearly has an effect on our attitude toward Western thought—I mean the criticism of Western concepts and reaction to outside criticism of us. Can the traditions and approaches which exist here remain outside the spirit of the times? When speaking of the main problems of contemporary times, can we fail to take into account, for example, the ideas of the Delhi Declaration or the idea, frequently expressed in party documents, of the priority of universal human values?

Of course, the roots of the opposition of the two systems are deep, and complete elimination of mutual criticism is hardly realistic. But criticism based on recognition of our common human fate is one thing and confrontational criticism, criticism in an environment of mutual hostility and hatred, and criticism which is based on the "image of the enemy" are another.

I would like to say a few words about the attitude toward criticism in general. This attitude is one of the criteria of spiritual health. Confidence in oneself and in one's rightness and the absence of an inferiority complex presuppose a sensible reaction even to unfriendly criticism and a desire not to repudiate it from the start, striking a pose of innocence, but a desire to derive benefit and learn whether there is anything justified or constructive in it.

For decades we unfortunately have not followed this principle. Western research thought was almost exclusively the object of "criticism," which was frequently a priori, foreordained, incompetent, and even ignorant. "Criticism of bourgeois sociology," "criticism of bourgeois philosophy," and the like—those are the titles which books, lectures, and departments in scientific institutes carried. They carry them even now. Is such an approach normal, especially when all kinds of quiet intellectual and methodological borrowing took place behind the screen of criticism, which lasted for many years? It is true that sometimes serious analytical works came out in the genre of criticism and the borrowings themselves often proved to be very useful, since in this way the solid front of dogmatic stagnation was breached and the achievements of Western thought were introduced. And still destructive criticism predominated. In our time the situation has fundamentally changed, but the tradition of a priori criticism often based on obsolete

conventions and stereotypes is in principle far from being overcome.

The basis of this approach was the postulate: we possess the highest, absolute, and final truth. The word "Marxism" was considered essentially a kind of magic spell and talisman which gave any person, even an extremely ignorant one, the status of oracle and judge and the right to tower above all unanointed ones and to judge them and pass final sentence.

Such an attitude has nothing in common with the approach of the classics of Marxism, who viewed their own doctrine as an exceptionally constructive method which, nonetheless, does not provide guarantees of the truth of the results and research indulgences but, on the contrary, demands great human cultural sophistication and by no means denies the possibility of major scientific achievements within the framework of other research schemes.

Universal criticism was also justified by one more very vulgar idea: Western social science, discounting its few Marxist variants, was and is considered "bourgeois" and, consequently, erroneous from origin.

Such an idea can hardly be accepted without significant qualifications. First, by no means all non-Marxist social thought can be considered "bourgeois." All kinds of social democratic and simply democratic, left-radical, and many other viewpoints simply cannot, of course, be categorized in this department. Secondly, even the "bourgeois character" itself, which although it may have specific ideological motives and distortions and is sometimes even reduced to them, is by no means a primordial, obligatory, and hopeless "mark of Cain" which excludes, in principle, any basic scientific achievements.

I know the style of undifferentiated criticism very well. In my case it perhaps did not seem so old-fashioned as in some others, but that is more of an aggravating circumstance. In regard to openly old-fashioned works, everything was clear even at that time: they even brought a certain benefit by their incompetence and awkward and unconvincing bias. It was obvious self-exposure. But my works contained a fair amount of informational material, stylistic merits were not alien to them, and they had the appearance of intellectual sophistication, professional polemic, and a certain academic refinement. Consequently it was not immediately apparent what they really were. But that was a kind of game which had little in common with real research work and took place according to fairly strict rules from which it was not customary and, moreover, not always safe to deviate. For some people the game was pure hypocrisy, for some real self-deception, and sometimes—a mixture of both.

In many respects we remain loyal to the traditions of this kind of "criticism." Let us take one fairly fresh example

which is especially noteworthy because it refers to serious work on the whole done in an altogether different spirit—the dictionary on non-Marxist Western sociology [Source 5].

Let us look at the two articles devoted to K. Popper. This Western researcher is evaluated in different ways, depending on one's attitude toward the positivist and humanist orientation in Western thought. But in any case one cannot deny that Popper is one of the major figures in Western philosophy and sociology of the 20th century; he had significant influence not only on science and culture, but on the program goals of influential political forces of the modern world as well.

And this is what we read in a book about this researcher. Popper's "historicism" is a "relativistically distorted," "simplified and dogmatized form of historicism," and a "caricature of the historical method in the social sciences" [Source 5, pp 130-131]. These definitions are taken from an article which came out under my name, but they do not belong to me. The quoted phrases were inserted by an editor. But I probably would have written the same thing some 15 years ago.

Another article on Popper is "Society 'Open' and 'Closed.'" By introducing these concepts Popper, according to the article, reveals the "bourgeois-apologetic character of his theoretical structure," "wastes the criteria of social progress," and makes an attempt to "develop a speculative philosophical-historical conception on a pseudoscientific 'systems worldview' basis." According to the article, these concepts have "certain heuristic potential" only for understanding the "processes of development in archaic societies" [Source 5, pp 256-257].

I do not know whose words these are—the author's or the editor's again. But let us put aside the quoted definitions and pose just one question for their author—does he really believe that the concepts of an "open" and a "closed" society, despite their lack of rigor and perhaps inadequate definition, do not have real heuristic value in our time? In the 20th century which has known so many fascist and leftist dictatorships! In a period when we are learning glasnost, democracy, and openness!

While we cannot think of ourselves other than in the role of "critics," still we are ourselves unable to take a reasonable attitude toward criticism by our non-Marxist opponents. That did and continues to do a great deal of harm to moral foundations, hinders consolidation of the spirit of human mutual understanding and solidarity in face of the threat of nuclear apocalypse, and also prevents some strictly practical problems from being resolved.

In responses to questions by the editors of the newspaper L'UNITA M.S. Gorbachev said: "It is important to know not only the position of your comrades in the party and in the movement, but to also know what the class enemy says about us. For he, first, expresses his views clearly and, second, sees the weakness in our positions

more sharply" [Source 2]. In fact, if one studies things objectively one can see that some Western researchers, Soviet experts among them, long ago posed—some in a hostile, some in a neutral, and some in a sympathetic tone—some fairly important questions which were forbidden in our country and at which we have only now arrived, so to speak. Moreover, there are even processes in our society—economic, social, and cultural, which they have studied better than we have (even though with ideological distortions). They had the opportunity to do this, while for us this type of research was taboo. This made our reaction to criticism from the West more intense: for those things which people strove to keep silent about or present in an unrealistic or an embellished light were revealed. More and more publicistic and scientific literature—sociological, political, economic, and philosophical—is now becoming accessible to everyone and entering scientific circulation. But this process is still a long ways from completion. The situation which existed in the period of stagnation in the sphere mentioned was incompatible with the principles of glasnost and democratization. It helped create an unhealthy, hypocritical, artificial spiritual atmosphere which first engenders fanaticism and then to an ever greater extent—skepticism and indifference.

Universal dogmatic criticism in combination with intolerance of outside criticism stood us in poor stead, promoted unfounded sociopolitical conceit, narcissism, arrogance, and complacency, and reinforced our lack of sociopolitical sophistication and habits of glasnost and democracy. People indoctrinated in these traditions are deaf to new trends, and it is extremely difficult for them to overcome this type of inertia. New political thinking is incompatible with cultivation of the "image of the enemy."

Undoubtedly, Western researchers and especially the mass information media most often create an image of our country and our life which is far from reality and sometimes simply a parody. Criticism of such devices are lawful and fair: they are not only dishonest but also dangerous in the modern world where we need truth and recognition that mankind faces common problems which must be solved. And I think that we should be an example in this regard.

Finally, we must abandon the questionable precept that all criticism of our system coming from outside is invariably "slander," "anti-Soviet propaganda," "ideological subversion," "malicious fabrications," and the like. When it is that, it is much more reasonable and, if you will, more useful in propaganda terms to respond calmly and with dignity by trying to separate the fair from the unfair and not so much respond to lies with lies as to see what is useful; and of course, an outside view often contains something useful. Only such an approach attests to confidence in ourselves, our research, our ideological and political health, and our lack of complexes.

Incidentally, a healthy attitude toward criticism and the custom, habits, and culture of national and historical self-criticism are a necessary element of real patriotism. Without them patriotism inevitably turns into chauvinism and national egoism, and certain forms of chauvinist extremism inevitably begin to emerge. At the plenum of the RSFSR Writers' Union, Yu. Bondarev said that the people need self-affirmation rather than self-humiliation. That is certainly so, but self-affirmation without a critical attitude toward oneself on the individual, social, national, and historical levels, without the ability to rationally treat and utilize criticism "from outside," is an extremely risky thing. It seems to me that we should not so much protest against "self-humiliation" as support the standard of a sober critical attitude not only toward friends but above all toward ourselves (without despising others' help). "Pochvennichestvo" is almost more dangerous than any "self-humiliation." Self-affirmation lies not in the creation of myths or futile legendary figures nor in idealization of the past and the present nor in the creation of social, political, and cultural idols, but in self-critical realism and truth.

A great deal has already been done in our country in this regard, but not everything. We will definitely stand to gain, for example, if we acquire the ability and opportunity to look not only at internal affairs critically but also at certain aspects of foreign policy and critically discuss all of its aspects—regardless of the official viewpoint. And here the principle declared by the party should be definitely realized: there must be no sphere or subject closed to discussion.

Western social science is continually in the process of searching for new means of study and new theoretical approaches and concepts. We will discuss the question of how successful this search is. It is important that in this regard there are no dogmatic barriers and restrictions. The many centuries of historical experience confirm that the possibility of renewing ideological models should exist, at least those parts of them which have ceased to "work." That is a condition for the healthy, fruitful, and constructive development of research thought, in social science in particular.

Western social science, sociology included, should not be idealized of course. Frequently this sociology is far from objective and errs in being one-sided, superficial, sociopolitically biased, and deliberately distorted. But despite all this its potential to express the most varied viewpoints, among them those which contradict official ones, cannot be denied. That is a necessary condition for the normal and fruitful development of the social sciences. Otherwise, it is useless and unfair to accuse them of falling behind and being ineffectual.

If we move in this direction, then the time has most likely come to change our attitude toward the problem of pluralism. (M.S. Gorbachev has used the phrase "socialist pluralism" [Source 3]). Such a formulation of

the question is a principled one, since the term "pluralism" can be interpreted in different ways. According to some interpretations, it is a synonym for permissiveness, unlimited self-will, lack of social and civic discipline and responsibility, and rejection of the fundamental unity of ideals, constitutional principles, and common human values. In this sense pluralism is of course unacceptable and fairly criticized. But do not throw the baby out with the bath water. It is clear now as never before: diversity and the struggle of ideas, opinions, principles, undertakings, projects, experiments, and plans in all spheres without exception is a mandatory condition of vitality, effectiveness, and dynamism. Where all these things are artificially and by order ruled out or restricted, stagnation, backwardness, and mortification are inevitable. Disregard of this lesson of dialectics, of which people far removed from dialectics have often reminded us, leads to the most unfortunate results in economics, politics, and the social and cultural spheres. It has been said repeatedly that restructuring is only beginning. The point, therefore, is not that everything be carried out immediately, but that in the future there be no stopping half-way. Stopping half-way and preserving all the open and unspoken taboos on various important and fundamental questions will turn everything that is happening into a kind of carefully dosed "act" whose limits may be expanded or constricted at the whim of the bosses. And what will this whim be tomorrow? Where are the guarantees that the process will not be stopped or even reversed, as has happened more than once before? Certainty that such reversals will be ruled out is necessary.

The principle of reliable, stable guarantees that cannot be voluntaristically revoked is extremely important. Lack of faith that they do or may exist is one of the obstacles on the path of development of many spheres of, for one example, individual labor activity. The rapid replacement of appeals for effective management with prohibitions and command-administrative barriers has been imprinted on the people's social memory. That not only had an effect on the level of agricultural production but also played a very dramatic role in the fate of certain social groups.

The problems of pluralism and legislative guarantees are part of the broader problem of democracy and human rights which we are constantly being sharply criticized for. For decades we criticized bourgeois democracy for its limited character. This criticism was in many respects justified. By its very essence socialist democracy must be incomparably higher and more democratic than bourgeois democracy. V.I. Lenin repeatedly emphasized that. But before going forward and reaching the heights, we cannot disregard certain rudimentary things. But that is exactly what has happened a number of times. What does learning democracy mean? Is it perhaps in part restoring what has been rejected and forgotten and perhaps also borrowing something, even if this borrowing is limited. Sometimes something limited is better than nothing! Moreover, is bourgeois democracy really



limited in everything? I think that there are still elements which are generally significant and common to mankind and inalienable achievements of the many centuries of history of human civilization in any democracy except class democracies, and disregarding these elements may have and frequently has had tragic consequences.

V.I. Lenin always said that in resolving fundamental political problems the question of "cui prodest?"—who benefits from it?—must be posed. In connection with this the problem of bureaucracy and bureaucratism, which is now being very extensively debated, should be dealt with. In our country, as far as I remember, there has always been a struggle against bureaucratism, but since the mid-1920's and until quite recently no one here really tried to figure out what bureaucracy and bureaucratism as a social phenomenon really are. It was silently assumed that they are things that are very easy to understand and that bureaucrats are red-tape mongering civil servants and formalists who can and should be eliminated, and then things would be all straightened out. But that did not happen, and there continued a strange kind of verbal war with shadows and with a social phenomenon whose nature not only was not analyzed but somehow invariably proved to be beyond the sphere of analysis.

Undoubtedly, the above-mentioned phenomenon is exceptionally complex and very difficult to study. The large number of conceptions and definitions of bureaucracy in Western sociology which are often remote from one another and even contradictory attests to that. Sometimes there have even been doubts of the possibility of devising a generally significant conception of bureaucracy. "Bureaucracy," one Western author wrote, "is a phenomenon which everyone speaks about, feels, and knows by experience, but which cannot be conceptualized" [Source 6].

However, despite all the difficulties Western sociology has made numerous attempts to analyze bureaucracy as a social and administrative phenomenon. Such major figures as M. Weber and R. Michaels were among the pioneers in this research. R. Merton, A. Gouldner, M. Crozier, P. Blau, and many others played a significant role in it. Many other viewpoints exist between Weber's primarily positive appraisal of bureaucracy (as an anonymous rational management system needed in contemporary society for it to function efficiently) and the idea of bureaucracy as a dysfunctional and inefficient system of management or the completely pessimistic appraisal of R. Michaels, who believed the bureaucratic rebirth of all parties and organizations to be inevitable. The idea frequently arose that the nature of bureaucracy is to isolate administrative power from the citizens and to overinflate and absolutize it, and that that is a form of social elitism and exploitation and a form of concentrating power in the hands of a narrow group of people regardless of the will of the citizens or only formalistically related to that will. It is completely understandable that the very approach to such problems is frequently

defined to a great extent by self-seeking group interests. "To a significant extent," wrote M. Crozier, "the debate regarding bureaucracy has so far been an arena of ideological myths and passions" [Source 7].

V.I. Lenin once gave a profound interpretation of the phenomenon of bureaucratism when he analyzed the differences in its aspects in capitalist and socialist society. He revealed not only the organizational-administrative and abstract-social aspects but also the class aspects of bureaucracy and showed that it camouflages class antagonisms and the predominance of a certain class. Among the basic features of bureaucracy, according to V.I. Lenin, are separation of administrative functions from legislative ones with purely formal participation of citizens in making legislative decisions and their complete removal from performing administrative functions, the irremovability of officials, and the like. Lenin emphasized the urgent need for special measures against the bureaucratic rebirth of the apparatus. In a socialist state, he wrote, state employees should not become bureaucrats, that is, "privileged persons alienated from the masses and standing above the masses" [Source 1].

Unfortunately, these warnings of Lenin's were not realized for a long time, and that had serious consequences. "An administrative-command system of party-state leadership of the country emerged and bureaucratism, a danger of which Lenin once warned us, intensified. The administrative-command system, which began to be formed during industrialization and received new impetus during collectivization, influenced the country's entire sociopolitical life. Consolidated in the economy it also spread to the superstructure and restricted the development of the democratic potential of socialism and impeded the progress of socialist democracy," M.S. Gorbachev said [Source 4].

The social processes and the particular changes in our society's social structure which occurred in this period still await serious and dispassionate study. Up to now this research has unfortunately only been done by our ideological opponents and frequently with distortions and exaggerations.

The next issue is human rights. Great changes have now taken place in this sphere in our country. Some fundamental steps have been taken to expand democracy and reinforce legality. However, for a long time, in the period of stagnation, we approached this question in a fairly one-sided way. There was really no self-criticism. Criticism from outside was rejected. Let us try to analyze the practical results of this position. Was it useful to the country and to the world democratic movement?

First, it gave our Western opponents major propaganda trump cards and allowed them to accuse us of obvious lies and hypocrisy. Secondly, it was one of those "nontruths" which molded the worldview positions of many people who wanted nothing to do with lies. And, finally, there have been and still are fairly large groups of

people who are absolutely certain that any criticism of us from abroad is always an enemy plot. Even now they are sincerely and even militantly of the opinion that all the world's evil is concentrated in the nonsocialist countries and that in all relations we "ourselves, ourselves," were and are a model and example for all. Such people are programmed for good and it is impossible to prove to them that things are not so simple. Their certainty is a fundamental obstacle on the path of restructuring. In fact what is the reason for restructuring if we actually are the standard for everyone and in all relations?

Quite a lot is now being said about improving and partially even rebuilding the criminal law system. There are many problems here: guarantee of equal rights and accountability before the law for everyone without exception, full glasnost and public monitoring of the activity of the criminal law organs, absolute exclusion of the practice of nonjudicial or purely "administrative" verdicts or even the possibility of them, and restoration of the rights of lawyers to become involved in the investigation from the moment of the first interrogation. Or here is a problem which has almost always been ignored. To the present day many countries are identifying and prosecuting people who are guilty of mass murder and atrocities in concentration camps, Gestapo torture chambers, and the like. And that is fair, just as it is fair that we object to the use of the "statute of limitations" in regard to these crimes. But what about those who took part in the mass repressions of the 1930's and 1940's? I do not mean vengeance. Taking vengeance means heaping evil upon evil. But we must remember social and human justice: no one—neither fascists nor people who acted in behalf of socialism—should be allowed to do their arbitrary will and destroy those whom they do not like. It is very important for mankind that such a thing not be repeated again and that those who would try to repeat it know that they will not remain unpunished.

M.S. Gorbachev emphasized: "Even now we still encounter attempts to discard the painful questions of our history and silence them, and make it look as if nothing happened. We cannot consent to this" [Source 4]. Naturally, in addition to past and future party documents on this problem area, comprehensive objective research work is needed. There has been practically no such work in our country, although interpretation of the past has begun to some extent in artistic literature (A. Tvardovskiy, A. Rybakov, Yu. Trifonov, A. Bek, and others). That is very important to the broad audience, but it is still a different form of interpretation than scientific interpretation. And again we encounter a paradox: numerous studies of the tragic aspects of our recent history—whether bad or good—were done and published in the West rather than in our country. Of course, some very serious complaints may be made against the works of many Sovietologists. And not just ideological ones, but also treatment of facts, sources, and the like. There is too much that is hypothetical, unverified, questionable, imprecise, and simply untrue in

them. But are their authors the only ones to blame for that? For even those sources, documents, and evidence which were preserved are for the most part unavailable to them, just as, incidentally, they are unavailable to our researchers even now.

One of the main questions of Sovietology is the question of the economic efficiency of our system. For a long time we reacted very nervously to any criticism regarding this. Now, as never before, it is clear that by no means was all this criticism mere "slander." For example, a simple and now apparently obvious idea was constantly repeated: the competitive principle must not be completely eliminated from the economic sphere, since this deprives that sphere of a vital nerve and incentive for improvement and condemns it to stagnation and backwardness, at least when the period of extensive development is over. But these types of considerations should, of course, not be viewed only as the intrigues of class enemies; it would be much more useful to cleanse them of certain ideological overtones and promptly utilize them in practice.

In connection with the question of "natural" mechanisms of socioeconomic development, it is relevant to mention yet another problem which has been posed and examined in different variants in the West. I am referring to the limits of what is possible and the consequences of radical intervention in social reality during the historical process. An analogy with the global ecological problem area comes to mind. The idea that the processes occurring in nature and natural systems must be approached with extreme caution, remembering that radical intervention in them means catastrophic or at least unpredictable results, has become an axiom of contemporary ecological consciousness. Should social and historical consciousness not be raised to the same level? According to Marxist theory, social development is a natural-historical process and a more complex one than natural processes. And systems operating in it are also more complex than natural systems. Is it not logical to conclude that the course of development of society and self-regulation of economic mechanisms should be treated with even greater caution than processes which occur in nature? Could it be that man's role in history should, among other things, be recognizing and implementing this truth? Historical experience confirms that attempts at global transformations, which inevitably are based on consideration of only a small part of the countless multitude of relationships and sometimes on nothing but pure enthusiasm or fanaticism, generally lead to the most surprising and frequently negative results. Let us recall M.S. Gorbachev's words regarding what ignoring objective economic laws and social processes occurring in the countryside in combination with the administrative-command system of party-state leadership led to in the period of collectivization.

The conclusion from what has been said is obvious: global project mongering and incompetent intervention in the natural-historical process should be avoided in the social sphere to an even greater degree than in the

natural sphere, and the experimental method should be used to the greatest extent possible. In our country this idea has now received the right of final affirmation and is being realized.

Caution and a reasonable and competent attitude toward socioeconomic reality and the historical process are necessary because, among other reasons, their natural course is generally far from straightforward and has many variants. And the well-being and now even the very existence of mankind may depend on what variant is chosen. In this connection, it is worth mentioning one danger which usually remains in the shadows even though attention has been repeatedly drawn to it, especially in the West. I am referring to the threat of total control over human thought and behavior and manipulation of them, which the accelerating development of science and technology makes more realistic. The predetermined molding of consciousness by means of genetic engineering, psychotropic therapy, surgical techniques, and standardized use of micro-electronic indoctrination may soon become feasible in practice. In the fairly near future equipment and technology may not only prove to be the basis for flourishing democratic and humanitarian forms, but also open up very sinister prospects for development of supercentralist social systems which take full advantage of these possibilities. The choice among these paths will depend on whose hands the technology of the future is in—whether it is under real democratic control or in the hands of a narrow group of people whose intentions and orientation are impossible to guess in advance. In the latter case it is possible that there may be no turning back. Here is another argument in favor of consistent and, most importantly, real democratization and the introduction (in life rather than on paper) of public control and self-management. Numerous warnings of this threat are contained in sociopolitical commentary and scientific research (A. Gorts and others) as well as in the long-standing tradition of the literary antiutopia. The novels of Zamyatin, Huxley, and Orwell, the less well-known but no less brilliant novel by Nabokov "Invitation to a Beheading," and many others have a great deal of humanistic potential and constantly draw attention to the danger which is threatening.

And, finally, the last question—what are the roots of hypertrophied criticism of Western ideas, on the one hand, and of the extremely morbid attitude toward criticism against ourselves, on the other? The political-administrative aspects of the phenomenon being examined are understood; let us recall the social and ideological causes. Because of one-sided, guided indoctrination during the period of the cult of personality and the period of stagnation, whole generations of people grew up who were genuinely convinced that they possessed the final truth and that we are higher and better than others in all parameters. The new thinking is incompatible with social narcissism. Progress toward universal accord and happiness on the earth demands not only clean hands but also a reasonable attitude toward criticism.

A great deal has changed in our time. More and more rarely do we don the garb of universal critics and

supreme arbitrators and more and more often do we appeal for all-out expansion of criticism and acknowledge its profound usefulness. But one must know how to listen to criticism not only from friends but from enemies as well. Restructuring cannot fail to touch on this problem too.

We are of course not speaking of following the path which the capitalist West call us to. Just the opposite: a reasonable attitude toward criticism and the ability to derive benefit from it will allow us to implement restructuring more quickly, achieve high socioeconomic effectiveness, overcome shortcomings, and realize our ideals.

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#### All the Same, What Comes Next?

18060004o Moscow SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE  
ISSLEDOVANIYA in Russian  
No 1, Jan-Feb 88 (signed to press 18 Jan 88) pp 115-118

[Article by M.A. Maksimov under the rubric "Letters to the Editor"]

[Text] The journal has been watching the subject of alcohol use and the struggle against drunkenness and alcoholism for a long time (see, for example: [Source 2]). Today, when a broad and decisive attack has begun on this front, any article provokes an interested reader reaction. We received an especially large number of responses to the article by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences V.B. Olshanskiy entitled "It's Begun, But What Comes Next?" (No 1, 1987). Most of the authors of the letters which came to the editorial office agree with the evaluation of the causes of the widespread predilection for alcoholic beverages. Let us briefly recall V.B. Olshanskiy's conclusions. Alcoholism used to perform the function of compensating for gaps in social organization. Production of alcoholic beverages brought a tidy



sum into the budget. The disproportion between the growing reserves of free time and opportunities to use it reasonably was compensated for by drinking. The "bottle" performed the function of a kind of "universal currency" in an implicit exchange which covered the shortcomings both in organization of labor and in the services sphere. In this way, a real contradiction existed: although broad use of alcohol undermines the economic, social, and moral foundations of society, in stagnant conditions of a social system it helps preserve the system and there arise groups objectively interested in developing the demand for alcohol.

But V.B. Olshanskiy's answer to the question "But What Comes Next?" does not satisfy the authors of the letters. The choice of a position, L.M. Ovrutskiy (Moscow) justifiably emphasizes, is determined "by the attitude toward sobriety as a strategic goal of antialcohol policy." At the same time, however, let us yield the floor to Candidate of Historical Sciences V.M. Lovchev from Kazan: while he thoroughly reveals the reasons for drunkenness, the author of the article "wrongly assesses the internal structure of the alcohol problem and its place among other problems now facing our society. In discussing drunkenness and alcoholism V.B. Olshanskiy only once used the concept 'sobriety' ('extremists of sobriety'). Does the author really not know that only sobriety is an alternative to drunkenness and alcoholism. The trouble is not so much that drunkenness has gone 'underground.' Sobriety has not become the norm of life." (Incidentally, the author discussed the letter at a meeting of the city's Phoenix Sobriety Club. We are in fact speaking of people who know the problem in detail). By sidestepping the subject indicated, V.B. Olshanskiy missed many important questions: the need for alcohol, the drinking culture, methods of struggle against drunkenness, and above all the role of all kinds of restrictions and prohibitions. The problems listed (and the letters to the editor confirm this once again) are crucial in antialcohol policy.

Is the need for alcohol a psychological one or do social factors play a decisive role here? Readers expressed various points of view on this fundamental question. L.M. Ovrutskiy believes: "The process of becoming an alcoholic, in addition to everything else (this refers to socioeconomic conditions—editor), is subject to its own relatively independent 'autonomous' logic, based on the narcotic nature of alcohol." In commenting on the responses V.B. Olshanskiy substantiates the idea that this approach is naturalistic. The social definition of alcohol cannot be derived only from its chemical properties. The latter is manifested in the fact "that people begin to drink by overcoming their natural aversion to the physical and natural qualities of alcoholic drinks." The complex and ambiguous combination of social and natural in the question under study obviously compelled Candidate of Economic Sciences Ye.A. Maslov (Moscow) to suggest that the editors "open a debate on the journal's pages: 'Alcohol: For and Against.' Why are we always against it? Let medical experts, biologists,

psychologists, economists, sociologists, opponents and supporters, 'fans' and abstainers speak. Let them state their opinions on this social problem openly and honestly (without looking over their shoulders at the 'higher-ups')." Well then, let us consider this publication the start of a broad debate and appeal to those who want to continue it.

But if we speak to the point, the author has implicitly expressed an idea which we are afraid to say aloud. In the eyes of many, many people the use of alcohol is considered valuable. This stereotype which is by no means acknowledged by everyone was formed over the centuries and has received ideological-artistic grounds, so to speak, in world literature and art (another line existed parallel to it—one that exposes it as a destructive predilection). The above-mentioned circumstance must be taken into account, just as the fact that social values are not replaced by order but can only be supplanted with other values. Of course, the "shot glass" may and frequently does become an end in itself, shutting out the whole rest of the world for the drunk. At the stage of alcoholism, that is, the disease, the question of choosing life priorities no longer exists at all. However, the predilection for alcohol and its large-scale use is related above all to the fact that alcoholic drinks perform functions which are socially significant to the individual. Let us refer in this connection to the results of a study by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences A.I. Rybakov from Yelaburga (1,562 workers under 30 years of age were surveyed in 1984-1985).<sup>1</sup> The reasons for consuming alcoholic beverages are distributed in the following way: orientation to those around (they act like everyone else)—89 percent; the need to get conversation going—68 percent; traditions—64 percent; the possibility of solving daily and life problems—53 percent; to remove psychological pressure—49 percent; nothing better to do—44 percent; the possibility of getting in a better mood—43 percent; to stifle a feeling of tiredness—39 percent; to get rid of a feeling of constraint and embarrassment—31 percent; a desire to seem self-sufficient and independent—25 percent (respondents could mark several positions). As we see, alcohol performs a whole spectrum of functions—from emotional compensation to a means of including the individual in the role structure. It is notable that the direct purpose of alcoholic drinks, "getting drunk," proved to be less attractive. Only 13 percent of the respondents marked as a reason "the desire to try it, curiosity) and only 7 percent referred to habit, while no one at all chose the position "drinking for its own sake."

Here are recent data, obtained in June 1987 by V.P. Shelkopyas in Krasnodar Kray (4,635 people were surveyed). Today in public consciousness the attitude toward alcohol is quite critical. Nonetheless, a significant number of the respondents are certain that drunkenness is certainly an evil, but is permissible on a holiday—what kind of feast is it without a bottle? Alcohol is considered an essential attribute of celebrating the New Year by 44 percent of the respondents, at a

wedding—by 41 percent; on a birthday—by 28 percent; at a burial and funeral banquet—by 25 percent; on Soviet holidays—22 percent; and when someone is inducted into the army—17 percent (those surveyed could mark several positions).

Analysis of the value-meaning functions of consumption of alcohol seems to be a prelude to studying the social significance of sobriety. At first glance this question may seem self-evident: overcoming drunkenness means affirming sobriety. But this is how A.S. Tyurin from Ust-Kut poses the problem: "If we are fighting *against* consumption of alcoholic beverages, then in fact the fewer binges, the greater sobriety. But suppose that the longed-for time has now come and the 'dry law' has become the norm for everyone. What is this sobriety supposed to do for me? You can't touch it with your hands like a bottle. You can't buy a ticket to the movies or dance performance with it. In my opinion, 'against' should always be subordinate to 'for' in any serious cause. Otherwise, the victory will be a transparent one or even worse—any means to achieve it will be justified by the nobility of the goal. By leaving drunkenness behind we not only get a good feeling from having 'started,' but above all we also acquire a sober view of life in which a multitude of problems which need to be solved at once are immediately identified." The author justifiably focuses attention on the circumstance that sobriety must not be turned into an end in itself in the struggle against alcohol. Undoubtedly physical health and a healthy way of life, of which sobriety is an inseparable part, represents one of the fundamental human values. However, a person's life activity certainly cannot be reduced to physical existence. The condition of sobriety which is natural to human nature acts as a prerequisite for developing and realizing the individual's numerous talents and inclinations. In other words, the dispute between the opponents and supporters of alcohol consumption (although, it is believed, there are no supporters in our country, only those who are temporarily confused) concerns the question: what is a full existence? Can it only be achieved on the basis of sobriety or does it include moderate, social drinking?

Judging from the mail, people are still not sufficiently clear on this problem. Some readers, like Ye.A. Maslov, for example, unconditionally acknowledge the right of social alcoholic consumption to exist. And our correspondent refers to well-known writers and figures of science and culture who have "never refused to drink a little good, ordinary wine or other strong drink." But most of those who sent responses take a sharply negative position on moderate consumption. "How is it possible without betraying common sense to defend social drinking and at the same time reject drunkenness?" exclaims L.M. Ovrutskiy. The reasons for such a reaction are laid out in detail in V.M. Lovchev's letter. "The preservation of social drinking (a society's lack of sobriety) is spontaneous and reproduces drunkenness and alcoholism on an ever-increasing scale. First, it 'preserves' the present sum of millions of alcoholics. It is precisely from among those

who drink socially that the ranks of alcoholics are replenished. That is the second thing. Thirdly, it is precisely those who drink moderately who foster the rising generation in the spirit of alcohol consumption. They foster the regular practice of drinking parties and drunken holidays. And the personal example, as everyone knows, is much more persuasive to young people than a hundred high-quality lectures."

The arguments cited must certainly be taken seriously. However, it would be wrong to view social drinking only as a source of drunkenness and alcoholism. First of all the link between the phenomena mentioned is not such an unequivocal and straightforward one as appears from the lines just cited. A norm (even though an unnatural one from present progressive positions) in itself cannot be turned into a pathology. And there is more. Moderate drinking performs much broader functions than the role of "supplier of cadres" of drunkards and alcoholics. It was already mentioned above that it represents a converted form of realization of cultural needs.

Viewing social drinking exclusively through the prism of drunkenness and alcoholism oversimplifies the alcohol problem and restricts the field of practical activity to prohibitions and propaganda which intimidates people with the horrors of the "green serpent" [delirium tremens]. Moreover, even the extreme forms—drunkenness and alcoholism—have a complex internal structure, are fundamentally differentiated relative to the sociocultural characteristics of people who like to drink, and change significantly under the influence of particular historical conditions. L.N. Fedotova from Moscow cites interesting data on this in her letter. She compared the results of two surveys of persons who ended up in a medical sobering-up station, that is, those who make up the main bastion of drunkenness. The first survey was done in 1971 in one large and several medium-sized and small cities and urban-type communities ( $n = 1,514$  people). The second was done in 1983-1984 in Chernovtsy and Lvov oblasts (for more details see: [Source 3]). Here is how the composition of the clients of the medical sobering-up station changed in terms of age: under 18 years, in 1971—1 percent and in 1984—3.6 percent; 18-24 years of age, in 1971—11.0 percent and in 1984—30.2 percent; 25-29 years old, in 1971—9 percent and in 1984—23.4 percent; 30-39 years old—35 percent and 19 percent; 40-49 years old—31 percent and 14.9 percent; 50 years and older—13 percent and 8.9 percent. It is striking that in less than 15 years the proportion of young people almost doubled. It proved to be more difficult to correlate data in terms of type of occupation. In 1971 the social-professional structure of persons who ended up in a sobering-up station appeared so: workers—73 percent; employees of the state apparatus and the services sphere—8 percent; engineering-technical workers—5 percent; intelligentsia engaged in production—2 percent; pupils and students—1 percent; pensioners—6 percent; and persons not involved in socially useful labor—5 percent. Slightly different criteria for the breakdown were used in the second survey. But on the whole the conclusion may

be drawn that the proportion of workers decreased slightly and the proportion of students, pensioners, and persons not involved in socially useful labor rose substantially—their number reached one-third. In other words, extreme forms of drunkenness intensified in spheres on the periphery of social control.

The results cited induce us once again to look carefully at the problem of prohibitions and restrictions as a method of the antialcohol struggle and to evaluate the present situation with alcohol consumption. Not one of the readers' letters ignored these questions. Drunkenness has been fundamentally restricted and "fewer people have begun to drink," states V.M. Lovchev, "but to assert that substantially fewer people are drinking (and especially that the number of active abstainers has increased)—even the most inveterate optimist does not dare draw such a conclusion." The results of an interval study done by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences V.Ye. Khvoshchev (Chelyabinsk) also confirm the author's conclusion. The first survey was conducted in 1985 and the second—in 1987. Although during those 2 years the level of alcohol consumption of the population of Chelyabinsk Oblast declined substantially, the correlation between "nondrinkers," "people who do not drink much," and "people who drink often" remained unchanged (the classification was constructed on the basis of data of the respondents' self-appraisal). This was the proportion: 14 percent—nondrinkers; 82 percent—people who do not drink much, and 4 percent—people who drink often. A balance—50 percent as compared to 50 percent—was also maintained between the supporters and opponents of introducing a "dry law."<sup>2</sup> The cited materials and published statistical information confirm that qualitative changes have not occurred in alcohol consumption and there is a long way to go before the situation turns around. One of the reasons is that drunkenness has gone "underground." Readers agree with this conclusion of V.B. Olshanskiy, but with certain reservations. L.M. Ovrutskiy poses the question: "What is the point the author is making in this thesis? It is relevant here, in my opinion, to recall the 'law of the irreversibility of the harm from alcohol consumption' formulated by the well known publicist S.N. Shevardin. In the 'underground' one can drink and sing, fight with members of one's household, and distill home brew, but one cannot 'hide' mortality and injuries, crime and divorce, violations of labor discipline, and degradation of the individual. Has drunkenness really 'become invulnerable to social control'? Not at all. Forms of social control such as restriction on the sites and times of alcohol trade and higher prices for alcoholic beverages must not be dismissed. (It cannot be ruled out that the sale of sugar, yeast, and other products used in making home brew, colognes, and the like will have to be regulated in the not-too-distant future). Ultimately, family control exists. One can dispute its effectiveness, but it was observed long ago that men who like to drink quite often refer to their wives as the 'obstacle.'" I think that the question of

the limits and mechanisms of social control as applied to the current situation with alcohol and in the future demand most serious study.

V.B. Olshanskiy's thesis that the success of the cause depends utterly and completely on the fastest possible introduction of a complex of revolutionary transformations which is today designated as the 'strategy of acceleration' also brought firm objections from some readers. In explaining his position, the author writes: "The potential of the emergency measures which are now being used in the struggle against drunkenness is very great, but not infinite. It is limited because they do not change either the properties of alcohol or the social characteristics of the people who use it." The comment is undoubtedly a true one. Nonetheless, the readers' alarm is understandable: even if we assume that restrictions are not an adequately effective step, that does not mean that special measures can be rejected and progressive advances in the economy or the social sphere alone can be relied upon.

So, what should the strategy for further action be? This question is posed in almost every letter. At the same time, however, many express a sense of alarm over progress in the struggle against drunkenness and alcoholism. In reality, drunkenness has been substantially restricted, and this is confirmed above all by statistical reports (alcohol consumption, mortality, traumatism, and crime owing to drunkenness have declined). However, there are other alarming facts. A large-scale check done recently by the Committee of Party Control under the CPSU Central Committee showed that production of liquor and vodka items and especially brandy has risen substantially in some republics and regions of the country. A great deal of "rotgut wine" has been delivered to the trade system in violation of state discipline and outside the plan. In some places all restrictions on the sale of alcoholic beverages have been lifted. All that has led "to deterioration of work to prevent and eradicate drunkenness and alcoholism. Drunk people have once again begun to appear on the streets of cities and villages. In the first six months of last year 4.2 million people were arrested in a state of intoxication. The number of people brought to medical sobering-up stations and drunken drivers who cause accidents has not decreased. In certain regions of the country discipline has deteriorated, cases of binges during production and especially in daily life have become more frequent, and crime owing to drunkenness is not declining. The distilling of home brew and speculation in alcoholic beverages has increased and drug addiction and the use of all kinds of substitutes have become widespread" [Source 1]. And here is one more fact. Our country's population "consumed" an additional "surplus" million tons of sugar during the year. If we assume that it all went for home brew, then it comes out to eight bottles for each inhabitant a year. Converted into the present price of vodka, that is 20 billion rubles. "That was precisely the country's annual income from the vodka monopoly before the ukase was adopted" [Source 4].



What do these sad statistics prove? Not just the irresponsibility of certain officials and the lack of conscientiousness of some citizens. The actions of those people and of others fill a vacuum which measures of the antialcohol policy, above all sociocultural ones, should have filled and did not. That misfortune is reparable if, of course, we base our actions not on reveries but on realities. But the situation is such that reliance on prohibitions and restrictions has yielded its results, at times marked ones, but only in a certain area—the scope of alcohol abuse has declined. But it is impossible to control the overall situation with alcohol using such methods. First, because even though drunkenness entails major losses, it has still managed to adapt itself. That means that we must look for additional new forms of influence. Secondly, the measures mentioned have not affected and, moreover, were hardly able to significantly shake the position of social drinking. For in fact the current ceiling on the production and sale of alcoholic beverages presupposes, or rather preserves a place precisely for, moderate consumption. It is now difficult to drink often and as much as one wants, but to drink moderately—not always, but it is possible. The store is open from 1400 hours. In other words, by constricting drunkenness and alcoholism (although there is still a large field of activity here), we have thereby come face to face with the problem of “social” drinking and moderate drinking. But taking into account that the latter is the ground on which alcohol abuse grows, this problem should become one of the main and perhaps the main guidepost of the antialcohol policy.

Our readers also write about the need to pose the question that way. “Today we have taken after precisely the ‘roots’ of the ‘tree,’ the social-drinking traditions from which the ‘treetops’ of drunkenness and alcoholism grow,” L.M. Ovrutskiy emphasizes. “Surmounting them can follow (both logically and chronologically) only after surmounting social drinking,” V.M. Lovchev is convinced. The author, it is true, believes that to do that the prohibitions must also extend to moderate drinkers. It seems that we must discuss the expediency of these measures within the framework of the question of the general strategy of the antialcohol policy at the present stage. And that strategy, let us once again stress, needs to be fundamentally corrected. For if it is restricted to measures which are effective only within certain limits and are not suited to performing tasks of a different level, the situation may really become much more difficult. Opposition is growing not only to the antialcohol policy but also to the transformations being carried out in the economy and in the social and ideological spheres. We cannot overlook such a possibility.

The main goals and directions of the antialcohol policy are defined in the party and state documents of the last 2 years. But its concrete guidelines, broken up into stages, methods, and forms, certainly require serious and extensive discussion. The letters the editorial office received contain many valuable ideas. But the main result of this readers’ skull session by mail is perhaps an

understanding that we must reject the stereotypes generated by the first and still modest successes in the great cause which has begun. Drunkenness has still not demonstrated all its adaptive possibilities and not revealed all its secrets. We face lengthy laborious research and practical work.

#### Footnotes

1. The editorial office proposes to publish the article with a detailed analysis of the results of the study mentioned in one of the next issues.
2. The editorial office proposes to publish the article with a detailed analysis of the results of the study mentioned in one of the journal's issues this year.

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